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CASE A APOLLO BLINDS LIMITED 
The franchisor 
1. Background 
Apollo Blinds was established by James and Robert 
Macneil in the late 1960s. They intended to run the 
business as a franchise system as early as possible. 
Franchising began in 1975. Prior to this date, the 
brothers manufactured and sold window blinds through shops 
in the Glasgow area, building up a business model which 
could be franchised. Even in the earliest days before 
full business-format franchising began, the Macneils were 
using agents who sold on commission from home using 
newspaper advertisements. The information on Apollo which 
follows is based on an interview with Nan Stevenson, the 
current Franchise Manager. 
In addition to Apollo, the Macneils operate two 
related businesses. Eclipse Limit4d is used to sell 
components and materials to franchisees and to other 
window-blind companies. Macneil Property Limited arranges 
property leases and store-design services for franchisees. 
Both companies have been developed to fulfill particular 
needs of the Apollo franchise system. 
Apollo now has around 100 franchisees. The average 
annual sales turnover of a franchisee is 9100,000 at the 
time of writing. There are around 200 direct employees at 
the Apollo and Eclipse factories in Glasgow. Franchisees 
are located mainly in Scotland, Northern Ireland and the 
north of England. The company wishes to expand into 
southern England and Eire, and has set a current target of 
250 franchisees. 
*1 
Apollo is no longer involved in retailing having 
franchised its last company shop in 1982. Franchisees 
just retail blinds for the first four weeks of operation, 
and then gradually build up facilities to manufacture 
standard louvre, venetian, and roller blinds. Special 
orders are tailor made by the Apollo factory for 
franchisees. The manufacturing side of the shops has been 
added since 1985 when Apollo began to extend its 
communication lines with its expansion southwards. With 
manufacturing, it is often worth while for franchisees to 
appoint sub-agents who sell on a one-third mark-up on 
costs. In addition to manufacture and retail sales, the 
franchisee repairs and cleans blinds and may supply trade 
customers such as architects or department stores. 
Mrs. Stevenson emphasises that franchisees are 
expected to 
' 
operate from premises which are wholly devoted 
to their Apollo operations, although there are a few cases 
of shop-within-shop display areas in department stores. 
Fractional franchising is not permitted as Apollo prefers 
its franchisees to be completely devoted to the business. 
I was told that there would not be time for a franchisee 
to have other business interests if he were properly 
performing for Apollo. However, multiple franchises are 
permitted: some franchisees have more than one territory. 
Once a franchisee proves himself, he may be offered 
additional, usually contiguous, territories. The ideal 
profile of a typical franchisee is very much that of a 
local entrepreneur who maintains daily involvement with 
his business. 
The franchisor is a founder member of the British 
Franchise Association and of the Irish Franchise 
Association. The franchisees have an association. 
Apollo has numerous competitors such as Perma Blind, 
Luxoflex and Chris Craft. 
wherever it is located. 
2. Nature of the franchise 
3 
It remains market leader 
An Apollo franchise confers the sole manufacturing 
and marketing rights to the Apollo-branded product and 
service within an agreed territory. The franchisor 
expects complete commitment from franchisees, in 
particular with regard to maintaining the corporate image 
and service standards. In return, the franchisor sees his 
obligations as providing centralised marketing, operating 
property management services, and giving general technical 
and managerial back-up. Apollo offers a full business- 
format (manual-based) franchise. 
There is pre-trade training in sales, operations and 
administration at Apollo headquarters. Following thist a 
new franchisee spends his first week of operation with an 
operations manager supervising his activities. 
Thereafter, Apollo provides occasional training as it is 
required. Training is at the franchisor's expense 
excluding the franchiseeps subsistence costs. 
In addition to training, an Apollo franchise provides 
manuals covering parts ordering and stocking, 
manufacturing of standard blinds, sales methods, and 
business administration. There is no direct financial 
help given to franchisees but there are packages available 
from major banks like the National Westminster Bank and 
the Royal Bank of Scotland. Banks appear more willing to 
lend to franchised compared with independent new 
businesses. A further important part of the structure of 
the franchise is the acquisition of high-street property, 
which is then rented to the franchisee through Macneil 
Properties. Shopfitting fees are levied at cost. A 
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franchisee's investment in his premises creates an highly 
specific asset. 
National advertising is the franchisor's 
responsibility for which he levies a 3% charge on the 
retail price of all materials and finished blinds. Local 
advertising is largely at the franchisee's discretion. 
The trading links of the Apollo franchise system are 
summarised in Figure A. The direction of sales is shown 
by an arrowhead for each link in Figure A. Dotted lines 
show links which are subject to franchisee choice (for 
example, over whether to use sub-agents). Interestingly, 
the retailer gives up his normal freedom to refuse to 
sell. This is because his contract with the franchisor 
requires him to pursue all sales. Finally, the figure 
shows that all parts must be bought from Eclipse by the 
franchisee: he cannot shop around. 
Contract 
3(i) The Asreement 
Apollo uses an extensive Franchise Agreement. There 
now follows a simple summary of the principal contractual 
clauses. A copy of the Agreement is available for 
inspection should this be required. 
The Agreement defines the rights to operate the 
system and use the trade name along with the know-how 
which is to be transferred to the franchisee. The 
business premises are also defined allowing Apollo to 
specify a property to be leased from Macneil Property in 
an attached schedule. A territory is fixed for the 
franchisee. The term of the Agreement is set, usually for 
five years, and may be renewed at a cost equal to 10% of 
the then current initial fee. 
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The Agreement sets out the franchisor's and 
franchisee's obligations. At this point the contract 
looks decidedly one sided with a ratio of 20 franchisee to 
seven franchisor obligations. The franchisor undertakes 
to provide know-how manuals, facilities for consultation, 
training, display systems, corporate-image materials like 
stationery at a specified cost, and national advertising 
support. The franchisor's levies for ýadvertising and 
administration are set. The franchisee is obliged, among 
other things, to preserve the company image by using only 
its trademark, to provide a suitable vehicle, to use only 
company materials, to allow Apollo to vet employees, to 
seek written permission for other business interests, to 
attend promptly on customers, and to refrain from 
supplying other franchisees. 
The franchisor will pay for training excluding travel 
and subsistence cost but retains the rights to insist on 
particular items of training and to terminate the contract 
if, during training, the franchisee is discovered to be 
unsuitable. The franchisee is required to pass on 
property rights in his innovations to the franchisor and 
to accept changes in the know-how, to pay a specified 
lump-sum franchise fee, to allow franchisor vetting of his 
advertising, and to accept that trade marks are the 
franchisor's property. The franchisee agrees to place 
local newspaper advertisements as directed by Apollo., 
There is no interest rate set to apply to overdue payments 
should these occur. 
The franchisee may sell his business subject to 
franchisor approval of the purchaser although a fee of 50% 
of the then current franchise fee will be charged; the 
franchisor will grant a new term of not less than three 
years. If the franchisee should die then there can be a 
simple transfer to his beneficiary. If a beneficiary 
wishes to sell the business the the franchisor will 
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provide and charge for a manager for up to six months to 
enable the sale to proceed. If there is no sale then the 
franchisor has the right to buy back at market value less 
20% with a disputed valuation going to compulsory 
arbitration. Termination may be for any breach of the 
contract but the emphasis is on bankruptcy or disclosure 
of information to competitors as grounds for this. 
Following termination the franchisee will cease operating 
under the trade name and will not compete with the 
business in his old territory. 
The franchisor states that his failure to exercise a 
right on any occasion will not constitute its abandonment. 
He also states that the Agreement is complete and will not 
be altered by oral undertaking or by custom and practice. 
If a condition of the contract is found to be contrary to 
statute law then it is severed and the remainder of the 
contract will stand if and only if the franchisor so 
wishes. He can end the economic relationship if the law 
erodes its value to him but preserve it in the face of a 
lost clause if this is his wish. 
There is a provision for compulsory arbitration. In 
Scotland, a mutually agreed arbiter's rulings will be 
binding or, failing such an agreement, the rulings of an 
arbiter appointed by the President of the British 
Franchise Association will be accepted. It is important 
to note that this rules out costly litigation. 
Arbitration is of course not costless. Liability to pay 
for it is not defined in the Agreement. 
Finallyt schedules give opportunities to specify 
variable details referred to in the clauses, such as the 
franchise fee and the term of the Agreement. 
I 
3(ii) Implicit aspects of the contract 
The overall contract between Apollo and its 
franchisees contains implicit aspects as well as the 
written clauses of the Agreement. 
It is Apollo policy to require franchisees to rent 
their properties from Macneil Property. This is an 
implicit aspect of the contract in that the Agreement does 
not require this, although the specific premises are 
indicated in a schedule. Enforcement is through the 
market sanction of withdrawal by the franchisor of the 
offer to enter the Agreement in the event of 
noncompliance. In shortl the franchisee is offered an 
all-or-nothing choice. Either he rents from Macneil and 
is allowed to join Apollo, or he is excluded if he insists 
on obtaining property elsewhere. 
It 
The obvious function of this property link is to 
enable franchisees to obtain high-street leases when they 
would appear bad risks to property owners without the 
franchisor's backing. This raises the question of why the 
link is made obligatory. It is also possible that it acts 
as a device to keep goodwill in the hands of the 
franchisor, although this function can be performed by a 
device like Clause 15 of the Agreement (where post- 
termination competition is limited). It may also act to 
render investments in the site fittings worthless to a 
franchisee should he leave the business. The final 
possibility exists that the link is a means for extracting 
pure profit from the franchisee subject to leaving him a 
normal business return. In short, it may be a device to 
extract economic rent. When interviewed Apollo indicated 
that it was the first reason, helping franchisees to find 
property, which explained the link. 
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A second implicit aspect of the contract is the 
expectation of franchisees that the franchisor will 
develop the business. The franchisor is well aware that 
failure to promote the growth of the business through, for 
example, advertising and product innovation would result 
in the loss of existing franchisees at times of contract 
renewal. Again, there is a market discipline on the 
franchisor. 
A third implicit aspect concerns the sales territory 
referred to in the Agreement. Early on this was found to 
be impractical to operate as customers entered branches 
away from their homes. Franchisees can sell anywhere they 
now wish, but must promote themselves only in their own 
area. This is an understanding not written down anywhere. 
A final implicit aspect is the acceptance by 
franchisees'of transfer prices for tied-in sales. These 
terms are not specified in the Agreement. Excessive 
prices could lead to a loss of existing franchisees and to 
difficulties in recruiting. However, the pricing of tied- 
in sales gives another possible avenue for rent extraction 
by the franchisor. 
3(iii) Enforcement and monitoring 
The franchisor monitors the franchisees in a number 
of ways. Weekly sales returns are made based on a system 
in which copies of all. sales receipts are sent to Apollo 
headquarters. In addition, costs are monitored implicitly 
from these returns as Apollo has a good idea of material 
requirements for the sales which are reported. Apollo 
raises most of its continuing fees from franchisees by 
means of a mark-up on its product sales. It is therefore 
important to prevent purchases from outside of the 
company. Arithmetical discrepancies between inputs and 
outputs would alert Apollo to outside purchases. 
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Correct reporting of sales is encouraged by a 
centralised complaints procedure. If a franchisee avoided 
reporting sales, there would be the danger that a customer 
complaint to Apollo would alert them to his practice. He 
would be in breach of his contract and would risk losing 
his investment in the business. 
Daily observation of 
undertaken by Apollo. Only 
from a franchisee will I 
Operations managers exist 
monitor and they are few in 
for England and one for all 
franchisees' conduct 
a problem arising or a 
ead to a visit from 
to give help rather 







Mrs. Stevenson knows only very few cases of dispute 
with franchisees. Occasionally there are franchisees who 
are discovered purchasing products other than from Apollo 
or Eclipse. ' Sometimes, franchisees run into financial 
difficulties. The company prefers not to rush into 
quoting contracts at people but always tries exhortation 
first, following this with a fine for a breach if this 
seems appropriate. In extreme cases, termination would be 
considered. In Apollo's history, breach of contract has 
been resolved twice by fines and in only three cases has 
it led to termination. The commonest cause of thee 
solutions has been nonpayment of bills. 
A few franchisees have either left the system, 
usually by selling their businesses to new franchisees 
approved by Apollo. No figures for this are quoted by the 
franchisor. Some of these sales have been at Apollo's 
suggestion as a means of settling disputes. 
Apollo emphasises its wish to avoid legal process in 
its dealings with franchisees. There is a concern not to 
develop a reputation for oppressive litigation and the 
company appears to prefer to err in the other direction. 
to 
This history in this area and statements made in interview 
are consistent with the provision for compulsory and 
binding arbitration in the Agreement. 
4. Why franchise? 
Mrs. Stevenson believes that the major advantage 
Apollo offers a franchisee is it brand name. The name is 
well recognised by architects and ordinary members of the 
public. They will often just look for the nearest Apollo 
branch if thinking of fitting blinds. Other advantages 
mentioned in interview were a debt-factoring service for 
larger account clients, Apollo's marketing expertise, and 
the financial package offered by major banks to Apollo 
franchisees. It was also felt that franchisees would be 
supported in times of poor market conditions in that 
business advice would be available and some rescheduling 
of bills would be possible. 
Compared with managers of company shops, franchisees 
are thought to be more entrepreneurially alert to business 
opportunities. I was told specifically that "The quality 
of person is very much better than any manager we could 
afford to employ". It is felt that this is due to the 
franchisee's greater commitment to the business as he has 
his own funds sunk in it. If the market becomes tight, 
for example, the franchisee would be much more active in 
seeking new business. 
Compared with selling the product through any retail 
outlets, product debasement is believed to be avoided by 
the franchise arrangement. Apollo wishes to offer a total 
service of supplys fit and service. Furthermore# it 
wishes this total package to be perceived as being of the 
highest quality. Without control over outlets, quality 
would suffer and brand image would slip. Even if the 
quality began at a high level, individual retailers would 
have incentive to sell the product but skimp on servicep 
free-riding on the efforts of others. Either the 
franchise system or company shops will correct this 
problem. Interestingly, the contract refers to the 
avoidance of product debasement. 
Mrs. Stevenson perceives no capital-raising 
advantages for Apollo from franchising. Apollo would have 
"No problem in raising capital to open shops". In fact, 
it is thought likely that the system gives advantages to 
franchisees. This is an interesting result as it runs 
counter to much received wisdom among franchisors. ' 
Monitoring costs are thought to be very low compared 
with a system of company-owned shops. I was told: "There 
is no way the UK and Hire could be covered with four 
operations managers outside of a franchise system". The 
franchise arrShKement gives the benefit of tying 
everybody's fortunes together in an incentive-compatible 
system. Effort-monitoring problems therefore recede. In 
the Apollo system, problems of honest reporting are well 
controlled through arithmetical and complaints checks. 
Also, a franchisee has a lot to lose if he is discovered 
trying to cheat. 
5. Fees and returns 
At the time of writing, Apollo charges an initial 
lump-sum franchise fee of 14,000. Franchisees may also 
reserve the option of expanding into contiguous 
territories for 500 once they have proved themselves. 
Renewal fees are 10% of the franchise fee. The franchisor 
spends money when setting up a new franchisee and does not 
aim to make a profit out of the franchise fee. Total set- 
up costs for the franchisee are approximately 220,000 as 
shown in Appendix A. Two-thirds of this figure could 
usually be borrowed from the banks. 
II 
Sales targets are not set for franchisees. This is 
considered unnecessary as both franchisor and franchisee 
profits are believed to increase with sales. Apollo is 
well satisfied with its profitability and is not 
considering changing its operating methods. In 
particular, there is no intention to forward integrate 
into retailing by opening company shops. The franchisor 
believes returns for franchisees are higher than they 
would receive if they operated outside of the franchise 
system. Appendix A also shows the franchisor's financial 
projections for a franchisee's first two years of trading. 
The figures are calculated on prices ruling in January 
1987 and show a weekly net profit of just over 2300 after 
two years, which amounts to a good return for a small 
businessman in retailing. The business is meant to be 
established by the second year. There is no separate wage 
calculation for the franchisee in the projections. The 
wage heading allows for one assistant and some casual help 
in the first year with additional help from the second 
year onwards. 
The franchisor levies no sales royalty but does 
charge 3% of the wholesale price of products for 
administration and 3% of the retail price for national 
advertising. Prices are taken to exclude VAT. 
There are tied-in sales. Products must be bought 
from Apollo or Eclipse, depending upon whether further 
assembly is required or not. The transfer prices are 8% 
higher than similar sales by Eclipse outside of the 
franchise system. Apollo is effectively levying an 8% 
royalty on competitive input costs. overall, pricing aims 
at a one-third mark-UP for franchisees on retailing and a 
further one-third for any manufacturing. There is a 
discount scheme which operates as a negative royalty. The 
discount applies to purchases by franchisees if annual 
sales exceed 37,000, which they certainly should. It 
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starts at 1% and rises by increments to 10% for annual 
sales of 600,000 or more. The franchisee can roughly 
recoup the franchisor's mark-up at the highest sales 
levels (the percentages apply to different bases). Apollo 
is clearly willing to exchange unit profit for volume on 
its tied sales. VAT is added to all fees charged by the 
franchisor and may be claimed back by the franchisee. 
No interest rate on overdue payments is specified by 
the franchisor in the Agreement. However, the franchisee 
agrees to abide by the credit terms offered by Apollo. 
There are no opportunities for new franchises in 
Scotland and Northern Ireland. The territorial allocation 
which implies saturation for the two areas was set many 
years ago and was based on Apollo's projections of market 
growth and production costs. Once set contractually, the 
pattern is aifficult to alter even if it were thought that 
new market conditions allowed further expansion. Apollo 
believes its coverage to be correct, given the performance 
levels of franchisees. 
The franchisees 
1. Franchisee A, 
AjL began as an Apollo franchisee in XXXX back in 
1980, having previously been in retail management 
elsewhere. He added a second Apollo franchise, XXX in 
XXXX, in 1986. The two franchises share a factory unit 
which manufactures venetian and louvre blinds. Materials, 
components and assemblies are always purchased from Apollo 
or Eclipse sources. There are three full-time, five part- 
time and two casual employees. 
At confirms the financial and structural details of 
the franchise system which Mrs. Stevenson reported. He 
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also agrees that it would not be practicable to run other 
business interests alongside his franchises. He sees his 
obligations as "Giving 100% loyalty and working in 
partnership with Apollo". In additiont he believes that 
he has a duty to report any other franchisee who appears 
to be letting down standards of service. Apollo is 
expected to give total support to his operations in terms 
of national promotion of the brand and availability for 
local consultations. 
The contents of the written contract are well 
understood. Furthermore, A, verifies Apollo's stated 
preference for avoiding litigious solutions to disputes, 
which are anyway described as rare. He thinks that Apollo 
"Bends over backwards to keep franchisees". They are more 
likely to exhort or to fine franchisees for breaches of 
contract. He knew of no use of the compulsory arbitration 
clause. It 
AiL confirms the strong understanding over renting 
premises from the franchisor. Interestingly, he gave me 
details of post-contract renegotiations which had occurred 
over rents. In his own case, the new XXXX premises had 
not initially performed as well as had been projected. 
Apollo had therefore agreed to reduce the rent it charged. 
This lends some support to the notion that control of the 
lease may allow extraction of economic rent by the 
franchisor: when returns are poor the cost of the lease 
falls. 
I was told that the major benefit of signing with 
Apollo is the brand image. Awareness of the brand is very 
high. A, reports conversations in which people refer to 
blinds as Apollos rather as they might call vacuum 
cleaners Hoovers. Reporting that his business returns are 
better than he feels he could obtain independently, he 
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emphasises that "It is definitely worth fitting in with 
Apollo". 
I met Ai at his XXXX shop. My observations were of a 
low-volume retail outlet trading on customer awareness 
that a full service is available. Apollo prices are 
certainly not the lowest. However, do-it-yourself 
installation or little-known installers are avoided. 
2. Franchisee At 
A2 set up the XXXX franchise in 1983, when an 
existing franchisee sold part of his territory. XXXX was 
added in 1985 and was bought from a franchisee who did not 
get on with Apollo ("Basically they did not like the 
man"). I met with A2 at XXXX and accompanied him on his 
business calls while we talked. over the course of the 
afternoon he serviced a blind, dealt enthusiastically with 
shop customers, fitted a blind, and measured for some new 
business. 
Each of his shops has its own workshop for 
manufacturing and servicing. At employs his son full time 
to run the XXXX business and has a further six part-time 
employees. In addition, he casually employs various 
fitters (who are mostly moonlighting firemen). Materials 
are mostly bought from Apollo although a small amount is 
bought from outside of the system contrary to the 
Agreement. In addition to Apollo productst curtain rails 
and velux roof-window blinds are sold "With Apollo's 
knowledge but not with their blessing". I was told that 
most shops have some small sideline of this sort. It is 
probably not worth the franchisor's time to police small- 
scale infringements of contract of this type. 
As confirms the details of the franchise system 
reported by Apollo. He asrees that there would not be 
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time to pursue significant other business interests 
alongside an Apollo franchise. He sees his principal 
obligation as making his business a success. Apollo is 
expected to maintain its current product quality and to 
provide general support. 
This franchisee is not instantly familiar with the 
content of the Franchise Agreement and believes that he 
should have paid more attention to it. He also verifies 
Apollo's preference for avoiding litigation and considers 
it likely that they would encourage a franchisee to sell 
his franchise if there were a serious dispute. A2 is 
aware only of minor disputes within the system. 
Occasionally there are arguments about franchisees buying 
products away from company lines. Franchisees sometimes 
wish to see more franchisor advertising, which may be an 
inevitable consequence of exacting a levy rather than 
linking franchisee contributions to the amount of 
advertising. There are "gripes" because Eclipse sells 
more cheaply to competitors. Generally, the long-term 
value to franchisees of remaining within the system 
enables Apollo to find managerial solutions to such 
disputes. 
A2 agrees that there is a strong understanding that 
franchisees should rent their premises from Macneil 
Property. He feels a little vulnerable as a result of 
this. One of his leases is due for renewal and the new 
rent which has been suggested seems high to him. He 
suspects this has happened because his shops have 
performed better than had been predicted in the original 
projections. 
The major benefit of signing with Apollo is again 
thought to be the brand image. A& comments "They really 
have the marketing right, customers choose us first even 
though we are not the cheapest". on his own, he believes 
I+ 
he would all too often be tempted into unnecessary price 
competition. 
A2 provided some useful insights into risk sharing in 
this franchise. Measurement errors are always borne by 
franchisees, who accordingly have a strong incentive to be 
careful. Apollo will only accept responsibility for 
faulty products which it supplies. In addition, the 
franchisee bears the risk of bad debts unless the customer 
qualifies for the debt-factoring service offered by 
Apollo. 
My observations whilst accompanying At during a 
fairly representative afternoon were again of a small- 
volume retail operation (albeit with trade customers) 
which trades on quality and not on price. He is extremely 
active in pursuing new business leads and finds his 
returns to be better than those he believes he could 
achieve if he were independent. 
3. Franchisee A3 
A3 obtained his franchise from an existing franchisee 
in 1982, having previously worked as a sales manager for a 
X= company. The previous franchisee's commitments 
became too extensive elsewhere and Apollo encouraged him 
to sell out. Although he only has one shop, A3 has 
appointed two agents who sell venetian blinds which he 
manufactures on a one-third mark-up on transfer prices. 
Both agents are within his territory as they are required 
to be. 
A3 has manufacturing and servicing facilities behind 
his shop. He employs his son full time in manufacturing 
and his wife works part t ime in the shop. A retired 
fireman is casually employed as a fitter. All main 
products come from Apollo or Eclipse, although A3 does 
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have a sideline in curtain rails. Apollo turns a blind 
eye to these. Generally-, it is not worth buying materials 
from outside (although he may have been cautious in 
talking with me). 
A3 confirms the details of the franchise system 
reported by Mrs. Stevenson. He also feels that Apollo 
business keeps him fully occupied. He sees his 
obligations as manufacturing to standard'and maintaining 
service quality. The franchisor should monitor the system 
to control for poor franchisees ("or we all get a bad 
name"), promote the brand, maintain good supply lines, and 
generally support franchisees. 
The franchisee had looked at his Agreement in the 
earlier days of his business. However, he now feels that 
the contract is very much in the background. It is not 
regularly quoted and the links with Apollo are based more 
on the value of the business relationship. He knows that 
Apollo favours sell-out solutions to contractual disputes 
as he bought his own shop that way. other than this, A3 
is only aware of minor disputes over advertising: the xxxx 
franchisees want more Apollo advertising and dislike their 
obligation to advertise in the Evening Times. 
A3 realises that there is a strong understanding that 
franchisees should rent their properties from Macneil 
Property. However, 
Ae 
of the possible 
,, 
/is not aware 
extraction of economic rent which could result from this. 
He believes that the franchisor would always keep lease 
costs within commercial ranges and that he could anyway 
appeal to a Rent Tribunal. In fact, there is no redress. 
once a franchisee has agreed to a rent, it is not a matter 
subject to the arbitration clause in the Agreement. Rent 
Tribunals are not relevant to commercial property. 
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A3 supports the claim of the other franchisees that 
brand-name strength is the real advantage of signing with 
Apollo. He feels that it is worth fitting in with the 
company in order to benefit from this. In contrastt he 
thinks that his local knowledge is of benefit to Apollo, 
and also understands that he bears measurement risks. 
Business returns are "Adequate but not startling". 
During my observation of this franchise, I saw a 
practical demonstration showing how territories indeed do 
not relate to sales (but to advertising). A customer 
entered to order blinds for a London flat. 
This franchise is very much a mom-and-pop operation. 
Summary 
Apollolessentially markets its window-blind products 
through a franchise system. It does not contemplate 
opening company shops. Franchisees are seen as more 
committed retailers compared with shop managers. 
Franchisees must buy only the tied-in products and are 
charged a transfer price 8% above market price minus 
discounts for high volumes of sales. The transfer prices 
for a tied-in sales are not set in the Agreement, leaving 
the company a device with which to extract any economic 
rent arising at the retail end of the business. Apollo 
insists that franchisees take out property leases through 
its associated property company, which may give another 
device to extract any economic rent. Apollo believes in 
market-based rather than legal solutions to any disputes 
which may arise. 
Franchisees perceive an important brand-name benefit 
from belonging to the system. They bear measurement and 
small-debt risks. They are happy with their profits but 
do not regard them as exceptional. The requirement that 
LO 
they follow the franchisor's pricing policy is probably 
illegal and unenforceable. 
Small contractual breaches are overlooked by the 
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ARvendix A ADollo Projections 
Cavital Requirem nts (1100o) 
Supply of know how 4 
Property 9 
Vehicle 1.5 





Overating Budg ets (Z) Year 1 Year 2 
Weekly sales 1,300 1,650 
J. 
Less purchase 600 670 
700 980 
Weekly expenses: 
Wages 100 180 
Premises 255 300 
Marketing 80 80 
Vehicle 60 70 
Miscellaneous 26 26 
521 656 
Weekly profit before tax 179 324 
Annual profit before tax, 
depreciation, drawings and 
interest 9,300 16,800 
Annual sales 67,600 86,800 
All excluding VAT 
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CASE B THE GARAGE DOOR COMPANY 
The franchisor 
1. Background 
William Hamilton established the Garage Door Company 
Limited in 1978. He intended from the start to run a 
franchise system but waited until 1983 before signing the 
first franchisee. His pilot operation still runs in 
Edinburgh, employing 10 people, and providing the majority 
of his business revenue. The complete system has now 
grown to include four franchisees as well as the 
franchisor. It is fully based in Scotland. Although Mr. 
Hamilton once had very ambitious plans for expansion, it 
now seems likely that the network will remain small. 
The fl-anchisor is not a member of the British 
Franchise Association. There is no formally constituted 
franchisee association. 
About two-thirds of the sales of a typical outlet are 
of new garage-door systems to private homes. The 
remainder are equally divided between subcontract work for 
builders and service work on existing installations. A 
franchisee would typically work from a small factory unit 
located on an industrial estate, operating one or two 
vans, and employing two people. 
Mr. Hamilton expects his franchisees to specialise 
fully in garage doors and not to add technically 
complimentary lines like wardrobe doors to their 
businesses. He also expects there to be no additional 
business interests and for franchisees not to use limited- 
company status. Lately he has come to be against 
partnership status as well, due to difficulties with one 
franchisee. Franchisees are required to use Mr. 
Z4 
Hamilton's supply lines with all invoicing passing through 
his Edinburgh business. 
There is much competition from door manufacturers, 
builders and other garage door companies. 
2. Nature of the franchise 
Garage Door offers a full business-format franchise 
with manuals covering all salesp service and 
administration procedures (the know-how). Financial 
assistance is not offered and neither are there specially 
provided packages from the banks, although Mr. Hamilton 
insists that banks have approached him with packages in 
mind. The franchisor is able to show his own Edinburgh 
operation as a model which can be easily duplicated 
elsewhere. 
Mr. Hamilton sees the franchisee's obligations as 
duplicating the original model as closely as possible, 
buying doors and parts through his supply lines, and 
maintaining service quality. His own role requires him to 
monitor the system in accordance with the interests of the 
franchisor and all franchisees, to purchase products 
economically, and to provide central marketing support. 
He claims to find that franchisees have an expectation of 
him as if he were an employer. 
A franchisee is essentially obliged to use the 
corporate image# operating methods and supply lines of the 
Garage Door Company. He then has the right to pursue 
business in the territory allocated to him. The territory 
is officially one in which the company will not set up 
another depot but is in practice treated as a sales area, 
and is based on Yellow-Pages areas. Franchisees bear all 
measurement and all bad-debt risks. 
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The franchise system of the Garage Door Company is 
illustrated in Figure B, where arrowheads show the 
direction of sales. There are no procurement links over 
which franchisees can exercise choice. The independent 
advertising agency which is shown is used by the 
franchisor to provide centralised marketing services. 
Strictly speaking the franchisee remains free to choose 
whether to supply any particular customer. 
There are no highly specific assets created in the 
franchise as modest stocks are carried and equipment may 
easily be put to other uses. 
3. Contract 
3(i) The Agreement 
The Franchise Agreement used by the Garage Door 
Company is an extremely detailed and comprehensive 20-Page 
document running to almost 100 clauses. What follows is a 
much edited summary of the main clauses. A copy of the 
Agreement is available for inspection should this be 
required. 
The first 25 clauses of the Agreement essentially 
define the franchise. It is "the method under the trade 
name" which is granted initially for five years but with 
an option to renew. The territory is one in which the 
franchisor will locate no additional depots although it 
may be noted that he leaves himself some discretion in 
this matter. If a franchisees's performance were 
"unsatisfactory" such location would be permissible. The 
franchisor will provide all necessary support at the 
launch of a franchisee, including advertising and 
training. Centralised advertising will be funded by a 4% 
levy on the franchisees' turnover (this has not been 
enforced at the time of writing). Equipment will be 
provided at normal trade 
and other parts will, in 
Telephone lines will be 
be in the name of the f 
goodwill remains with 
termination. 
cost but supplies of gar 
addition, incur handling 
rented by the franchises 
ranchisor, ensuring that 







The franchisee will conform to the franchisor's 
methods and will not divulge these to any third party. 
There can be no employment of anyone who has been an 
employee of the franchisor or who has been a franchisee 
within the previous 12 months. There must be no other 
business on the premises and no involvement in a 
competitive business of any kind. The franchisee accepts 
tied-in sales from the franchisor. He also agrees not to 
appoint sub-agents. The franchisee's prices will be no 
higher than the manufacturer's or the franchisor's 
recommended retail price. Apart from these undertakings, 
the franchisee agrees to keep his premises business like, 
to encourage tidiness in his staff, and to allow the 
franchisor to vet his local advertising efforts. 
The initial franchise fee is set at 2,500 and is 
meant to cover the franchisor's costs incurred in starting 
a franchisee in business. There is a weekly royalty of 5% 
on gross turnover excluding VAT. The franchisee agrees to 
cover any taxes imposed on the franchisor's fees of any 
k ind and must pay interest of 2% per month on any late 
payment he might make. Each year, the franchisee must 
report audited revenues and costs to the franchisor. 
The franchisee may sell his franchise with the 
consent of the franchisor and after paying a 2,000 fee. 
The fee is intended to cover the franchisor's costs 
incurred in starting up the transferee. In addition, 5% 
of the sale price is payable to the franchisor if he 
introduces a purchaser. 
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In the event of the death of the franchisee a simple 
transfer of the business to his beneficiary is possible. 
There is a three-month period for the beneficiary to 
decide whether to request this, during which the 
franchisor will provide a manger at cost. The beneficiary 
must be acceptable to the franchigor. Otherwise, or if 
the beneficiary wishes to sell anyway, the franchisor may 
exercise his option to buy back which is spelt out in the 
Agreement. If the beneficiary does not either take on the 
business or sell it, then the franchisor can repurchase it 
at its market value less 20%. 
The grounds for termination of the Agreement by the 
franchisor are principally poor standards, insolvency# fee 
arrears, or information disclosure to a competitor on the 
part of the franchisee. Upon termination, the franchisee 
must return all trade-marke4 equipment and display 
materials an'd then cease carrying out the business. There 
is no scope for the franchisee to terminate the Agreement 
prematurely by giving notice. 
One clause is very interesting as it gives the 
franchisor the right to impose a supervising manager on 
the franchisee if his turnover performance is not 
"substantial" within one year of the start of business. 
The clause leaves the franchisor considerable discretion 
even though there is some qualification over illness as a 
course for such action. One franchisee discussed below 
had this taken out of his Agreement. 
Some clauses cover legal technicalities like 
servability, non-exercise not being a waiver of rights, no 
warranties without authority and the recognition that 
results are not guaranteed. There is also a professional 
limitation covenant which prevents an ex-franchisee from 
competing with the Garage Door Company for up to two 
years. Finally, compulsory binding arbitration is the 
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specified means for conflict resolution, with the Director 
of the British Franchise Institute or his nominee acting 
as arbiter. 
Implicit asvects Of the-contract 
Mr. Hamilton claims that he has an &version to 
unwritten business understandings and emphasises his 
attempts to make his Agreement as comprehensive as 
possible. Nevertheless, it is worth again noting that no 
advertising levy is in fact operated at the moment. Mr. 
Hamilton believes that his system is too small at present 
for this to be viable. He feels that his franchisees 
could not bear these payments. In addition, he 
experiences demands to behave in the manner of an 
employer, often giving detailed instruction to some 
franchisees to solve particular business problems. 
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The franchisor's handling charge for tied-in sales is 
mentioned but is not specified in the Agreement. This is 
an implicit aspect of the contract as the amount will be 
determined by what the franchisor thinks the franchisees 
can bear without Jeopardising the long-term relationship. 
In principle, the tied-in sales could be used to extract 
economic rent from the franchisee. 
3(iii) Enforcement and monitoring 
The Agreement provides for weekly reporting by the 
franchisee of his revenue. ' This practice is strictly 
required, as also is the presentation of annual audited 
accounts. However, the franchisor does not observe the 
franchisee's daily conduct of his business an a matter of 
course. There are occasional visits from the franchisor's 
accountant, but these are aimed more at encouraging good 
housekeeping by the franchisee. The system of tied-in 
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sales anyway allows Mr. Hamilton to form a good impression 
of a franchisee's business costs. 
Under-reporting of sales turnover is discouraged by 
the requirement for audited statements. Further control 
is exercised by the sales documentation system whereby a 
copy of all receipts goes to Mr Hamilton. Finally, 
customer complaints could indirectly alert the franchisor 
to a bootlegged sale. 
Mr. Hamilton believes that his ultimate control over 
a franchisee stems from the possibility of terminating an 
agreement in the event of breach of contract. He does 
find it necessary to remind franchisees of their 
obligations from time to time. In one case which is 
discussed below (BI) a warning was given of possible 
termination when the franchisee's partnership broke up 
and performance slackened. The warning led to the 
resolution of the problem. 
The franchisor understands that he does have less 
formal mechanisms open to him for influencing franchisees. 
He realises that some of his supply lines are unique in 
the UK and knows that it would be hard for a franchisee to 
replace them. Thus a franchisee could be made to fear the 
loss of his supplies if he were to contemplate leaving the 
franchise system. At a more minor level, a franchisee in 
dispute with Mr. Hamilton could find his supplies slowed 
down, although this would probably mean reduced royalty 
payments. 
According to Mr. Hamilton, no franchisees have had 
agreements terminated, none have left the system and no 
use has been made of compulsory arbitration. No manager 
has ever been imposed on a franchisee. 
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4. Why franchise? 
Mr. Hamilton feels that the principal advantage for 
franchisees joining his system is the well-packaged brand 
image which he has invested in developing. Beyond this, 
he offers managerial support in all operating areas and 
believes that he provides a discipline to their activities 
which many franchisees would lack as independent 
businessmen. He does not aim to bear any risks for 
franchisees although he would claim that the risk of 
business failure is lower for them in the franchise 
system. 
A number of advantages are claimed by the franchisor. 
First, he maintains control over sales and service in a he 
way which would not be possible ifýsimply were to sell 
garage doors to any independent installer. He is 
therefore able to preserve a branded service which 
customers recognise as being of high quality. Secondly, 
he benefits from franchisee entrepreneurship and is 
convinced that this works to create much new business at 
the local level, especially when the market is poor. He 
also believes his own monitoring costs to be much lower 
than they would be in a non-franchised system using direct 
employees. Finally, he perceives capital-raising 
advantages to himself. 
Fees and returns 
It costs about 212,500 to set up a Garage Door 
Company franchise. Details of the outlays are given in 
Appendix B. 
Apart from the 5% royalty, 2,500 initial fee and the 
possibility of a 4% advertising levy, all of which are 
discussed in section 3(i) above, the franchisor is 
currently adding a 5% handling charge to all tied-in 
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sales. Mr. Hamilton believes in setting sales targets and 
expects franchisees to show some growth on the previous 
year's sales. He is well satisfied with his profits and 
believes that franchisees make adequate returns. No sales 
figures of any kind were given to me. VAT is added to all 
fees charged by the franchisor and is claimed back by 
franchisees. 
The franchisees 
1. Franchisee B, 
B, has run the XXXX franchise on his own since 1985. 
For six months prior to then he was in a partnership which 
operated the franchise along with a double-glazing and 
house-insulation business. The work consists almost 
entirely of fitting domestic garage doors with some 
service work added. Bi hopes to add subcontract work for 
local builders in the future. A fitter and his assistant 
are employed full time, along with a part-time secretary. 
The business operates from a factory unit in 33M. 
The franchisee sees his obligations mainly as 
maintaining the quality of fitting and minimising 
complaints, and building up sales. The franchisor is 
expected to give help and encouragement and to maintain 
quality within the system by monitoring all franchisees. 
B, believes that his and Mr. Hamilton's interests coincide 
and that this is the long-term basis of the franchise 
relationship. However, the franchisor does remind him of 
contractual clauses from time to time: "It rankles a bit, 
being told what to do when you are used to being self- 
employed". Bt is the franchisee who was in dispute with 
Mr. Hamilton over inadequate performance caused by his 
partnership breaking up. Nevertheless, he was able to 
give an example of a recent minor disagreement which had 
been easily resolved by the franchisor. B, had threatened 
to purchase a door from outside 
as it had not been available f: 
Hamilton made a great effort and 
own operations in Edinburgh. it 
relationship is now more settled. 
U 
of the franchise system, 
rom the franchisor. Mr. 
diverted a door from his 
would seem that their 
B, believes that the brand name is very important to 
him. He thinks the well-designed company logo draws 
attention to a multibranch operation and that this 
attracts business. He also feels that the franchisor 
would help him if business conditions became tight and 
specified advice and payment rescheduling as the means by 
which this help would occur. In fact, the franchisor 
would maintain "strict accounting" in such times subject 
to the interest charge provisions in the agreement for any 
overdue fees. 
Pý from his In taking on his franchise, Bi took advice 
bank and from an Edinburgh Consultant. Andrew James was 
the consultant and he had also been retained at an earlier 
stage by Mr. Hamilton at the launch of the franchise 
system. The basis of advice from both sources was that 
Bi's previous working experience in the building industry 
suited him for garage-door installation work. 
BjL confirmed the structural details of the franchise 
system reported by Mr. Hamilton. He believes that the 
initial franchise fee was not sufficient to cover Mr. 
Hamilton's costs in starting him up. Also, B, believes 
that tied-in sales have a mark-up of about 5% although 
figures are not quoted to him. This estimate is based on 
his knowledge of trade prices and tallies with the 
handling charge which Mr. Hamilton quoted to me. As for 
sales targets# the franchisee is not aware of figures but 
believes that Mr. Hamilton has these (as indeed he does). 
Bi's business has been through a bad patch, is just about 
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breaking even and is gradually picking up since the 
resolution of problems over the earlier partnership. 
Although Mr. Hamilton does not like franchisees to 
have limited liability, he has reluctantly accepted this 
in Bils case. The earlier partnership had limited 
liability and Bi has continued the practice in his new 
private company. My observations were of a small building 
business which was still very much in the start-up phase 
of its operations. 
Franchisee Bz 
B2 is a skilled electrical technician. On returning 
from an overseas contract, he set up as a Garage Door 
Company franchisee in August 1986. He began as a job 
franchisee which meant that' he paid a lower initial fee 
but a highei- turnover royalty in exchange for a full 
administrative back-up from Edinburgh. However, from 
April 1987 he has been operating as a regular franchisee 
on the usual terms, using a factory unit in XXXX. The 
reason for starting as a job franchisee was that it 
limited his initial commitment. 
A range of domestic, business and subcontract garage- 
door work is undertaken, along with some service work. 32 
employs his son as an assistant. All supplies are from 
Mr. Hamilton as specified in the Agreement. 
B2 feels his 
brand image that 
Door Company. He 
system "For the 
technical back-up 
the system and 
Hamilton. 
obligation is to preserve the quality- 
he believes to be attached to the Garage 
expects the franchisor to monitor the 
good of all" and to provide a full 
He knows of no cases of dispute within 
has experienced plain sailing with Mr. 
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Again, it is the brand name which is the important 
advantage to the franchisee of belonging to the system. 
In addition, it should be noted that Ba feels that he 
would be cut off from supplies if he tried to operate 
independently. Interestingly, he believes that no exact 
operating territory is marked out for himq which is not so 
as the franchisor has a precisely marked map. 
B2 confirmed the structural details of the franchise 
reported by Mr. Hamilton. Like B1, he believes that there 
are no sales targets. However, B2 is very happy with his 
early business returns and has been surprised to find 
"Such a good living in such a highly specialised 
business". MY observations were of a busy small building 




B3 was a civil engineer working on overseas contracts 
before opening as Mr. Hamilton's first franchisee in 
November 1983. The business operates from a factory unit 
in XXXX and employs four fitters, a salesman and a 
secretary. About two-thirds of all work consists of the 
sale and installation of domestic garage doors. The 
remainder is subcontract work for small builders and 
servicing. B3 avoids working for big builders as he has 
found them to be bad payers (he is currently suing 
Barratts). W, is also covered from X=. The 
franchisor's wish for B3 to open additional premises in 
XXXX is being resisted. All products are purchased from 
Mr. Hamilton, as specified in the Agreement. 
B3 sees his obligations as living up to the quality- 
brand image of the company and paying the royalty. He 
expects Mr. Hamilton to obtain products economically, to 
provide technical, commercial and legal support and to 
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monitor the franchise system in order to maintain the 
brand image. He believes that the franchisor is not as 
active as he could be in monitoring, citing the case of Bi 
whose neighbouring franchise threatened to bring XXXX's 
work into disrepute when B, was experiencing his early 
difficulties. If anything, the franchisor "Bent too far 
backwards to retain a franchisee" in that case. 
On the whole, B3 enjoys a good relationship with Mr. 
Hamilton. He sits as a director on Mr. Hamilton's board. 
They often meet socially. The Agreement seems to B3 to be 
"Very much filed in the drawer" and is not regularly 
quoted. The main advantage of being a franchisee is the 
ability to then use the brand name and logo. Again, it 
seems to the franchisee that he would lose access to 
certain door supplies if he went independent. Apart from 
the EI, affair, B3 is not aware of any disputes within the 
franchise system. 
B3 confirmed the structural details of the franchise 
system described by Mr. Hamilton. Interestingly, he is 
aware of sales targets set by the franchisor, no doubt due 
to his closer relationship. However, a clause in the 
Agreement was successfully resisted: this being the one 
giving Mr. Hamilton the right to install a paid manager if 
performance is unacceptable to him. The business showed 
losses for the first 18 months but is now giving a 
"reasonable profit". 
A criticism of the sys- 
links with suppliers. 
implications would be for 
direct links would save a 
and time lags presently 
through Edinburgh. 
tem is that there are no direct 
B3 feels that whatever the 
Mr. Hamilton's handling fee, 
lot of wasteful administration 
incurred as all orders pass 
3ý ., 
My observations were of a small budding company, 
which was beyond its start-up phase but which appeared to 
be not very busy. 
Summary 
Mr. Hamilton markets a branded service through a 
franchise system. This system has been slower to grow 
than he anticipated. Although there are some product 
lines which franchisees would find difficult to obtain, 
acceptable substitutes would not be impossible to find. 
At the end of the day, the franchisor may not be offering 
very much to prospective franchisees. Tied-in sales may 
give the franchisor a variable device for the extraction 
of economic rent, given that terms are not governed by the 
Agreement. Mr. Hamilton does occasionally refer to his 
Agreement with at least one franchisee, and has attempted 
(the impostible) to cover most eventualities in this 
document. Most of Mr-Hamilton's fees came from tied-in 
sales and a turnover royalty. 
Franchisees recognise brand-name advantages to 
belonging to the system. They bear measurement and bad- 
debt risks. Except for Ba, no-one interviewed was 
impressed with current profitability. The Aberdeen 
franchisee was not interviewed. 
Ib An interesting feature of the franchise is the extent 
to which Mr. Hamilton has had to comply with franchisee's 
conditions before they would sign with him. Bz wished to 
test the market before committing a large investment. Bi 
retained limited liability against Mr. Hamilton's wishes. 
B3 would not accept an Agreement clause allowing Mr. 
Hamilton to impose a manager if his franchise performed 
poorly. This feature supports by observation of a 
franchise system finding it difficult to recruit 
franchisees. 
P 
An extract from the franchise information pack is 






























YOUR QUESTIONS ANSWERED 
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Q. How much money will I require to invest? 
A. A total of approx. E12,500.00. This varies according to location and 
type of premises availqble. 
Q. What will I get for this sum? - 
A. This will cover your Franchise Fee, a fully-equipped van and trailer, 
starting stock, a small stock of spare parts, tools and office equipment 
(including desk, 2 chairs, filing cabinet, typewriter, carpet tiles and 
installed telephone). 
* Can this initial investment be reduced in any way? 
YES, if a) you already have the tools required, 
b) your vehicle can be acquired through lease or H. P., 
c) you reduce your initial stock of doors. 
In certain cases, the total investment can be as little as E4000.00! 
* Would I be atle to sell my franchise at any time? 
A. Yes, whenever you wish, with our help. 
Q. Can I speak to an established franchise before making my decision? 
Yes, with absolutely no interference from us. 
Q. How do'I pay my Franchise Fee? 
A. YOU 
' 
DO NOT REQUIRE TO PAY A LUMP SUM IN ADVANCE! Instead, you pay 
as and when we supply the goods you need to get your business going. 
Q. How do I pay for your continuing support? 
A. You pay us a fee of 5% on your weekly gross sales. 
Q. What is the most important factor in making a success of this franchise? 
A. A business-like and enterprising approach, coupled with full co-operation 
with us to resolve any problems which may occur. 
Appendix B Garage Door Company Promotional Material 
UNIT 5 
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CASE C AVIS RENT-A-CAR LIMITED 
The franchisor 
1. Background 
Avis is a world-wide operation which was initially 
established in 1946, in the USA, by Warren E. Avis who 
opened in Detroit with just three cars. Today it operates 
3,500 locations in over 100 countries with an estimated 
fleet of 265,000 vehicles. Around 21,000 employees work 
in the international Avis system. Franchising was adopted 
early in the history of the US parent company. 
Avis Rent-a-Car Limited was formed in 1965 to develop 
car rental in the UK. It did not adopt franchising until 
1984. Hoyever expansion through franchised outlets has 
been rapid and there are now 53 of these as well as 70 
company-owned rental stations (1987). Company outlets are 
located at airports and disproportionately in the south- 
east of England. Avis hopes to add 25 franchisees a year 
but intends to open no more directly owned outlets. In 
part this reflects the company's strategy of expansion 
into previously neglected local markets for car hire. 
According to data which Avis supplied for this study, in 
1986, out of a total UK rental market worth 1275 million, 
they had an 11.5% share. However, the share was more like 
30% for national business rentals, and just 2.5% for local 
business and leisure use. Of the total market, about two- 
thirds is local hire business which is mostly covered by 
small, local firms. Avis has decided that it wishes to 
increase its penetration of local marketr using locally 
based entrepreneurs as franchisees. Rental fleets consist 
of cars and light vans. About 75% of any outlet's fleet 
will comprise cars. 
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Avis's policy is to seek franchisees who will operate 
single-use sites under their logo. Some motor dealers do 
operate a franchise as part of a larger operation and some 
franchisees find that they can most easily rent a site 
which is part of a service station. Multiple franchises 
are not ruled out by Avis but the preference is for 
"owner-driver" franchisees, as this was expressed to me by 
Mr. Tony Brewer, the Franchise Development Manager. He 
prefers to have franchisees with just one to five outlets, 
rather than have whole areas of the country tied up by one 
franchisee. The fear is that a large multiple franchisee 
would lost touch with his local market place. 
Avis belongs to the British Franchise Association. 
There is a franchisee association. 
2. Nature of the franchise 
P 
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Avis offers a full business-format franchise with 
manuals covering all operating, sales and administrative 
procedures. A computerised administrative system (Wizard) 
which links with centralised Avis reservations, is also 
available. No financial assistance is given to 
franchisees and Avis in fact regards their independent 
ability to raise finance as an important part of the 
selection procedure. A finance scheme specially tailored 
to Avis franchisees has been developed by the National 
Westminster Bank. Franchisees are directed to this. Avis 
can show its owned outlets as working models for 
franchisees. 
Mr. Brewer sees franchisees' obligations as honouring 
the franchise agreement and maintaining service levels at 
least equal to those of the company-owned stations. In 
turn, he sees Avis as providing technical and product 
innovation, giving marketing support, and using purchasing 
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expertise to obtain good fleet and insurance deals for 
franchisees. 
A franchisee essentially receives the rights to 
operate under the Avis brand name, to use centralised 
booking arrangements, and to participate in a system of 
one-way vehicle hire. The Avis franchise is illustrated n 
Figure C, where dotted lines are used to show trading 
links over which franchisees have free choice, and where 
arrowheads show the direction of sales. No product 
is 
sold by Avis. Franchisees may choose to use company 
supply lines to lease or to purchase vehicles 
from 
manufacturers, and in particular from the Ford Motor 
Company. The lease arrangements are particularly 
attractive with manufacturers being very keen to place 
their cars into hire fleets as a promotional device. The 
cars are leased for 9,000 miles or six months, whichever 
is the sooner. The boxes showing the rental market in 
Figure C show the division of internationally and 
nationally generated rentals into business and leisure 
hirers in the approximate proportions in which these 
arise. In addition, the franchisees are shown to be more 
involved in local as opposed to international business. 
Strictly speaking, the franchisee is not free to choose 
whether to service any particular customer, as he must 
accept centrally booked and nationally negotiated hires 
and must service cars rented on the one-way systems. 
There are no stocks of products specific to Avis nor 
are there any investments to be made by franchisees in 
specialised equipment. Avis uniforms and display items 
are provided by the company. Franchisees could adapt 
their premises to other uses reasonably easily, although 
not costlessly. Set-up costs are around 25,000 for the 
franchisee, excluding franchise fees. Around 10,000 of 
these are sunk costs. 
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Contract 
3(i) The Agreement 
Avis uses a standard Franchise Agreement with its 
franchisees. Since Avis Rent-a-Car Limited is the 
licensee of Avis Incorporated of the USA, it describes 
itself as the licensor, its franchises as licensees, and 
its Franchise Agreement as a Sub-Licence Agreement in its 
formal, written contracting. There follows a simplified 
outline of the principal clauses of the Agreement. The 
franchisor/franchisee terminology will continue to be 
used. A copy of the Agreement is available for inspection 
should this be required. 
The Agreement begins by defining the sub-licence 
arrangement 
, 
between Avis Incorporated and the franchisee, 
through Avis Rent-a-Car Limited. The franchised system is 
defined as the uniform marketing and operating methods of 
Avis. The Agreement then sets the franchise fee. the area 
which is franchised and the five-year term of the 
Agreement. Separate schedules are added t specify the fee 
and area. The franchisee accepts Avis's right to modify 
the system and undertakes to fit in. 
The franchisee agrees to provide insurance on 
vehicles and drivers, to use Avis's rental agreement, to 
work in a business-like manner from procedure manuals, to 
allow Avis the opportunity to inspect the business, and to 
honour all credit cards approved within the Avis network. 
In addition, a number of financial terms are set. 
Turnover on rentals must be reported monthly to Avis along 
with customers' payments for personal accident insurance. 
A 10% royalty is due each month on turnover, where this 
consists of vehicle time and mileage charges plus 
collision-damage-waiver fees. A 40% royalty is due on 
charges for personal accident insurance. Overdue 
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franchise payments will attract interest at 5% above 
Midland Bank Pla annual base rate. Hire rates used by the 
franchisee must be reported to Avis but there is no 
attempt at retail price maintenance. Also, the franchisee 
undertakes to fit in with Avis over advertising: 2.5% of 
time and mileage charges are to be spent on local 
advertising, and standardised Yellow-Pages and telephone- 
directory entries must be placed by the franchisee. 
Further undertakings are that the franchisee will ass on 
business to other territories if this is appropriate and 
that he will participate in Avis's one-way rental system. 
Finally, the franchisee agrees to use the Wizard 
computerised system if Avis insists on this. 
Avis agrees to grant the use of the Avis name to 
franchisees, to provide corporate-image displays and 
stationeryto to give vehicle procurement help, to be 
available for consultation, and to issue directories of 
outlets. 
Vehicle fleet details for a particular franchisee, 
and the plan for the growth of this, are set out using an 
attached schedule. Also given are details of rental 
sharing which may arise over the operation of the one-way 
system. The franchisee agrees to participate in this 
system, under which vehicles may be left at an outlet from 
which they did not originate and may then be used by the 
receiving station, preferably as a means to make a return 
journey. The renting company (Avis or a franchisee) must 
pay 60% of time and mileage charges to the owning company. 
The franchisee undertakes to service vehicles presented to 
him by customers for this purpose, even if they are not 
his own. 
The franchisee may terminate the Asreement. by sivins 
six months' notice of his intention to do so. The 
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franchisor's grounds for termination cover breach of any 
contractual term by the franchisee, the latter's 
insolvency and any case of substandard operation. Also, 
the franchisor may give notice that a renewal option 
attached to the term of the Agreement is not to apply. 
Finally, legislative changes which jeopardise the 
franchisor's returns would be grounds for termination. 
There are a number of important but largely technical 
sections. Failure of the franchisor to exercise a right 
does not constitute its waiver. All rights to trade marks 
and the system revert to Avis on termination. Owners and 
managers of the franchised outlet are subject to Avis's 
approval before they can take up ownership or be 
appointed. Transfer of the franchise is possible with 
Avis's consent and# in addition, it can be inherited by a 
franchisee's beneficiaries. Finally, very technically, 
the franchisee is not to be regarded in law as the 
franchisor's agent and the Agreement is to be regarded as 
the whole contract. 
Avis uses a fairly minimal Agreement which, despite 
some clauses, does not really try to cover every 
eventuality. 
3(ii) Implicit aspects of the contract 
Mr. Brewer believes that there are three important 
business understandings between Avis and its franchisees. 
I interpret these to be implicit contractual terms in that 
they are nowhere written down yet they are important parts 
of the relationship between franchisee and franchisor. 
They are governed by the long-run value of the franchise 
relationship. First, there is an expectation that the 
franchisor will undertake a significant amount of national 
advertising, although technically this is at the 
franchisor's discretion. In the 1986/87 financial year, 
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10.5 million was spent. The figure was reached by Avis 
using a task and method approach, where expenditure is set 
to meet certain advertising objectives (for example 
television exposure to be equal to that of rivals). The 
feeling at Avis is that large expenditures are required as 
part of a means of keeping good franchisees in the 
network. 
Secondly, there is an expectation held by the 
franchisor that franchisees will operate vehicles meeting 
Avis quality standards. This is the "no-Ladas principle", 
as Mr. Brewer put it, referring to the exclusion of cheap, 
low-quality, East-European cars from the business on this 
criterion. Whilst the maintenance of standards is 
emphasised in the Agreement, a particular detail of this 
kind is not spelt out and relies on a subsequent informal 
understanding. 
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Thirdly, Avis has an understanding that franchisees 
will pay their own travel and subsistence costs incurred 
when attending training sessions. This is not specified 
in the contract but is accepted by franchisees rather than 
risk disrupting good relations with Avis, who pay all 
other training costs. 
There is no expectation that franchisees will lease 
property through Avis. They are free to make any 
arrangements which suit them. 
An interview with Mr. Michael Turner, Scottish 
District Manager for Avis, revealed a further 
understanding. Mr. Turner believes that it is accepted 
that Avis will take part in the selection of a 
franchisee's personnel. This is a strong addition to the 
control over management appointments, which relates only 
to the Managing Director and Operations Manager# listed in 
Section 11 of the Agreement. Normally this involvement in 
selection arises when Avis offers the assistance of its 
Personnel Department to the franchisee. 
Mr. Turner confirmed the existence of the no-Ladas 
principle. He also revealed that it is understood that 
Avis vehicles may be used by a new franchisee at 
uncontrolled local rates until his business begins to be 
established. Then they may be used only at national, Avis 
rates. This represents a little initial'support for the 
franchisee and will be applied in a discretionary manner 
by Avis's regional managers. Franchisees confirmed the 
existence of this initial help. 
In fact, the understanding over using corporate 
vehicles embodies a further understanding over pricing: 
normally, Avis-owned vehicles will be rented at Avis's 
corporate-outlet rates. The Agreement has nothing on 
this, and disclaims any attempts at price maintenance. 
Furthermore, the remainder of this understanding is that, 
other than for Avis-owned vehicles, the one-way rental 
system will operate on local rates which franchisees are 
free to set subject to giving 30-days notification to the 
franchisor. The notice requirement prevents a franchisee 
from using the vehicles of others at knock-down rates. It 
is also true that nationally negotiated company accounts 
must be serviced by franchisees at the negotiated rates. 
3(iii) Enforcement and monitoring 
Monitoring of the franchise network is fully 
integrated with that of company outlets. Daily conduct of 
the business is observed by District Managers, on average 
about once a month in the case of franchisees. Apart from 
the requirement in the Agreement for monthly performance 
reporting, copies of each day's rental agreements are sent 
into a franchisee's district office. For the first three 
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months of operations copies also go to the head office in 
Staines. 
Mr. Brewer feels that the Agreement should not be 
continually quoted at franchisees but, rather, exists as a 
last resort to clarify issues in a business relationship. 
He would feel that his franchise department would be 
failing in its work if franchisees ever had to report one 
another over substandard operation. Mr. Brewer claims 
that there are a few minor disagreements within the 
network over things like servicing transferred vehicles. 
Otherwise it is dispute free. There have been no 
terminations, contractual breaches or voluntary exists. 
In this last respect, it is important to note that the 
Avis Agreement makes it easy for a franchisee to leave 
after giving 6-months notice of his intention. 
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The monitoring system is reinforced by the 
possibility of centralised complaints indirectly alerting 
Avis to under-reported rentals. Also, Avis claims to have 
a good idea of what business an outlet should produce. 
Underachievement would lead to investigation so that, 
again, honest reporting is encouraged. 
Mr. Brewer describes monitoring costs as very low for 
the franchised network relative to company outlets as so 
much daily supervision can be left to the franchisee. 
Why franchise? 
Mr. Brewer believes that Avis offers an huge brand 
name advantage a franchisees: "It is what we are selling". 
In addition, central reservations and a national sales 
team which is active in the pursuit of company accounts 
both generate rental business for franchisees. The 
vehicle and insurance supply lines are also an advantage 
which Avis has to offer. Finally, the operating system 
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used is held to keep costs to a minimum, which helps 
franchisees to weather better any demand recessions. 
Avis gains largely from an influx of entrepreneurial 
talent at the local level. Mr. Brewer told me "We will not 
just take on investors, as we need entrepreneurial 
participation". The company's wish to expand into local 
markets requires that branches make efforts to drum up 
local business, for example going out to local businessmen 
to establish new accounts. It is felt that this is most 
likely to happen when a branch is run by a financially 
committed franchisee. In addition, Mr. Brewer can point 
to customer letters reporting higher service standards 
among franchisees compared with Avis-owned outlets. 
Finally, capital-raising advantages are perceived. 
Fees and returns 
A 
The Agreement allows for a 10% royalty which is 
levied on turnover excluding VAT. In addition, the 
current lump-sum initial franchise fee stands at Z15,000 
in 1987. This figure is negotiable for a franchisee with 
an established rental site. The negotiation occurs for 
two reasons. Firstp Avis is keen to move its logo into 
established sites as a matter of business strategy. 
Secondly, Avis's costs in starting up a franchisee are 
lower for an existing business. The start-up package 
includes such things as help with shopfitting, provision 
of uniforms, launch advertising, three-months stationery 
requirements, training, and promotional materials. Avis 
does not aim to make a profit from the initial fee. VAT 
is added to all fees paid to the franchisor and is claimed 
back by the franchisee. 
Full set-up costs for a franchisee are in the region 
of 25,000. An example, of an Avis -supplied profit and 
loss projectiont as an hypothetical fleet is built up to 
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26 cars and nine vans, is given as Appendix C. The 
franchisee's income as a manager is included in costs. 
Fairly healthy operating profits are shown from the first 
year of operation. No longer-term projections are 
available. It should be remembered that fleets are 
expected to build up to higher levels in subsequent years 
(, 0" franchisee discussed below has 75 cars and 
25 vans). Also, capital costs do not feature in the 
appended projection. 
Sales targets are not 
projections do form part of the 
believes that franchisees show 
be common in the vehicle rental 
happy with its profits which 
between 1984 and 1987. 
set as such but fleet 
Agreement. Mr. Brewer 
better returns than would 
business. Avis is very 
increased by about 350% 
Th_e franchisees 
Franchisee C, 
C, began as an Avis franchisee in 1986, with a fleet 
of 18 cars and three vans having been previously employed 
by XXXX XXXX- His rental work comprises locally, 
nationally, and internationally generated business in 
equal proportions. As a franchisee he has gained 
rel atively more local business compared with the 
performance of Avis's company stations. The franchise 
operates from the XXXX XXXX Service Station, X=, where 
cl also has an XXXX petrol-retailing dealership. He 
employs three people. One-half of all vehicles are leased 
and the rest are bought through Avis lines from Ford. 
CiL sees his obligations as maintaining Avis's 
quality-brand image in XXXX and paying his royalty. His 
expectations of the franchisor are that an efficient 
central reservation system should operate and that the 
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brand name should continue to be well recognised by the 
public. The reservation system generates about one-half 
of his business as XXXX is a tourist centre. 
For the first six months of operations, an 
understanding existed that Avis-owned vans arriving at 
XXXX could be used locally to help build up the business 
(with 60% of the rental being remitted to Avis). This has 
now tended to encourage C, to add to hi's van stock. C, 
does not experience regular reference to the Agreement by 
senior Avis personnel. He does however find that managers 
of outlets which are owned by Avis occasionally cite it 
when asking him to recover vehicles which have broken down 
in his area. This annoys him although he is paid for any 
service work which he does. 
CL feels that the Avis brand name is of considerable 
value to him. This, together with the possibility of 
participating in the one-way rental system, led him to 
sign with Avis rather than operate independently. He also 
sees advantages flowing from the central reservation 
system which Avis operates. Company supply lines for 
insurance and vehicles are less highly valued than Avis 
may believe. Ci thinks he could do quite well on his own 
in these areas. He would not have any wish to lower the 
quality of vehicle which he uses. 
C, confirmed the structural details of the franchise 
system which Avis described. He in fact paid only a 
912,000 franchise fee as his was an existing site in the 
sense that some office accommodation was available on the 
petrol station. His agreed fleet targets mean that he 
should have 30 cars and eight vans by 1991. He is happy 
with his profitability and intends to stay with Avis. 
However, C, has had a dispute with Avis over vehicle- 
recovery charges incurred over use of the one-way rental 
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system. He complains that Avis are very quick to charge 
him for recovery of his vehicles, when he wishes them to 
be sent back to him even though no rental is possible for 
the return journey, but that they are slow to pay him for 
recovering their vehicles. This issue remains unresolved 
but recently C, has threatened not to recover vehicles 
unless payments are speeded up. 
My observations were of a busy local. rental station. 
The Avis identity is not lost even though siting is on a 
petrol station. 
Franchisee C2 
C2 trades as XXXX XXXX and was already established as 
a commercial vehicle hire. company when he signed with 
Avis. He became the first franchisee in early 1985, and 
joined as aPmeans of expanding into car hire. The fleet 
now consists of 75 cars and 25 vans, and 20 heavy trucks 
which are still hired out under the XXXX logo. Avis is 
not involved in the heavy end of the market. There are 
also petrol-gtation and servicing components to the XXX 
business on the XXXX site. My observations were of a busy 
local car-rental business which looks like a service 
station incorporating an Avis office and fleet. 
Around 20% of all rentals are to private users and 
the rest are to businessmen. 10% of rentals are generated 
by central reservations with the remainder of the business 
being mostly locally generated, coming particularly from 
the XXXX XXXX XXXX. XXXX fits in well with Avis's wish 
to expand into local markets using local entrepreneurs. 
Almost all vehicles are leased from Ford through Avis 
channels. A manauert his assistant and three service 
agents (who prepare vehicles for hire) are employed 
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Cz believes that his main obligation is to maintain 
the quality of service on which Avis's reputation is 
based. He expects the franchisor, in turn, to promote 
this quality-brand image. He also expects the centralised 
booking and one-way rental systems to operate efficiently, 
and for good supply lines to be established for vehicles 
and insurance. 
The contract is not regularly quoted by Avis, in C: Is 
experience, but reference to it was made recently when 
XXXXIs shareholders changed. The understanding limiting 
the fleet to quality vehicles ("no Ladas") is also 
recognised by him. 
Avis's brand name is the major advantage of being in 
the system. C2 also mentioned the one-way system and 
service support for international rentals as being 
important benefits. In general, ' he feels himself to be in 
a stronger position through his association with Avis. 
C2 reports that there are minor disputes within the 
franchise network. He feels that central reservations are 
not always passed to franchisees when they should be but 
may find their way to nearby company outlets. He has had 
petty gripes over territorial observance with local 
company stations. His judgement is that systems need 
improving in the long run. 
C2 confirmed the structural details of the franchise 
system. In the case of XXX a franchise fee of only 
8,000 was required as it was an established business, 
Profitability has improved since xxxx joined Avis. 
Minimum-fleet targets are already being exceeded. 
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Franchisee C3 
C3 began as an 
previously worked in 
from a site rented 
XXXX, with a fleet of 
an assistant, a full- 
helpers. 
Avis franchisee in late 1985, having 
engineering management. He operates 
from the XXXX XXXX Service Station, 
31 cars and four vans. He employs 
time service agent and five part-time 
Around 90% of all rentals are to business users. 
Only 5% of all business arises from central booking with 
the rest being mostly generated locally. XXXX fits the 
Avis plan of expansion into local markets. 
C, j believes his obligation is principallY to uphold 
Avis service standards. He expects the franchisor to give 
general support, to help to attract business through 
advertisingg to promote the brand, and to police standards 
throughout the network. 
There is no regular reference to the Agreement in the 
case of XXXX. C3 confirms the existence of an 
understanding that there should not be excessive use of 
Avis-owned vehicles outside of the initial start-up 
period. In general, the franchise system seems trouble 
free as a recent franchisee conference suggested no real 
problems. C3 experiences occasional uneasiness over his 
r elationship with company outlets. He finds it hard to be 
precise about this but senses that the franchise system 
"Threatens the future of middle managers". 
C3 believes that the brand name of Avis is of great 
value to him but points out that it can sometimes be a 
problem. Customers perceive a quality brand which they 
believe will prove expensive. Competition is often on 
price in local markets. The one-way rental system is also 
seen as an important benefit. Also, because Avis-owned 
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cars can be used, the one-way system runs better for 
franchisees than one operated by Budget Rent-a-Car (which 
relies entirely on franchisees' own cars as Budget is a 
wholly franchised operation). 
C3's franchise has a standard structure. He paid a 
Z15,000 initial fee and had his accountant check that at 
least this amount was spent by Avis at the start-up. This 
proved to be the case. The fee included the provision of 
a prefabricated office. No profits had yet been made when 
I spoke with C3 in June 1987. He anticipates these for 
the following financial year. 
An unexpected point arose during this interview. C3 
has carefully chosen to lease his site from the filling 
station on very short terms. The leases are for three 
months at a time. He justifies this by his wish to limit 
his commitment to the business in case profits do not 
materialise. My observations were of a locally based 
business which was still very much at its start-up stage. 
Company outlets 
Avis runs only company outlets in Scotland. I interviewed 
Michael Turner, Scottish District Manager, to ascertain 
some of the differences existing between franchised and 
company outlets and to obtain comments on some of the 
conflicts described by franchisees. Some of Mr. Turner's 
information is summarised earlier in this case (3(ii) 
above). 
Mr. Turner reports that controlling company outlets 
is a straightforward matter of enforcing company policy. 
There are no difficulties caused by the independence of a 
franchisee. However, many day-to-day decisions require 
district management to be involved in a company outlet 
whereas they would just be left to the franchisee. He 
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believes that monitoring is more costly on balance for 
company outlets. Regional management structures are more 
occupied by matters relating to company stations. 
Mr. Turner believes that all outlets will try to use 
the one-way rental system to shift costs. Franchisees 
will worry about their profits whereas company managers 
are on profit-related bonus schemes. The specific 
problems encountered by C, are most likely due to changing 
vehicles which break down in his area. If he replaces a 
vehicle he only receives the 60% hire fee that he would 
receive if his vehicle had been hired out of its own area. 
This may be resented as the opportunity cost could be the 
full local rates. 
I observed the company's station in Edinburgh and saw 
no superficial differences compared with franchised 
outlets. 
Summary 
The Avis franchise offers a brand name and a national 
rental network to franchisees. Avis is able to draw on 
local entrepreneurship to develop local business by 
franchising. It appears that there is no attempt by Avis 
to make profits from lump-sum franchise fees. Avis's 
returns come from a royalty which is levied on rental 
turnover. The single-use site does not materialise among 
franchisees. All of those whom I interviewed had set up 
on service stations, and this appears to be efficient. 
Some problems exist over fitting the franchised outlets in 
with the company stations. Some of these could no doubt 
he cured by altering payment schedules (for example, 
replacement vehicles could be charged at full local 
rates). 
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The franchisor may use the initial franchise fee and 
the royalty to extract any economic rent arising for 
franchisees. There are no tied-in sales and no control of 
leases. The royalty is set in the Agreement. Avis has no 
means of responding to unforeseen changes in retail 
profitability. It is noteworthy that franchisees may gave 
notice to quit and could move to other suppliers of 
franchise services. It is also interesting that initial 
fees vary from site to site suggesting the value of Avis's 
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CASE D MOBILETUNING LIMITED 
The franchisor 
1. Background 
Mr. Anton Rowntree established Mobiletuning Limited 
as a franchise system in 1976, in partnership with Mr. 
Derek Morley. Both had begun separate mobile car-tuning 
businesses in 1973 and subsequently became partners. The 
system has now grown to include 65 franchisees each on 
annual sales turnover of about 230,000. Mobiletuning 
competes with firms like Hometune for the market for 
tuning cars and light commercial vehicles at customer's 
homeg or workplaces. A typical customer would be a 
private motorist who runs a five-year-old car. 
Mobilefuning prefers franchisees to operate just one 
tuning van. There are no cases of multiple franchises. A 
typical franchisee is a man with mechanical aptitude who 
operates a Crypton engine-tuning apparatus from a van. He 
is often assisted in his booking system and in keeping 
accounts by other members of his family. Mr. Rowntree 
arranges training for a franchisee and the equipping of 
the van and supplies ignition and other components if 
these are required. Although Mobiletuning in a main 
distributor for NGK, a Japanese manufacturer of spark 
plugs, there are no tied-in sales. 
The company belongs to the British Franchise 
Association. There is an association for franchisees. 
2. Nature of the franchise 
Mobiletuning offers a full business-format franchise 
with manuals covering all aspects of operations, marketing 
and administration. Many franchisees come from 
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backgrounds different from the motor trade and really 
start from scratch. Tuning procedures are rigorously 
standardised as is the sales-recording system. The use of 
company manuals is more discretionary outside of these 
areas for a franchisee. Essentially a franchisee has the 
right to trade under the Mobiletuning name using the know- 
how summarised in the manuals. He may choose to purchase 
supplies from the company. The system is illustrated in 
Figure D, where arrowheads show the direction of sales. 
Mr. Rowntree considers that franchisees have one real 
obligation which is to represent the brand name well by 
maintaining high standards of service. He sees 
Mobiletuning's role as ensuring that the business is 
profitable by developing brand awareness among customers, 
procuring good quality supplies at reasonable prices, and 
maintaining up-to-date technical procedures. In addition, 
he emphasisis a role as system monitor. I was told that 
"Poor-quality franchisees would cause us all to suffer a 
loss of business". 
Mobiletuning only operates one company-owned van. 
This is in Greenwich where the company has its base. The 
van is run purely as a device to keep the franchisor 
informed about current operating costs and conditions. It 
is only rarely used as a model to show prospective 
franchisees, who are generally happy to Join following 
conversations with randomly chosen existing franchisees. 
Financial assistance is not provided for franchisees 
by Mobiletuning. The company is happy to advise on 
sources of finance. 
There is very little investment in specialised. 
equipment or stocks. The van and tuning equipment could 
easily be sold without excessive loss or could be used 
outside of the Mobiletuning network. 
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Contract 
3(i) The Agreement 
Mobiletuning uses a 
been kept as simple and 
Rowntree believes it 
franchisees by letting them 
principal clauses are now 
the Agreement is available 
required. 
Franchise Agreement which has 
as brief as possible. Mr. 
acts principally to protect 
know where they stand. Its 
simply summarised. A copy of 
for inspection should this be 
The Agreement first sets the franchise fee and grants 
the franchisee the right to operate as Mobiletuning in an 
area which is specified by postcodes. The operation must 
begin within two years of signing the Agreement. 
The frýnchisee undertakes to promote the business in 
his area, to operate in a business-like manner, not to 
operate extra unauthorized services under the brand name, 
to allow Mobiletuning to vet any employee prior to their 
appointment. Furthermore, he will not charge less than 
Mobiletuning's recommended prices without prior approval, 
and will pay the royalty and submit copies of all charge 
sheets. If the Agreement is terminated, the franchisee 
will not compete with Mobiletuning in his area for two 
years. Interestingly, the franchisee agrees to pay a 
minimum royalty based on tuning 40 cars each month. The 
franchisee agrees not to damage the interests of the 
franchisor or other franchisees. Strictly speaking, the 
franchisee remains free to choose whether or not to 
service any particular customer. 
The franchise may be sold and transferred with the 
franchisor's consent. It may also be inherited by the 
franchisee's beneficiaries in the event of his death. The 
10-year term may be extended by mutual consent for 
63 
additional 10-year periods with no further lump-sum 
franchise fee. 
The franchisor's undertakings are mostly of a general 
kind. He will assist the franchisee to run his business 
profitably, provide initial and continuing training 
especially in technical matters, supply free tuning sheets 
detailing work done and acting as receipts for customers, 
and procure products at economical prices. In addition, 
Mobiletuning will build the brand name and give 
promotional support, including the provision of a local 
Yellow-Pages advertisement for each franchisee. 
The franchisee has the right to terminate the 
agreement by giving three-months notice. The franchisor 
may terminate for any breach, or in the event of the 
franchisee's insolvency. 
P 
Failure to enforce any right is not to be taken to 
indicate its waiver by the franchisor. Finally, the 
Agreement is described as embodying the entire contract 
between the parties. There is only a small number of 
purely technical clauses, and no provision for compulsory 
arbitration. No rate of interest is specified for overdue 
franchise fees. 
Vii) Implicit aspects of the contract 
Two implicit aspects of the contract between 
franchigor and franchisee emerged from the interview with 
Mr. Rowntree. First, there is a strong expectation that 
Mobiletuning will pay the costs of all training excluding 
travel and subsistence costs for franchisees. This has 
led in recent years to the Directors or a Training Officer 
visiting a region from time to time on the grounds that 
this less costly for franchisees. Rather than visit 
individuals, Mobiletuning uses one as a base to which all 
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neighbouring franchisees come for a training session. The 
full understanding which has arisen is that direct 
training costs will be borne by the franchisor and, in 
additiont training will be organised to minimise 
attendance costs to the franchisee including his time lost 
from operating the business. Keeping the franchisee 
engaged in operations as far as possible benefits the 
franchisor through his royalty. Training is an important 
element of the franchise package as current vehicle 
specifications are subject to much change. 
A second implicit aspect is that franchisees are free 
to offer some non-tuning services. Some undertake general 
servicing lubrication services, vehicle alarin fittings or 
automatic choke conversion work. These extras can help a 
franchise to set up profitably, especially in areas of low 
population. Even though the Agreement largely rules out 
subsidiary iervices, there are cases where the franchisor 
ignores the use of Mobiletuning receipts for these 
purposes because he realises that extra revenue helps to 
keep a franchisee in business. 
T(iii) Enforcement and monitoring 
Mr. Rowntree does not believe that the Agreement 
exists to be regularly quoted. He told me that 
Mobiletuning always tried to avoid litigation: "If it came 
to that we would not want each other anyway and would no 
doubt part company by some arrangement". Rather, he feels 
that the long-term value of the franchise relationship 
will always enable disagreements to be resolved. 
All sales receipts must be submitted to the 
franchisor on a monthly basis according to the Agreement. 
There is a three-copy system in which the customer, the 
franchisee and Mobiletuning each receive a copy of the 
receipt, which also details the work completed and acts as 
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an invoice. Apart from the possibility that centrally 
received customer complaints or comments could alert the 
franchisor to sales discrepancies, and his occasional 
observation of franchisees, there is no real check on 
honest reporting of sales. Mobiletuning runs a van in 
Greenwich and has some idea of the amount of business 
which is possible, but regional differences will exist. 
No tied-in sales exist to act as a check. Mr. Rowntree 
believes that his franchisees are fairly honest in 
revealing their sales for royalty payment purposes# and 
does not believe that additional monitoring would be cost 
effective. A voluntary system exists whereby franchisees 
submit details of their costs and in which 50% 
participate. 
Mr. Rowntree described his monitoring system as 
justified by its low cost. Only three employees work at 
head office. This figure is impressive, bearing in mind 
that there are 63 franchisees throughout England and Wales 
and a further two in Scotland. He told me that "It is 
just not worth checking a little bit of work done on the 
side". His methods place a lot of emphasis on selecting 
only those who he feels to be trustworthy as franchisees. 
In the 10 years for which the franchise system has 
been operating, there have been few disputes according to 
Mr. Rowntree. The Agreements of two franchisees have been 
terminated because of their inability to generate 
sufficient business. 10 franchisees have left the system 
but for innocent reasons: for example, one enjoyed a win 
on the football pools. The franchisor has tightened up 
his selection process in order to avoid the adverse 
selection experienced in the two terminations. Mr. 
Rowntree believes that a franchisor's image is badly 
damaged by cases of termination. 
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There is a franchisee association which meets each 
year. 
4. Why franchise? 
Mr. Rowntree believes that Mobiletuning has a lot to 
offer franchisees. The brand name is important and it is 
much easier to recruit franchisees now that it is 
established. Also, Mobiletuning can give a lot of 
marketing support in terms of promotional material and 
methods. On his own a franchisee would "Compete on price 
alone and lose money". However, the point which Mr. 
Rowntree emphasises is the up-to-date training which 
Mobiletuning offers. This is held to be vital in today's 
world of rapidly changing vehicle engine technology. I 
was told that "On their own, they would just wither on the 
vine". 
In turn, Mr. Rowntree sees a number of advantages for 
Mobiletuning in franchising. First, he believes that 
there are specialisation advantages in the franchisees 
concentrating on operations whilst Mobiletuning builds the 
brand image and provides training. Also, there is a major 
honesty problem in a business with many cash transactions 
in remote branches. He feels that vehicle tuning is not a 
sufficiently valuable business to be able to support an 
enormous administrative system. This would be necessary 
in a system using employees, which is the alternative 
organisational structure that could be used. Mr. Rowntree 
believes that in his system he is more able to rely on the 
honest conduct of franchisees and can avoid monitoring 
costs. 
Franchisees are likely to require less monitoring 
over the honest conduct of their businesses because of 
four factors which increase the incentives for true 
performance revelations. First, the franchisor only has 
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the franchisee to monitor for a given outlet, as all 
employees become the franchisee's responsibility. The 
franchisee as a residual claimant has the motivation to 
monitor any employees$ and as he is locally based is well 
placed to this. All of the franchisor's efforts can be 
concentrated on the franchisee. Secondly, the franchisee 
is highly committed to the franchise relationship because 
of his investment. He is less likely to wish to 
jeopardise this by dishonest conduct compared with an 
individual who would only risk damaging his reputation as 
an employee. Thirdly, some behaviour makes no sense when 
the franchisee is the residual claimant: there is, for 
example, no incentive to hide profits as costs as the 
royalty is levied on turnover. Finally, an employee who 
hides a sale benefits from the entire price, whereas a 
franchisee only saves himself the percentage royalty which 
he avoids. 
Mr. Rowntree feels that there are no current capital- 
raising advantages to Mobiletuning from franchising. In 
the early days he might have found difficulty in raising 
finance for company vans but this would not now be so. 
S. Fees and returns 
An initial lump-sum franchisee fee of 23,000 is 
currently charged (1987). In exchange for this, initial 
training, franchise manuals, launch advertising and 
promotional material is provided. The franchisor does not 
aim to make profits on this fee. 
The bulk of Mobiletuning's revenue comes from the 10% 
royalty which is levied on the franchisee's sales 
turnover. For this purpose, turnover is defined as the 
labour-charge component (around 925 in 1987) of the tuning 
services undertaken by a franchisee. There are no tied-in 
sales, but there are profits for Mobiletuning if 
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components or equipment are sold to franchisees. 
Mobiletuning aims to be very competitive with outside 
suppliers. Value Added Tax is added to all fees charged 
by the franchisor and then claimed back by the franchisee. 
The cost of establishing a franchise in 1987 is 
between 110,000 and Z16,000 depending on whether used or 
new equipment is bought. According to Mobiletuning's 
projections, an outlet will yield an annual gross profit 
of around Z18, OoO, excluding provision for salaries or 
finance. Mr. Rowntree feels this is a good income for 
people working in this section of the economy. 
Mobiletuning is satisfied with its own profits. The 
franchisor's projection of profitability for a 
representative franchisee, undertaking around 1,000 tunes 
each year, is given as Appendix D. Mr. Rowntree reports a 
healthy demand for membership of his franchise system. 
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The franchisees 
1. Franchisee D, 
D, began as a franchisee in 1982. Previously he was 
a cost accountant with XXX XXXX, who made him redundant. 
He looked for a business opportunity into which he could 
invest his redundancy-compensation payment, which would 
use skills that he possessed, and which would provide a 
reasonable income for his remaining working life. DiL 
approached Mobiletuning after finding that the rival 
Hometune organisation had no vacant territories. Hometune 
was the better-known brand at that time. 
Equipment and parts are bought through Mobiletuning 
as D, finds this to be both more convenient and cheaper. 
However, he does add three non-tuning service lines to his 
business, which do not generate royalties for 
Mobiletuning. These are the fitting of car alarms, choke 
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conversions and car radios. They are small revenue 
generators which are accepted by Mobiletuning. About 85% 
of Di's tuning is of private cars. 
D, feels that his obligations are to pay his bills to 
Mobiletuning and to promote the brand locally. He expects 
the franchisor to provide training, which is thought to be 
very important, and to monitor the system to preserve the 
reputation for quality work. The franchise is full format 
but in practice the franchisee is left very much to his 
own devices after much initial advice. D, reports that he 
has not met Mr. Rowntree since 1982. 
D, confirms that Mobiletuning operates without 
frequent reference to the Agreement. Since starting up, 
this has only been mentioned once in his case, which was 
when a neighbouring franchisee was established and a 
territorial boundary had to be defined. He knew of no 
disputes, thought the system was operated very 
harmoniously, and valued his own independence. 
When he began in 1982, the Mobiletuning name meant 
little in although this is changing now. Di believes 
that the major advantage of being a Mobiletuning 
franchisee is the technical back-up and continuing 
training. 
Dt's profitability is acceptable to him although not 
as good as he had hoped. Interestingly, he told me that 
the minimum requirement for paying a royalty equal to that 
generated on 40 tunes a month is not enforced in his case. 
Di confirms the structural details of the franchise system 
reported buy Mr. Rowntree. 
The franchisee is now an established specialist who 
is kept quite busy but is not fully occupied by his 
business. This is a home-based venture. 
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Franchisee D2 
D2 became a franchisee in 1981 having previously 
worked as a service station manager. He was looking for 
an opportunity to become self-employed and was impressed 
with the low start-up cost attached to a Mobiletuning 
franchise. 
Equipment and parts 
as this is found to be 
elsewhere. D2 does ai 
business and this seems 
although it generates no 
of all work is on private 
on company cars and light 
are purchased from Mobiletuning 
cheaper and easier than going 
dd an oil-change service to the 
to be accepted by Mobiletuning, 
additional royalties. About 80% 
cars, with the remainder being 
commercial vehicles. 
D2 believes that his obligations to Mobiletuning are 
to maintain"standards of service and to pay the royalty. 
In return, he expects full support, particularly in 
technical areas. The know-how embodied in the franchise 
manuals was particularly useful when starting up. I was 
told "There would have been cars I could not have tuned 
without these guides". In practice, D2 is left very much 
to his own devices now that he is established. The main 
advantage of being part of the network is the continuing 
technical support. 
D2 confirms the structural details of the franchise 
system reported by Mr. Rowntree and agrees that the 
franchisor does not operate by frequently quoting terms of 
the Agreement. D2 feels his relationship with 
Mobiletuning to be a easy-going one. He knows- of no 
disputes. He is very happy with his profitability. 
The franchisee is now well established and is kept 
very busy by his business. It is a home-based venture. 
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Franchisee D3 
D3 began as a franchisee in 1981 after being made 
redundant in his previous engineering employment. He was 
looking for a business opportunity into which he could 
invest his redundancy-compensation payment and which would 
generate a reasonable income for his remaining working 
life. D3 made his own comparisons of several franchises, 
including Dyno-Rod and Prontaprint, before seeking a 
Mobiletuning franchise. He was impressed by franchising 
in general because he understood that franchised new 
businesses have better survival rates. 
About 50% of all supplies are bought from 
Mobiletuning. Otherwise a good local wholesaler is used, 
which speeds delivery times. In addition to offering 
tuning, D3 fits sunroofs and car alarms, and undertakes 
servicing wdrk. These extra lines generate no royalties 
directly for Mobiletuning. Nevertheless, the franchisor 
has been happy to supply separate, non-tuning invoices for 
D3's use. I was told: "I did not ask for permission but 
just told them what I do". About 80% of all work is on 
private cars. 
D3 confirms the easy-going nature of the franchisor. 
The Agreement is not quoted. He knows of no cases of 
dispute. When he was ill for a time, Mobiletuning 
rescheduled his payments and paid for a second launch of 
his business when he recovered. The franchisor is 
expected to provide technical support and to obtain 
discounts on parts. D3 feels it is his obligation to 
maintain local standards. 
The main advantage of belonging to the franchise 
network is the continual technical support it gives. D3 
believes that the value of the brand name is growing, 
however. He confirms the structural features of the 
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franchise system. Profitability is felt to be better than 
could be achieved by operating independently. 
The business is home based and well established. it 
keeps D3 fullY Occupied given the additional services that 
he offers. 
4. Franchisee D4 
D4 established his franchise early in 1986 having 
previously worked for 22 years as a fitter for the XXXX. 
He was led to Mobiletuninx following discussions with XXXX 
advisors when he was made redundant. They helped him to 
examine the franchise, directed him to sources of finance, 
and explained to him the better survival rates for 
franchised new businesseswhich are commonly believed to 
exist. 
About 80% of D4's business is with private motorists. 
He proudly told me that he also tunes cars for the local 
constabulary. About 50% of his parts come from 
Mobiletuning with the rest being bought from the sane good 
local suppliers used by D3 in XXXX. Like D: # D4 
undertakes servicing work on separate MobiletuninS 
invoices but with no royalty payment implied. He claims 
that the understanding over this is that servicing must 
accompany an engine tune, as indeed it normally would. 
D4 sees his obligation as showing total loyalty to 
Mobiletuning and in return expects then to fully support 
him, especially by keeping him abreast of technical 
developments. He confirms that the franchisor in very 
easy going and knows of few disputes. He has heard that 
the Agreements of two franchisees have been terminated, 
for failure to pay monies due, since 1973. Otherwise, the 
Agreement appears to be largely forgotten about. The main 
advantage of belonging to the network is definitely the 
technical support. 
D4 confirms the structural details of the franchise 
system. He is happy with his early profitability and 
would not wish to go independent. Interestingly, he was 
allowed to operate part-time until he felt sure that the 
business was viable. Part-time operations would not 
lessen financial commitment as the same equipment would be 
needed. 
The business is not yet well established but keeps D4 
busy given the additional servicing work. It is home 
. based. 
SummarY 
Mobilefuning Limited operates a franchise system in 
which a 10% royalty is levied on the service charges of 
franchisees who operate mobile engine-tuning equipment. 
The franchisor is able to specialise in offering strong 
technical support which is highly valued by franchisees. 
Hd saves monitoring costs in a business which relies on 
cash payments and could be open to fraud. Mobiletuning 
has a reputation for easy-going operation of its franchise 
network and appears to have been very flexible in allowing 
franchisees to personalise their businesses. This 
flexibility has probably helped franchises to become 
established under quite poor market conditions to the 
ultimate benefit of the franchisor. It is worth noting 
that the extra lines mentioned by franchisees do not 
interfere with the quality of tuning services. Also, 
fewer extras are offered in where population density 
is higher and markets are larger for tuning alone. 
The franchisor relies on the 10% royalty for most of 
his revenue. There are no tied-in sales and an initial 
franchise fee would appear to be substantially spent by 
the franchisor at start-up. Some profit will be made on 
product sales, although the stocks held and used by 
franchisees are not large (stocks are worth about Z1,000). 
However, even though no vital input is controlled by 
Mobiletuning, it is not strictly true that there is no 
scope for the extraction of economic rent from 
franchisees. The royalty payment (or initial fee) could 
be sent to extract rent in the original design of the 
Franchise Agreement if market conditions allowed rent to 
be earned. The franchisor has no scope for varying his 
royalty (at least in an upward direction) as Agreements 
are automatically renewable and royalty terms are not 
separately schedule. It is strictly true to say that the 
franchisor could not capture any increase in profits in 
the business, unless these were solely due to his 
efficiency in procurement of parts. 
10 
Mobiletuning entered the business after the market 
leader, Hometune, and such entry would have reduced any 
rents which were present. This could explain the 
franchisor's lack of interest in setting up devices which 







































Appendix D Mobiletuning Projection 
HOW MUCH WILL YOU EARN? 




VAT on Sales 
TOTAL REVENUE 
First Second Third 
Year Year Year 
530 875 915 
Els Els Els 
13,118 21,656 22.646 
1,590 2,625 2.745 
2,206 3,642 3,809 










VAT on Purchases 
Payments to Customs & Excise 
175 175 175 




450 450 450 
954 1,575 1,647 
398 656 686 
223 735 769 
297 490 512 
684 1,115 1,165 
1,522 2,527 2,644 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 
GROSS PROFIT 
Less provision for finance 
NET PROFIT BEFORE TAX 
7,214 11,525 12.024 
9,700 16,398 17,176 
1,865 1,865 1.865 
7,835 14,533 15,311 
Tý 
NOTE: Expenditure shown above is for the first year in addition to the 
items on page 1. 
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CASE 9 YOUNG'S FRANCHISE LIMITED 
The franchisor 
1. Backitround 
Young's Franchise Limited was set up in 1985 after 
Young's Franchise Group Limited failed. The company was 
bought from receivership from Cyril Spencer, a former 
chairman of the Burton Group. It now consists of Young's, 
a menps dresswear hire business and Pronuptia, which sells 
bridal gowns. Often the two businesses are combined in a 
single franchised or company-owned outlet. The failure in 
1984 arose when a maternity-wear hire venture, La Mama, 
went wrong. The new company has dropped all maternity- 
wear interests. 
A typidal outlet has a floor area of 800-1,500 square 
feet divided into a shop area, offices and preparation and 
storage areas. Any number from three to 20 people might 
be employed depending on the size of the market which is 
served. There are 61 franchised outlets and a further 18 
or so company-owned shops. 70% of outlets are coubined 
Young's and Pronuptia businesses. Around 750 people are 
employed throughout the network. The company is at the 
beginning of a period of recovery from its financial 
difficulties, when it lost a number of franchisees. 
Young"s is a dresswear- hire business which was 
established in the . 
1930s. The first franchisees were 
created in 1975. Pronuptia was added in 1977 when the UK 
master franchise was bought from the French parent 
company. The UK rights to Pronuptia were renewed for a 
further 10 years in 1987. There is an agreement for 
minimum orders of bridal gowns from Paris but otherwise 
all products are bought competitively on open fashion 
markets. 
Franchisees must buy their stocks from Young's 
franchise Limited# or hire then on an intershop-loan 
system which operates to meet some of the requirements of 
the Young's shops. Fractional franchises are rare, unless 
they involve the combination of a Pronuptia and Young's 
franchise which would normally be run by a husband and 
wife team. The company prefers stand-alone sites which 
are used for either or both of its brands. There is a 
policy of increasing the number of franchises as the 
company believes that profitable opportunities exist for 
new outlets. Existing company-owned outlets will not be 
converted to franchises but no new ones will be added. 
Some franchisees have more than one outlet. 
Young's outlets mostij hire out men's formal wear. 
Sales of accessories or formal wear represent only about 
5% of the business. Pronuptia shops exclusively sell 
bridal wear; accessoriest and clothing for bridesmaids and 
other female wedding attendants. 
The company belongs to the British Franchise 
Association. A National Advisory Panel which is elected 
by franchisees meets with the franchisor on a monthly 
basis. 
2. Matur2 of the franchise 
Mr. Norman Grossman, a director of Young's Franchise, 
granted an interview for this study. He seen 
franchisees' obligations an loyalty to the brand, 
participation in the intershop-loan system# buying 
products from the company, and abiding by the recommended 
procedures. In return, he believes that the franchisor 
must provide full support especially on the marketing side 
and must act as a monitor of standards of service. 
A franchisee essentially has the right to trade under 
the Young's or Pronuptia logo, to participate in garment 
loans, and to receive general advice on running the 
business. He must buy products from Young's Franchise but 
nothing in his Franchise Agreement forces him to supply 
any particular customer. The franchise system is 
illustrated in Figure E, where arrowheads show the 
direction of sales links. 
The company offers a full business-format franchise 
with manuals covering sales, operating and administration 
systems. Initial and continuing training is provided. 
There is no franchisor control on property leases although 
assistance can be given over obtaining these if it is 
required. No financial help is given to franchisees 
although the company can direct them to banks offering 
franchise financial packages. 
Stocks are paid for by franchisees once they arrive 
at local outlets and are valued at around 212,000 for 
Pronuptia (and around Z18,000 for Young's and 930,000 for 
a combined business). Other than stocks, there are no 
highly specialised assets. However the 212,000-930,000 
represents a considerable commitment in its own right. 
Contract 
3(i) The Agreement 
Young's Franchise uses an extensive Franchise 
Agreement. A copy of the Pronuptia version of this was 
given to me by Mr. Grossman. It runs to around 40 pages. 
The Young's version is similar but also has clauses 
dealing with compulsory participation in the intershop- 
loan system. The principal clauses of the Pronuptia 
version are simply summarised below. A copy of the 
so 
agreement is available for inspection should this be 
required. 
The Agreement gives the franchisor the right to veto 
any choice of premises, although the lease is to belong to 
the franchisee. In additiont the company must approve of 
the shop layout which has to use the standard livery. 
Young's Franchise will pay 50% of shopfitting charges. 
The franchise granted is defined as the right to 
trade as Pronuptia within an agreed territory. The grant 
is for five years and may be renewed without additional 
fees. The initial franchise fee is not set in the 
Agreement but is inserted into a blank space left for the 
purpose. This is not true for the royalty payment which 
is defined as 10% of gross sales turnover each month. 
Gross turnover excludes VAT. Overdue payments incur a 
0.5% a week interest charge (a 24% annual percentage 
rate). The franchise must make weekly sales returns using 
company forms. VAT is charged on all fees levied by the 
franchisor but may be reclaimed by the franchisee. 
The franchisor agrees to spend 30% of his monthly 
royalty on central advertising, whereas the franchisee 
agrees to spend 3% of his gross turnover on local 
advertising. The company has the right to vet any local 
advertisements. The franchisee may seek contributions 
from Pronuptia or from other franchisees towards 
advertising which will give benefits outside of his 
territory but he cannot force others to pay. 
The franchisor's 
general terms for the 
whenever it is sought. 
of the franchisee for q 
start up. Marketing 
including invoices, are 
obligations are listed in very 
most part. Advice is to be given 
The company will train a nominee 
P to four weeks before the business 
support and company stationery, 
to be supplied at the rranchisor's 
Lt 
expense. Products are to be procured economically and 
transfer pricing should aim for a 120% mark-up for 
franchisees. The company will assist with opening a new 
franchised outlet and will pay 50% of launch-advertising 
costs. An annual fashion viewing must be organized. 
Manuals covering sales, operations and administrative 
procedures must be supplied to franchisees. 
The franchisee agrees to follow the standards common 
in the company network and to pass on any complaints not 
resolved within 14 days. The franchisor's rulings over 
complaints are to be accepted. Each year, copies of the 
franchisee's business plan must be supplied to the 
company. Only Pronuptia supplies are to be used unless 
the franchisor"s permission is granted to use some line, 
which must be exclusive to the franchisee in his area. 
Defects in products are to be notified within seven days 
or else accdpted by the franchisee. 2500,000 of public- 
liability insurance is to be carried by the franchisee, 
who fully indemnifies the company against claims. The 
franchisee must have no competing business interests, and 
he must not solicit the franchisor's employees to come nd 
work for him. He will submit an annual audited profit and 
loss account to the franchisor. 
The franchise may be transferred with the 
franchisor's consent and it may also be inherited by the 
franchisee's beneficiaries. The company will provide a 
manager for up to six months, in the event of the 
franchisee's death or disablement, at a charge equal to 
salary plus expenses. At the end of this period the 
franchisor can buy back the franchise at its market value, 
or terminate the Agreement, if no buyer has been found. a 
5% commission is payable if the franchisor introduces a 
buyer. No mechanism is given for deciding market value. 
ti 
The rranchisor may terminate the Agreement without 
notice if the franchisee becomes insolvent or if he does 
not correct poor service quality. This last ground 
appears to be open to the franchisor's discretion in its 
interpretation. Buying outside, becoming involved in 
other businessess infringing the trade mark or imparting 
know-how leads to the franchisee receiving 28-days notice 
to correct a contractual breach. Failing this, the 
franchisor may terminate. 
The Agreement contains some technical details: non- 
enforcement of a right is not a waiver; each contractual 
clause is severable; the Agreement is held to be the 
entire contract; and the franchisee has no powers to 
represent the franchisor without authority. 
3(ii) ImiDlicit asiDects of the contract 
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Mr. Grossman emphasises that the company tries to 
avoid conflict in its relationship with franchisees. He 
is able to identify three areas in which understandings 
have arisen. First# regular training sessions will be 
attended by a franchisee's staff. This is not provided 
for in the Agreement. From time to time the franchisor 
wishes to train in an aspect of the business and expects 
franchisees to cooperate in this. He is under pressure to 
ensure that such training really is relevant. 
Secondly, it is understood that small sidelines may 
be carried by franchisees in their shops. An example 
would be Pronuptia shops selling locally made bouquets, 
which is a common practice although it is prohibited in 
the Agreement. Such lines are often not locally exclusive 
and are usually not subject to permission from the 
franchigor. They probably help to boost sales and 
indirectly benefit the company. 
A final area in which understandings have arisen 
concerns disputes over advertising or territory. These 
are resolved by compulsory binding arbitration. There is 
no provision in the Agreement for this. 
3(iii) Enforcement and monitoring 
The franchisor does not believe in regularly quoting 
the Agreement at franchisees and believes that the value 
of the relationship causes them to fit in with the spirit 
of the contract. Some disputes have arisen over such 
things as franchisees buying products from outside 
sources# poorly maintained shops, inadequate stocks, 
unacceptable advertising materials, and non-payment of 
fees. 
Mr. Grossman outlined a three-stage procedure to me. 
The compahy normally exhorts franchisees to end 
unacceptable practices and is successful- in this. 
Franchisees who persisted in contractual breaches would be 
encouraged to sell their businesses either to a third 
party or back to the franchisor. Finally, an Agreement 
could be terminated. Mr. Grossman believes that six 
terminations have occurred: all of these were for non- 
payment of fees. 
During the receivership period in 1984 a number of 
franchisees left claiming that the failure broke the 
Agreement, but tried to continue using the Young's or 
Pronuptia name. The franchisor did not wish to dispute in 
the courts over this an a consequence of losing a case 
would have been to undermine all Agreements. At the very 
least, bad publIcity would have accrued to Young's 
Franchise. I quite independently have discovered that in 
at least one of these cases, Finchley in London, a company 
shop has been opened nearby. The intention appears to be 
to compete vigorously with the resigned franchisee. 
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Franchisees have initiated disputes over such things 
as delivery times, pricing and advertising. Often these 
date from receivership days. Mr. Grossman insists that 
the franchisor has improved matters in these areas during 
the recovery period and there is now less dispute. This 
is confirmed by franchisees. The areas which caused 
franchisee dissatisfaction are interesting. There is no 
clause in the Agreement governing delivery times. The one 
covering transfer pricing is very weak: setting the 
franchisee's mark-up does not guarantee competitive 
prices. During receivership, central advertising more or 
less dried up. 
Mr. Grossman describes the costs of monitoring 
franchisees as "acceptable". Apart from monthly sales 
reports for the purpose of paying the royalty, weekly 
sales returns are made. The franchisor relies on his 
experience of running company shops# tied-in sales, and 
occasional observation of day-to-day activities to 
encourage honest reporting of results by franchisees. Mr. 
Grossman believes that franchisees would not wish to 
jeopardise their long-term business interests by 
excessively under-reporting sales or buying extensively 
from outside. Business costs are closely monitored only 
for new franchisees in order to help their management. 
otherwise, audits are made quarterly, which is quite 
frequently compared with other franchise systems. Area 
managers visit franchisees roughly once in every six 
weeks. 
4. Why franchise? 
Mr. Grossman believes that Young's Franchise can 
offer prospective franchisees a strong brand name under 
which to trade. In addition, the company aims to give 
good general-management support so that franchisees should 
feel more secure in their businesses. It is felt likely 
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that franchisees would be better placed to survive 
recessions in demand because of the franchisor's 
management skills. Finally, the intershop-loan system for 
Young's should keep costs down for franchisees. 
The franchisor recognises that he is better able to 
control the quality of his brand image by running a 
franchise system or company shops, compared with 
distributing through independent menswear retailers. Mr. 
Grossman feels that the company gains much from the 
entrepreneurship of franchisees at the local level. Self- 
employment is much more likely to lead to alertness to 
opportunities for generating new business or controlling 
costs than an employee bonus scheme, however good this 
might be. 
Problems of ensuring' the honest reporting of sales 
are believed to be eased by franchising. The franchisee 
has a lot invested in his business and will be less likely 
to defraud, compared with an employee, as the Agreement 
could be terminated were irregularities discovered. Mr. 
Grossman emphasises this benefit. 
Mr. Grossman believes that there are capital-raising 
advantages to franchising. I was told that "It would have 
cost a fortune to build this network at 280,000 for each 
shop". This is a common view among franchisors which does 
not bear close examination. Shares could always be sold 
in the company without requiring the managerial 
participation of investors. 
5. Fees and returns 
Apart from the sales royalty of 10% which is 
discussed above, Young's franchise charges an initial 
lump-sum fee of 110,000 for a Pronuptia or Young's 
franchise, or of 215,000 when these are combined. In 
exchange for this, the franchisee receives 50% of the cost 
of all start-up advertising, franchise manuals, training, 
the design of a shop layout, and a press launch. The 
franchisor does not aim to make a profit from the initial 
fee. Franchisees confirm that the fee is largely spent at 
the start. Both the initial fee and the royalty may be 
set to extract any economic rent arising at the retail end 
of the business. However, these may not be varied once 
the Agreement is in place. I 
There is a profit component in the transfer price of 
products. However, Mr. Grossman maintains that he is very 
aware that shops are price-takers. Excessive transfer 
prices would drive them out of business. If this is so, 
then the tied-in sales could not be used to extract 
economic rent from franchisees as there would be none to 
take. The facility would be there if market conditions 
changed. 0' 
It costs 145,000 to set up a Pronuptia shop, 951,000 
to set up as Young's, and 278,000 to combine the two 
businesses. Estimates of start-up costs given to me by 
Mr. Grossman are recorded in appendix El. No 
profitability projections were supplied. Mr. Grossman 
described the business as profitable for both the 
franchisor and franchisee, although it is accepted that 
the current period is one of recovery from financial' 
difficulty. 
Mr. Grossmann asked me whether it was common for fees 
to be charged for renewal of franchise agreements. This 
matter had been under discussion among the directors. I 
informed him that practices varied among franchisors. 
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The franchisees 
1. Franchisee E, 
EjL has the largest franchise arrangement within 
Young's Franchise. He operates Young's and Pronuptia 
shops in XXXX and a combined unit in XXXX. I met him in 
his XXXX offices but observed both XXXX and XXXX shops. 
In total, he has 34 employees. He began,, in 1979, having 
previously been a self-employed journalist. 
Interestingly, the clause in the Agreement 
restricting other business interests has been modified in 
Et's case to enable him to operate a specialist dry- 
cleaning business from his premises. This service 
supplies replacement uniforms for hotels and similar 
establishments whilst cleaning takes place. The sideline 
fits in well with the Young's hire business. In addition, 
and in common with other Scottish franchisees, El can 
offer highland dress for hire but, unlike with the 
cleaning business, sales receipts count towards the 
royalty payment. Highland dress is an example of an 
exclusive local line supplied with the franchisor's 
consent, as permitted by the Agreement. 
E., believes that his obligations are to run his own 
business efficiently and to maintain the high quality 
image of the brand in his locality. He expects full 
support from the franchisor, who should also monitor the 
overall quality of service in the network. His main 
advantage from belonging to the system is the ability to 
trade under the brand name. The products are of high 
quality, according to E1, which is the basis for the brand 
image. Apparently, it is not worth using the intershop- 
loan system if a garment will be hired more than three 
times in a shop. As a large, multiple franchisee, R, is 
left to run things very much his own way. He controls his 
own leases. 
El provided some useful comments on the failure of 
the original company. At the receivership stage, the 
franchisees took legal advice and concluded that their 
beat assurance of liability discharge by the franchisor 
was their future commercial value if he managed to remain 
in business. Although one or two went independent, many 
franchisees were "very tolerant" as Young's Franchise 
recovered. At times, suppliers were difficult both from 
the company, and, as debts had been left unpaid by the 
failed business, also from outside. The position is now 
improved, although the unpaid debts make some firms 
reluctant to deal with the new company. Interestingly, 
Young's Franchise tries to encourage unincorporated status 
among its franchisees (although Rt operates as a limmited 
company). 0 
The franchisee confirms that Young's Franchise does 
not regularly quote clauses from the Agreement. On the 
whole# monitoring has been light, particularly an Scotland 
i. s distanced from London. Ei requested that the company 
tighten up on its checks on franchisee sales reporting. 
There are now seven managers charged with this task. He 
believes that all franchisees should contribute fairly to 
central costs. 
The franchise network 
confirms Mr. Grossman's claim 
over the business failure. 
been a few terminations over 
&part from the one or 
independent, a few more sold 
the failure. 
is fairly dispute free. Ri 
that most disputes have been 
He is aware that there have 
mon payment of fees. Also, 
two franchisees who went 
their franchises because of 
I 
E, is happy with his own profitabil 
that the business is fundamentally sound. 
structural details of the franchise system 
Grossman. He is aware of no company sales 
business. Based on his knowledge of 
transfer prices would appear to contain 
element. 
3-q 
ity and believes 
He confirms the 
outlined by Mr. 
targets for his 
the trade, the 
a small profit 
My observations were of a busy, locally based 
business. 
2. Franchisee Ea 
E2 opened a combined Young's and Pronuptia shop in 
partnership with his wife, in XXXX, in 1982. Previously 
he was employed as a senior manager in the retail trade. 
The combination is found to be effective, with bridalwear 
sales leadin'g to menswear hire. Most products are bought 
from Young's Franchise as tied-in sales. Hixhland-dress 
hire is also offered, along with sales of outfits for 
mothers of brides. These local lines lead to royalty 
payments. Bouquets and accessories are sold without 
11 ncurring royalties. There are five employees. 
E2 sees his obligations an maintaining standards or 
service in his area and paying his fees to Young's 
Franchise. In return, he expects good product ranges and 
centralised marketing support. He is left to run his 
business without excessive interference and values his 
independence. The main benefit of being a franchisee is 
felt to be the use of the brand name. The intershop-loan 
system is again not as highly valued as the franchisor 
might believe. 
E2 confirms that the Agreement is not regularly 
cited. He described a number Of implicit aspects of his 
contract. Small quantities of products may be bought from 
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outside the network without provoking the franchisor into 
action. No value could be quoted for this, but a 
franchisor would know what would be reasonable in a given 
situation. Also# the clause in the Agreement requiring 
the franchisee to spend 3% of turnover on local 
advertising is not enforced. 
Interestingly, at the start of the business, E2 took 
his lease through Young's Franchise. He was concerned 
about the implications of this for giving the company a 
means of extracting some of his profits. An exchange of 
letters guaranteed that the property rent would be passed 
on without a profit for Young's Franchise. When he 
renewed his contract in 1987, E2 took control of his own 
lease. 
Ea is aware that there have been some disputes in the 
franchise network, mainly at the time of receivership. He 
believes that most franchisees were very tolerant and 
stood by the company at a difficult time. Over the years, 
he has come to feel that the franchise fee has bought his 
less and less in return. He signed again with Young's 
Franchise partly because he felt the brand name to be 
useful and partly because he feared that a company shop 
would be set up to compete with him if he went 
independent. 
The franchisee confirms the structural details of the 
system. However, he feels that there could have been a 
profit element in his initial fee as he received no design 
help with his shop. Although he believes he could make 
more profit working independently, he also feels that 
survival prospects are better as part of a multiple-store 
chain. The belief in higher profits from independent 
operation does not accord with the fear of competition 
from company shops. It is most likely that Ex is thinking 
of his current need to cover his costs and pay a royalty, 
compared with an independent, when making this point. 
My observations were of a busy locally based 
business. It is run with care by E2 who takes pride in 
his independence yet wishes for some of the benefits of 
having a nationally known brand name. 
Franchisee E3 
E3 began as a Young's franchisee in XXXX in 1982. He 
had previously been in partnership with his brother in a 
menswear business until they fell out with each other. 
Now they engage in intense rivalry rather like a couple of 
characters in a Compton MacKenzie yarn. E*Is brother 
offers a men's formal-wear hire service in his shop based 
on the rival Dormie company. 
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The remarkable thing about E3'S franchise is that it 
is a fractional one. He has been allowed to establish the 
Young's menswear franchise on the upper floor of his men's 
outfitters shop. Moreover, he has rented out a part of 
that floor to a footwear business. The shop is fitted out 
as XXXX XXXX with Young's and XXXX XXXX XXXX added as 
shops within a shop. Even in the Young's section, R3 did 
not like the store design offered by Young's Franchise and 
modified colour schemes to his own taste. Yet, he 
re. ceived all normal franchisor support for the Young's 
part of his business including 50% of his launch 
advertising costs. An example of a lunch advertisement is 
given as Appendix E2 and clearly shows the individualism 
of E31s business. He employs 10 people, although only 
three of these are full time. 
E3 believes that his obligation is to maintain the 
quality of the Young's service in his area. He expects 
the franchisor to maintain the quality-brand image of the 
products by centralised promotion and by careful buying of 
products. The main advantage of being a franchisee is 
seen by E3 as being able to trade under the Young's name 
in the formal-hire side of his business. Yet he had never 
wanted to commit himself to only trading as Young's, but 
has continued to use his own name for the full business. 
In becoming involved with Young's, E3 saw an opportunity 
to add what he assessed as an high quality products to his 
existing business. Franchisor involvement in his 
management of the shop is low. He controls his own lease. 
E* does not participate very much in the intershop- 
loan system, preferring to own his stock. He must supply 
garments when he is requested to do so. His preference 
for keeping his own stocks is due to cost: if a garment is 
hired more than three times in a shop then it pays to 
have bought it. His stocks are extensive a fact which 
he demonstrAted by fitting my more than six foot frame 
with a tailcoat whilst I interviewed him. Sometimes he 
has experienced delay in receiving payments due to him 
under the intershop-loan system. 
The disputes mentioned by other franchisees, &rising 
due to receivership, are also known to R3* However, apart 
from the overdue intershop-loan payments, he has never 
experienced any disagreements himself. In that case, the 
matter was resolved after E3 withheld his franchise fee 
until the debts were paid. 
E3 confirms the details of the franchise system 
reported by Mr. Grossman. Also, he has never experienced 
the franchisor citing the Agreement. Clearly, the 
individualism demonstrated by his own business format 
indicates that the franchisor will be flexible in entering 
an Agreement. A particular implicit aspect of the 
contract is that the clause in the Agreement requiring the 
q3 
11 franchisee to spend 3% of his turnoverZ I is not enforced. E3 
is left to his own judgement in this area. 
A 9900 initial fee was paid. 13 is certain that 
Young's spent more than this on launching him as their 
contribution to advertising came to that amount. Royalty 
is only paid on the Young's part of the business. E3 is 
very happy with his profitability and takes great pleasure 
in performing better than his brother. 
My observations were of a fiercely independent local 
businessman who had succeeded in obtaining the benefits of 
the Young's brand without losing his own shop's identity. 
E31s business investment is less franchise specific due to 
his fractional status. 
Company outlets 
p 
To help in understanding the operations of Young's 
Franchise I interviewed Maureen Hamilton, the manageress 
of Pronuptia in Newcastle-upon-Tyne. This is company 
owned. The main aim of the interview was to check 
whether there are any significant operating differences 
between company-owned and franchised shops. I met her in 
her shop. 
The branch became a company shop in 1984, at the time 
when the Young's Franchise business failure began. The 
franchisee remained with Young's, and only gave up 
Pronuptia, in Newcastle. Mrs. Hamilton used to work for 
the franchisee and so can compare both arrangements. 
There are seven employees of whom four are full time. 
All supplies are from the company nowt whereas the 
franchisee did run some local lines. A weekly sales 
report is made now, as before. Occasional visits are made 
by an area manager# a little more frequently than used to 
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be the case when the shop was franchised. Mrs. Hamilton 
feels more secure in her employment now that the shop is 
company owned, although in fact only 50% of the previous 
workforce has been retained. She believes that sales- 
recording systems and checks are sufficient to en sure 
honest reporting. 
Mrs. Hamilton considers that the brand name helps to 
create sales in a very competitive business. 
I infer from the reduction in the workforce and the 
franchisee's exit from this business that it was 
experiencing financial difficulties. The company has 
reorganised it to enable it to survive. The profitability 
of the branch was not discussed with me. Even if this is 
low, avoiding unnecessary closures would have been very 
valuable to the company in 1984. Mrs. Hamilton does enjoy 
a sales-related bonus as part of her salary. 
The picture emerging from a comparison of company and 
franchised shops is that the company has better control 
over product lines in its own shops. In other respects, 
and leaving R3 aside, the company shop is no different 
from a franchised outlet in its appearance and day-to-day 
operations. However, the company cannot rely on local 
entrepreneurship but must be more involved in running its 
own shops. 
gummary 
Young's Franchise Limited sells its products through 
its franchised outlets and a lesser number of its own 
shops. Sometimes products are hired when a Young'; 9 
franchisee requests a garment on the intershop-loan system 
and this comes from a company shop. The picture is mainly 
one where franchisees invest in stocks and hire out men's 
formal attire or sell bridal wear. Tied-in sales leave 
open an avenue for extracting economic rent from 
franchisees. Young's Franchise attenuates problems of 
monitoring honest reporting of retail performance by the 
use of the franchise system. It also benefits from 
franchisee entrepreneurship at the local level. The 
franchisor perceives capital-raising advantages to 
franchising. His revenue comes from an initial fee, a 
sales royalty and the prices charged for tied-in products. 
Franchisees are given an intershop-loan system which 
appears not to be highly valued by them. The main benefit 
of belonging to the system is the right to trade using the 
brand name and the quality products. 
In practice, the detailed Agreement is not enforced 
in a number of areas. Complimentary sidelines are 
permitted in the cases of all franchisees whom I 
interviewec(. Revenue from these is usually not counted 
for royalty payments. In E3's case, the franchise has 
become fractional and he operates with a tailor-made 
Agreement. 
Franchisor control of products ranges, shop layout 
and operations can be seen at its weakest in E318 case and 
at its strongest in the company-owned shop. In fitting in 
with E3# Young's Franchise is not far removed from 
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Appendix El Young's Projection 
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PRONUPTIA* &YOUNG'S FRANCHISE 
Pronuptia-M 
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A typical Pronuptia shop is between 1,200 & 1,500 sq ft and a Young's no less than 
goo sq ft the ideal size being 1,000 sq ft. 
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CASE F- WIMPY INTERNATIONAL LIMITED 
The franchisor 
1. Backaround 
Wimpy International is part of the United Biscuits 
business empire, having previously been a part of Allied 
Lyons. Wimpy has been operating since the 1950s and has 
always franchised virtually all of its outlets. The 
annual sales revenue of the entire Wimpy chain is around 
ZJOO million in the U. K. Approximately 12,000 people are 
employed throughout the network. 
Since 1980, there has been a significant change in 
the nature of Wimpy's outlets. Prior to then, the 
business consisted of table-service restaurants with an 
average capacity of about 50 seats. The company is now 
phasing these out and moving over to a counter-service 
method of operation, along the lines of the American fast- 
food industry. Currently, in 1987, there are 432 outlets 
of which 117 are counter-service and 315 are table-based. 
87 of the counter-service and 309 of the table-service 
restaurants are franchised. In fact, the six company- 
owned table-service establishments came about by accident 
as they used to be franchised to United Biscuits. 
Approximately 60% of total sales revenue is generated by 
the counter-service side of the chain. 
Wispy has its own. bun and meat factories and a 
property division. There are specialised contracts with 
companies like Typhoo, Pepsi Cola and Coca Cola for 
supplies of drinks. There are also specialized contracts 
for the supply of uniforms, Paperwork, drinking straws and 
in-shop displays. Franchisees are required to take these 
items through Wimpy. The property division is occupied 
with identifying suitable sites, negotiating with high- 
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street landlords, and designing and fitting out 
restaurants. 
Some franchisees have more than one restaurant (in 
one case 12). Fractional franchises are not allowed as 
each restaurant must stand on a single-use site. 
All outlets are designed to appeal to passing custom, 
especially within the under 35-years age group. A major 
competitor for counter-service business is Macdonalds. 
The American rival does not franchise its restaurants in 
the U. K. 
Nature of the franchise 
I interviewed Mr. Colin McGlashan, Scottish Franchise 
Manager for Wimpy, in Edinburgh. His comments refer 
principallyAto counter-service operations because table- 
service restaurants are being phased out and are less 
relevant to current business strategy. He believes that 
the franchise is essentially an investment opportunity for 
a franchisee who requires about 1500,000 to set up a 
counter-service restaurant. Franchisees may well have 
other business interests and are likely to be involved in 
monitoring their restaurants rather than in actually 
working in them. Table-service franchisees would be more 
involved in catering operations management. Mr. McGlashan 
described the counter-service restaurants as "Factories 
which, once set up, can virtually run themselves following 
our very good systems". 
Wimpy offers a full business-format franchise with 
manuals covering all aspects of operations, sales and 
administration. A franchisee uses a highly standardised 
restaurant layout, buys his products through Wimpy, and 
receives continuing training and marketing support. Wimpy 
essentially sells its products and applies its production 
lot 
and marketing expertise through the franchise system. 
There is an expectation that franchisees will take leases 
through Wimpy, although it is argued that they would not 
be able to obtain these on their own. The franchise 
system is illustrated in Figure F, where arrowheads show 
the direction of sales. The franchisee does not formally 
give up his right to choose whether or not to supply a 
particular customer. The relative importance of table- 
service and counter-service, in theý sales of the 
franchisees and of company-owned outlets, is indicated by 
the division of the markets shown in Figure F. 
Mr. McGlashan believes that franchisees have an 
obligation to maintain the standards of service which are 
set up for the Wimpy chain ai3 a whole. In return, Wimpy 
must monitor the system to'weed out any poor units, give 
marketing support, and exercise purchasing expertise on 
behalf of franchisees. No financial support is offered, 
although Wimpy can direct franchisees to packages which 
have been devised by The National Westminster Bank and 
Barclays Bank. 
The Wimpy System of Operation for counter-service 
restaurants is very detailed. Stocks are very fast moving 
and a delivery system ensures that only two-days stocks 
need to be held, keeping franchisees' stockholding costs 
to a minimum. Very precise standards are laid down in 
cases like restaurant cleanlifiess: for example, cleaners 
are continually active during opening hours. Recipes are 
completely standardised. Finally a system of waste checks 
operates to monitor efficiency and honesty within each 
restaurant. 
A franchisee makes a large investment in a site 
layout and in equipment which could not easily be turned 
to other uses. He is contractually bound only to sell his 
business as a going concern and only with Wimpy's 
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permission. Any franchisee becomes necessarily highly 
committed to the chain. 
Contract 
3(i) The Aitreement 
Wimpy International uses a straightforward and fairly 
minimal, Franchise Agreement. A simplified outline of its 
main clauses now follows. A copy of the Agreement is 
available for inspection should this be required. The 
version analysed here is for counter-service franchisees, 
although the one for table-service franchisees is similar. 
The franchisor undertakes to maintain the good 
reputation of the brand, to supply shopfitting plans and 
advice, to train the franchisee and to provide start-up 
help. Widpy further promises to provide operating 
manuals, marketing support, new products from time to 
time, and economical supply lines. The company will be 
available to franchisees for consultation. These are all 
general undertakings and there is no attempt to tie down 
the details of advertising or transfer pricing, for 
example. 
The franchisee is granted tb 
trademarks including the logo, 
goodwill, and to copy the operating 
Wimpy for a term of 10 years. 
provided the franchisee satisfies t 
Agreement. There is no renewal fee. 
a number of precise undertakings. 
rights to use all 
o benefit from the 
methods belonging to 
The term is renewable 
e conditions of his 
The franchisee gives 
A franchisee's premises must meet with Wispy's 
explicit approval. To this end, a schedule is attached to 
the Agreement specifying the approved promises. In 
practice, this is used to tie in premises taken by Wispy 
11 103 
on a superior-lease agreement. There is nothing in the 
Agreement which rules out the case where a franchisee 
might make his own lease arrangements. 
The lump-sum initial franchise fee is set in a blank 
space left for the purpose. It is currently 110,000 in 
1987. In addition, a monthly royalty of 8.5% is to be 
paid on sales turnover excluding VAT. All franchise fees 
will carry VAT. The franchisor retains the right to 
inspect the franchisee's books to assess payments due to 
him, and anyway requires the submission of audited annual 
accounts. 
The franchisee undertakes to conform to the 
uniformity of the Wimpy Chain. The appearance of 
buildings is to be agreed with the franchisor. All signs 
and equipment must be bought from Wimpy, as must all food 
and other supplies. A standard menu is to be offered 
during agreed opening hours running at least between 10 
a. m. and 11 p. m. The franchisor is given the right to 
spot check the franchisee's business. 
During the term of the Agreement, the franchisee will 
engage in no similar hamburger business without the 
written consent of Wimpy. This is an unusually liberal 
professional-limitation clause for a franchise agreement. 
It reflects Wimpy's expectation of attracting investors 
who are likely to carry a portfolio of business interests. 
Also during the term# the franchisee will indemnify the 
franchisor against all risks arising through the 
franchisee's operations, and will take out "Prudent" 
amounts of employer-liability and public-liability 
insurance. 
The franchisee will submit himself or a nominee to at 
least twelve-weeks initial training. Costs are met by 
Wimpy, excluding travel and subsistence. 
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The franchise may, be sold with the franchisor's 
consent and subject to his right of first refusal to buy 
it at any price offered by a third party. Any purchaser 
acceptable to WimpY must pay the company an assignment fee 
to be determined by not to be less than 21,000 plus VAT. 
The franchise is inheritable by the franchisee's 
beneficiaries should he die. No management help for 
beneficiaries is detailed in the Agreemente 
The Agreement may be terminated by the franchisor, 
with discretionary notice, if operations are judged to be 
below standards, if there is default over fees, should the 
franchisee become insolvent or be convicted of serious 
criminal offences, if ownership or management of the 
franchisee's business changes in an unacceptable way, if 
inspection is refused, or if the franchisee sells non-menu 
items. Any other breach of the Agreement by the 
franchisee gives the franchisor the right to issue 30-days 
notice to terminate. On termination, the franchisee must 
sell back trade-marked items at the higher of market price 
or coatt if the franchisor requests this. 
There are some technical clauses: the Agreement is 
claimed to be the entire contract between franchisor and 
franchisee; it is to be governed by the law of England; 
non-exercise of rights does not imply their waiver by the 
franchisor; and clauses are severable. 
There are some interesting omissions from the 
Agreement. The franchisee cannot terminate by giving 
notice, although no doubt a breach of contract could 
easily be arranged by his to perform the same function. 
No significant professional limitations ai-e imposed on the 
franchisee. Finally, there are no provisions for 
compulsory arbitration or for interest payments on overdue 
payments. 
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3 (ii) Imv)licit aspeSts of the contract 
Mr. McGlashan believes that there are three implicit 
aspects of the contract with franchisees which are worth 
noting. These are business understandings which have 
emerged and which are governed by the long-term value of 
the business relationship. 
Although they would never advertise the fact, Wimpy 
would rescue a counter-service franchisee who fell into 
financial difficulties. Mr. McGlashan emphasises that 
this should not happen, given the level of market research 
which accompanies a launch and the franchisor's 
experience. However, it is felt that failures would be a 
very bad reflection on the chain, especially during the 
early days of counter-service franchising. There have 
been no cases requirinx such help. 
0 
A second implicit aspect of the contract is that 
wimpy always stands ready to act as superior lessee in 
obtaining high-street leases on premises for franchisees. 
High-street landlords are often reluctant to let their 
property for fast-food purposes and even Wimpy must on 
occasions pay a premium over going commercial rents. 
Landlords find that the subsequent rental value of a lease 
is affected by the kind of business which has operated 
from the premises. Fast Food has been regarded as a 
rather down-market activity with a lot of associated 
business failure. Consequentlyt individuals find it 
virtually impossible to obtain private leases. The normal 
practice is for Wimpy to take a lease for a counter- 
service site and then to sublet to a franchisee. Table- 
service restaurants tend to be away from prime sites and 
franchisees hold their leases fully in their own names. 
Care is needed in analYsing this understanding over 
counter-service leases as control of a franchiseets 
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property can be used by a franchisor as a mechanism for 
extracting any economic rent which may be present at the 
retail level. The understanding does not seem to operate 
as such a mechanism in this case. Wimpy takes a 26-year 
lease with an associated review of rent every five years. 
This is passed on to a franchisee as a 10-year lease with 
the same review of rent. The rental is simply passed on 
with an administration charge added. The handling charge 
is set in the sublease contract and is currently around 5% 
of the rental. Under these circumstances the franchisee 
is not vulnerable to variation of charges in a manner 
designed to remove any profits which he may be enjoying. 
Franchisees do not regard the handling charge as 
excessive, according to Mr McGlashan. This is confirmed 
by the franchisee interviewed below. 
It should be noted that the possibility always exists 
for Wimpy to use the initial setting of the administration 
charge as a rent-extraction device. If it is the case, as 
it seems to be, that Wimpy's involvement is needed to 
obtain the lease, and since franchisees are not prevented 
from acting alone, or with the help of a third party, any 
rent extracted would be converted into factor earnings. 
The reward would go to the superior lessorss risk-bearing 
services. 
The lease does not revert to Wimpy in the event of 
termination of the Franchise Agreement. Property control 
cannot be used to preserve the goodwill attached to a site 
in the hands of the franchisor. At present, it would seen 
that Wimpy provides a lease-obtaining service# in the case 
of counter-service sites, for which it receives its costs. 
The third implicit aspect of the contract covers 
territory. There is nothing in the Agreement which grants 
a protected territory to the franchisee. Mr. McGlashan 
states that it is understood that a franchisee will always 
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have first refusal on any restaurant likely to impinge on 
his sales. In practice this is unlikely to be of great 
practical significance except in two cases. First, where 
the table-service network is being allowed to diminish 
over time, counter-service restaurants which are likely to 
compete with the older units are set up from time to time. 
The practice is that the table-service franchisee for the 
area is offered the counter-service unit. The other case 
arises when it is thought that establishing two 
neighbouring restaurants can return more revenue and 
profit than a single unit. In such a case, an existing 
franchisee would be offered the additional unit. 
3(iii) Enforcement and Monitoring 
Wimpy has a system of very close monitoring of the 
restaurants. The same methods are used both for company- 
owned and franchised outlets; they are also broadly 
similar for counter-service and table-service units. 
Sales turnover and all inputs are reported weekly. Daily 
conduct of the business is observed by operations managers 
who make unannounced spot checks at roughly monthly 
intervals. Quarterly audits are made of all restaurants. 
Mr. McGlashan emphasises that the monitoring system 
helps to control the business for a franchisee. It is 
very difficult for fraud to go undetected. Wimpy knows 
what materials go into a unit and has a shrewd idea of 
normal waste rates. The routines prescribed for the 
franchisee include physical waste checks. At a counter- 
service unit it will be someone's job to inspect the 
dustbins at two-hour intervals to check the amount of 
waste. Everything must tally: waste, waste ratio, 
turnover and material inputs. The checks are of value to 
the franchisee, who could be losing money to dishonest 
staff# as well an of benefit to the franchisor. 
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Wimpy also has a clear idea of staffing levels which 
will be required for a restaurant. This results from 
company operating experience. The rule for counter- 
service is that 20% of all costs will &rise on labour. 
The franchise system itself discourages fraud in this area 
anyway. Since royalties are levied on turnover and not on 
profits, franchisees have no incentive to hide returns as 
mythical labour costs. 
Mr. McGlashan believes that the monitoring system is 
very efficient. The next step will be to computer-link 
all outlets with the centre. 
Wispy would not wish to quote contractual clause* to 
franchisees. The preference is for mutually advantageous 
development of the business. Mr. McGlashan thinks that 
"The franchisor in probably not tough enough with 
franchisees'*on occasions". This is because it is felt 
that the pursuit of court cases would not be good for 
Wimpyto reputation as a franchisor. 
There are occasional conflicts within the system 
between Wispy and franchisees. These have often been over 
standards in the table-service restaurants and have been 
resolved through exhortation. No terminations have 
occurred nor have there been cases of franchisees breaking 
their contracts and leaving. A few franchisees have been 
bought out by Wimpy, although Mr. McGlashan declines to 
give precise figures. There are no obvious cases of 
encouraged sales or restaurants by franchisees to third 
parties. However, table-s*rvice franchisees are not 
encouraged to renew their Agreements. 
There in & rranchisee association which meets 
annually. 
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4. Wh: r franchise? 
Mr. McGlashan believes that franchisees mainly gain 
from trading under the Wispy brand name, and by having 
access to high-street sites which would otherwise be 
denied to them. In addition# monitoring systems help the 
restaurants virtually to run themselves. Marketing 
supportt including product development, in available to 
franchisees who would otherwise be working in isolation. 
Wimpy benefits from franchising principally by being 
able to concentrate on property acquisition, purchasing# 
marketing and the design of operating systems, according 
to Mr. McGlashan. The franchisee concentrates on local 
operations, with support, and will be highly committed to 
achieving results. Wimpy operates its own restaurants; 
it is generally because of specific strategic or financial 
reasons (fo: ý examplet two units have been set up in 
Princes Street in Edinburgh as flagship operations in 
Scotland). 
Mr. McGlashan also perceives financial advantages to 
the franchisor from franchising. This perception in 
common among franchisors but does not stand up to 
analysis. Drawing in capital from investors may always be 
done without insisting on their participation in 
management. 
5. Fees and returns 
Apart from 
royalty of 8.5%, 
from Wiapy. Mr. 
profit component 
sales. In many 
up a franchise 
products. 
the 1109000 initial fee and the sales 
the franchisee must purchase his products 
McGlashan maintains that there in no real 
in either the initial fee or the tied-in 
cases# it can cost Wispy 1259000 to start 
Tied-in sales act to "standardise" 
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It is interesting to note that the franchisor has a 
number of possible routes for extracting any economic rent 
from franchisees. The initial fee, sales royalty and 
tied-in sales may all be used for this purpose an way the 
setting of the administration fee applied to any sublease 
which may exist. Once the initial franchisee fee and the 
sublease administration charge have been set# and given 
that the royalty is part of the renewable agreement, only 
the transfer prices of tied-in sales leave scope for the 
variation of the franchisor's returns. 
It costs about 2500,000 to set 
restaurant, a figure which often 
annual sales turnover is projected V 
similar level. The projection or 
given in Appendix F. No sales 
franchisees. 
A 
up a counter-service 
surprises. However, 
y the franchisor at a 
costs and returns are 
tarsets are set for 
Mr. McGlashan believes profitability in "Better than 
average" for both franchisor and franchisee. 
The franchisees 
1. Franchisee F, 
P, began his counter-service restaurant in MCKX in 
1986. go is a model of the new type of franchisee that 
wimpy is seeking. His background in an a member of the 
Edinburgh financial community. He sold a farm and came in 
to some family money# and was looking for an investment 
when advice from The Royal Bank of Scotland suggested-s, 
wispy Franchise. Fi also has an interest in a textil* 
company. 
There are 35 people OUPIOYOd on a shift system in the 
restaurant. Passing food trade generates the volume of 
business projected by Wispy. About 5pOOO customers pass 
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through the unit on a busy Saturday. Annual sales 
turnover is around the 2500,000 mark. Mr. McGlashan's 
description of a counter-service restaurant as a factory 
was borne out by my observations: the staff man equipment 
which sends food to the counter and the customers. F, 
confirms that the operating plan can be followed virtually 
without variation. Even the division of his costs with 
46% being spent on food and 20% on labour, is almost 
exactly as forecast. All products are bought through 
Wimpy. 
F, sees his obligations to Wimpy as maintaining ir 
not improving the brand image in the XXXX area. In return, 
he expects the company to develop the brand nationally and 
exercise quality control over the products. He definitely 
expects any poor outlets to be weeded out or improved. 
The main advantage to belonging to the franchise system is 
seen as the'right to use the closely monitored operations 
procedures, with waste checks, standardized recipes and 
management support. Fi believes that this in ideal for an 
investor who does not wish to spend all of his time 
involved in operations management. Apart from this, he 
finds the brand image or a standardised product useful in 
attracting customers who are often visitors to XXXX. 
Another benefit is on the product side: some supplies are 
half the price that an independent restaurateur would pay. 
Finally# F, believes he would not have obtained his lease 
without Wimpy's willingness to act as head lessee. 
The franchisee does not find the written Agreement in 
any way onerous but does feel that abuses would lead to 
legal action from the franchisor. He feels that visits by 
area managers are to help rather than to monitor him. It 
is definitely an understanding that he has first refusal 
on any site which would compete with hint although there 
is no specified territory. Fi thinks that occasional 
disputes are confined to the older table-service units: 
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"We all have too much tied up in the new restaurants to 
fall out with each other". He believes that his initial 
fee was more than spent by Wimpy at the launch. 
F, confirms the structural details of the franchise 
which were reported by Mr. McGlashan. He is also able to 
make an interesting comparison concerning his own 
profitability. His returns are better than he would 
receive as interest on his capital from a bank but a 
little less than had been projected. He states that his 
annual profit, before interest, tax and depreciation and 
as a simple percentage of his investment, is around 13% at 
present. It should be remembered that the business is in 
its first year. Ft is very happy with his investment and 
would like to take on another restaurant as soon an 
possible. 
A finiLl observation which I recorded whilat 
interviewing Ft was that Wimpy could not hire a local 
manager of his calibre for the wages which would most 
likely be offered. 
Franchisee A 
F2 opened her table-service restaurant in 1978, 
having previously worked as a catering manager for a 
different company. She had first refusal on the new 
counter-service franchise in P but declined it due to 
the size of the invest"nt. Her own restaurant has 48 
seats, employs seven p Ooplet and runs along more 
traditional lines. All products are bought through Wimpy. 
F2 has another, unrelated, restaurant elsewhere in the 
XM area. 
The franchisee sees her obligations an saintaining 
high standards of operation in her restaurant. In return, 
she expects WimPY to maintain the status of the brand. 
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She feels that the brand name is the main advantage of 
being a franchisee. Whilst operating manuals were 
supplied, she did not need then due to her previous 
experience and the type of restaurant which she runs. F2 
is very much involved in the operations management of her 
unit. She holds her own lease on the premises. 
Fz does not find her Agreement to be burdensome and 
nor does she experience its citation by Wispy. She 
accepts that the understanding over first refusal on a 
competing development was honoured by Wimpyt but is 
disappointed that the company has gone ahead with a 
different franchisee in her town. On the whole, her 
experience of the franchisor was of a "fair-going" 
partner. 
Profits, which were "very good", have fallen as a 
result of the counter-service development. However, F2 
has no intention of leaving the system when her Agreement 
comes up for renewal. 
Compamr-owned restaurants 
Mr. Andrew Hirst. Manager. Princ2s Street One. RdinbUrgh 
I interviewed Mr. Hirst at Wimpy's counter-service 
restaurant known as Princes Street 1 in order to make some 
comparisons between company-owned and franchised units. 
Mr. Hirst is the manager of the restaurant which, along 
with its sister unit in Princes Street, acts an a flagship 
operation in Scotland. He Joined Wimpy as a graduate 
trainee in 1982 and has had four specific posts leading up 
to the present one. It should be emphasised that no 
sideways comparison is being made here between Mr. Hirst 
as the manager of a counter-service restaurant and Fi as a 
franchisee. The latter employs a manager with =any of Mr. 
Hirst's functions. 
Managers like Mr. Hirst have short, tours of duty at 
any one restaurant of about a year's duration. Around 
five managers report to an Area Executive. Their 
operations are firmly tied to company procedures. Mr. 
Hirst has a free choice over his expenditure only with 
respect to a small operating expenses budget, which is 
used for purchasing things like light bulbs. An a company 
manager he must make daily cost as well as revenue 
reports. He knows that franchisees have much more cost 
freedom as they are monitored principally on results. For 
franchisees, it does not matter how results are attained 
although labour and food costs cannot be varied without 
jeopardising results. 
In practice, there is no significant difference 
between the appearance of a franchised and a company-owned 
counter-service restaurant. Mr. Hirst states that 
franchised Units might be less well lit during quiet 
periods and franchisees save on lighting costs using their 
greater freedom over inputs. Otherwise, layout is 
similar, staffing levels are identical and the same menu 
is used. 
Franchised counter-service units have made an impact 
on Wimpy's scheme of remuneration for staff. In early 
1987, a profit-related bonus scheme was added to managers' 
pay. Mr. Hirst believes this was because the franchisees 
had introduced good bonuses for their managers and Wispy 
became concerned about recruitment. 
Mr. Hirst believes that he achieves an acceptable 
level of profit in his restaurant although the opening of 
the second unit in Princes Street did lower his returns. 
He knows that overall profits are better on the two units 
than either shop could make in isolation. Wispy opened up 
in Princes Street to provide a visible model for Scottish 
potential franchisees. The second unit opened to pre-empt 
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any intention a Competitor might have to start up along 
Princes Street. The units are at each end of the street. 
In time, one of the two may well be turned into a 
franchise. 
summary 
Wimpy represents a mature franchise system which was 
initially established in the 1950s. In recent years, 
operating methods have moved from table-service to 
counter-service techniques. An associated problem has 
been the need to run down the established network of 
table-service restaurants without simply abandoning 
existing franchisees. In general, this has been achieved 
by offering counter-service opportunities to table- 
service franchisees. Often, however, it is a new breed of 
investor franchisee who is taking up the modern units. The 
new system appears to be designed to give profits which 
are just a few percentage points better than interest 
payments on banking deposits. 
The franchisor uses the current system to sell 
products and well-developed restaurant-management systems. 
comparing franchised with company-owned counter-service 
units monitoring problems are less severe: franchisees can 
be more easily trusted over honest reporting and are 
naturally inclined to take care over inputs. Franchising 
places a layer of high-quality management at the local 
level. 
Franchisees benefit 
low-cost products and 
methods. Wimpy has a nul 
a division of business 
franchisee can be set. 
royalty payment# transfer 
property-lease management 
from use of the brand name, from 
from well-designed operating 
aber of instruments through which 
returns between franchisor and 
These are the initial fee, the 
prices for tied-in sales and 
charges. Of theset the royalty 
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payment appears to be the main source of Wimpy's business 
returns. Products are transferred at low prices 
containing modest mark-ups. Leases are not always under 
the control of Wimpy and, when they are, appear to be very 
fairly managed. The initial fee can be more than spent-at 
a launch. However, once set, the royalty is difficult to 
vary. The only possibility for collecting any economic 
rent which might arise at the retail end of the business 
would be through the transfer prices of products. To the 
extent that any economic rent depends upon advantages 
conferred by The Wimpy System, its extraction amounts to 
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Appendix F I (ý 
WIMPY 
2a Counter sermce projection 
Initial investment LK EX 
Fees Frarxhse 10 
Estate agent 4 
BUiding sur4W 1 
Structural engneer 1 
16 16 
Property SoficHDr etc. 5 
Starm duty 1 
66 
Construction *ntWWheatJng 50 
building & stvpftttng- 165 
Kitchen equipnýierft 95 
Sigrs & Fixtures 40 
350 350 
Pre-opening Training 20 
Wages 1 
Operatirg costs 1 
Rert 8 
30 30 
Total initial investment 402 
Five year profit Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 (cash flow) LK LK LK LK &K 
Turnover100% 500 550 605 665 732 
Food cost 375% 187 206 227 250 275 
Wages 20% 100 110 121 133 146 
Operating costs 9% 45 50 54 60 66 
Franchise contribution 85% 43 47 52 57 62 
Rates 16 19 21 23 26 
Rent 40 40 40 40 40 
Profit (cash flow) 69 78 90 102 117 
Before interest ax and deprecation 
119 
CASE G PIZZA EXPRESS LIMITED 
The franchisor 
1. Background 
Pizza Express Limited was established in 1965 by 
Peter Boizot the well-known London-based entrepreneur. 
The company now comprises 40 pizza restaurants, of which 
28 are franchised. The chain is concentrated in and 
around London; and the 12 company-owned units are all in 
Central London. Franchisees between them employ about 300 
people. On top of this figure, the company employs around 
100 more, giving a total of roughly 400 employees. 
Approximately 80,000 customers are served each week by the 
chain, which has an annual sales turnover of about 130 
million. Franchising was begun in 1972 originally as a 
means of retaining a mans, ger who wished to set up his own 
restaurant. 
Each restaurant seats 80 or so customers and serves 
pizza dishes in stylish surroundings. A Pizza Express 
restaurant is often used for business lunches or for meals 
after theatre visits. Menus must be distinguished from 
those of fast-food outlets: Pizza Express offers classic 
pizza meals in a true restaurant setting. A company-owned 
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two or three si 
not permitted as the 
sites. Some multiple 
sub-chains would not be 
eixht restaurants. Even 
would be likely to be 
tea. 
I It 0 
Pizza Express is a member of the British Franchise 
Association. There is also a franchisee association 
within the company which meets once every six months. 
2. Nature of the franchise 
I interviewed Jonathan Dell, Franchise Manager for 
pizza Express at the company's Wardour Street restaurant. 
He believes that franchisees are obliged/to maintain the 
company's brand image of quality food and service in their 
restaurant operations. Keeping to specified recipes and 
designs are the important aspects in this. In return, Mr. 
Dell considers that the franchisor should be available for 
consultation and advice, and that he should monitor the 
entire restaurant chain to ensure standards are met. 
Pizza Express offers a full business-format franchise 
with manuais covering recipes, and other operating, 
administration and marketing procedures. Franchisees are 
bound by their agreements to buy supplies only from the 
company. Essentially, the franchisor sells products and 
his business management skills through a network of 
restaurants in which franchisees copy the format of 
company-owned units. The franchise system is illustrated 
in Figure G, where arrowheads show the direction of sales. 
Nothing in the franchise agreement causes a franchisee to 
give up his freedom to choose whether or not to supply a 
particular customer. 
The franchisor provides eight-weeks initial training 
for the franchisee at an established restaurant. This is 
followed by continuing training support for both the 
franchisee and his staff. The franchisee must meet the 
travel and subsistence costs of trainees. 
Advertising expenditures are divided on the basis 
that the franchisee has responsibility for his local 
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efforts. Sponsorship advertising is undertaken by Pizza 
Express on a discretionary basis. 
Pizza Express provides no financial help for 
intending franchisees. The ability of an individual to 
raise funds from independent sources is regarded as an 
important part of the selection process. The company does 
direct franchisees to financial packages offered by the 
main commercial banks; particularly 'those from The 
National Westminster Bank and from The Midland Bank. 
Excluding property acquisition fees, which would 
amount to Z100,000 it costs Z100,0000 to 1120,000 to start 
up a Pizza Express restaurant. Of this sum, shop-fitting 
and design services make up roughly 50%, and around 25% 
pays the initial lump-sum franchise fee and various 
professional charges. Expenditures in these two areas 
represent non-recoverable costs should the franchisee wish 
to leave the business given that property leases always 
belong to the franchisor. They are sunk costs which, 
given their size, will encourage commitment to his 
restaurant's success on the part of the franchisee. 
kemaining equipment costs would be substantially 
recoverable on second-hand markets. The franchisor's 
projection of costs and returns for a restaurant is given 
as Appendix G. 
Contract 
3(i) The Franchise Agreement 
Pizza Express uses a detailed and extensive Franchise 
Agreement which is normally issued in conjunction with a 
property underlease. The main Agreement runs to 31 pages 
and has a very legalistic format. Its appearance does not 
tally with Mr. Dell's statement to me that "We would like 
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to tear up the contract but unfortunately it is a 
necessity". The Agreement is not a nominal document. 
The presence in the Agreement of a requirement that 
property leases must be taken through the franchisor is 
unusual. It is more usual for an unwritten understanding 
to develop in this area. The device may help franchisees 
to obtain premises but is not aimed at this. Mr. Dell 
states that early agreements did not contain the condition 
which need not be made compulsory just to give help. The 
head lease, along with other devices, can perform three 
functions for the franchisor. First, it can keep a site 
in his possession should the franchisee leave the 
business: thus preserving business goodwill as an asset 
for the franchisor. Secondly, it can be an instrument for 
extracting any economic rent accruing to the franchisee: 
the franchisor can increase his profits by increasing the 
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commercial rent attached to the lease when it comes up for 
renewal. Other devices also have these functions: for 
example, professional limitation clauses prevent an ex- 
franchisee from competing for a period following his exit 
from the business, and tied-in sales can extract any 
economic rent. 
Finally, where there is a large sunk investment by 
the franchisee, an head lease can increase his commitment. 
In the case of a Pizza Express franchisee, large 
expenditures on restaurant design are made. If he owned 
the freehold on the unit, some of these costs would not be 
sunk as the designs might be incorporated into another 
business. Note that the franchisor could minimise the 
franchisee's commitment by making the sunk investment and 
then leasing the fully designed unit to him. 
There now follows a simple account of the Agreement. 
A copy of this is available for inspection should this be 
required. 
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The Agreement grants the franchisee the right to use 
the trade name, operating procedures and accounting 
methods of Pizza Express. The term for which it is to run 
is specified separately but is usually 10 years. It is 
renewable for a further 10 years, this renewal length 
being written into the Agreement. A renewal fee of not 
more than 10% of the then current initial fee may be 
charged. 
The franchisor undertakes to supply training and 
advice, assistance at the launch of the restaurant, and 
design specifications. He will pass on any results from 
research activities. Furthermore, Pizza Express is to 
specify suppliers for fittings and for promotional 
material. 
The franchisee agrees to follow laid-down procedures, 
to pay a separately specified initial luMP-sum franchise 
fee (currently 112,600) and to pay a 4% royalty on sales 
turnover excluding VAT. All charges levied by the 
franchisor carry VAT which may be reclaimed by the 
franchisee. In an attached schedule, the franchisee 
further agrees to use an architect approved by the 
franchisor for design of his restaurant, to present staff 
for training, to buy only the tied-in products, to stick 
to a standard menu, and to register a weekly sales report 
with the franchisor. He undertakes to run no separate 
pizza restaurant within two-mile radius of any Pizza 
Express unit, during the tbrm of the Agreement and for a 
further two years. 
The franchisee further agrees to purchase employers- 
lability and public-liability insurance to the value of 
9250,000 cover, and to indemnify the franchisor against 
claims arising at the franchisee's restaurant. 
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There is a provision in the Agreement for a 0.5% levy 
on the franchisee's turnover to be paid to a centralised 
advertising fund. This has not yet been enforced (1987). 
The franchisor has the right to vary the terms of this 
with the approval of affected franchisees, for individual 
variations, or with majority consent if all are to be 
affected. 
The franchise way be sold with the franchisor's 
consent. The franchisor has first refusal on the offer 
for sale. Any disputes over valuation are to be settled 
by an arbiter who is a Chartered Surveyor, with his fee 
being equally divided between the parties. If the 
franchise is sold to a third partyt the assignee must pay 
Pizza Express an unspecified "current investigation fee". 
The franchise is inheritable on Similar terms, with a 
beneficiary being treated like a purchaser. However, a 
manager wili be provided for six months at cost to help a 
beneficiary, if necessary. If a beneficiary has not taken 
on the franchise within eight months of the death of his 
benefactor, Pizza Express can terminate the Agreement. 
Termination of the Agreement may occur whenever one 
party breaches a condition. In such a case, 30-days 
notice must be given during which the fault may be 
corrected with no further penalty. However, Pizza Express 
can terminate without notice if the franchisee becomes 
insolvent# if he is convicted of a serious criminal 
offence, or if the ownership of his business changes 
without the franchisor's approval. 
In. the event of terminationt the franchisee must 
return all manuals and remove all trade-marked items from 
his restaurant. The franchisor can choose whether to buy 
back fixtures and fittings attached to the unit, at prices 
to be agreed at the time. 
Interest is payable at an annual rate 5% above 
Midland Bank base rate on any overdue payments to the 
franchisor. 
The franchisee may sell meals at prices which are 
below but not above those recommended by the franchisor. 
There are two technical- conditions: each clause is 
severable, and non-exercise of a right by the franchisor 
does not constitute its waiver. There are no conditions 
allocating a territory to the franchisee. The need for 
secrecy is only covered indirectly by the franchisee's 
undertakings to protect trade marks. Finally, there are 
no compulsory arbitration clauses other than the one 
concerning valuation of the franchise. 
3(ii Implicit aspects of the contract 
0 
Mr. Dell believes that there are two implicit aspects 
of the contract which are important. The first of these 
has already been touched on above: the requirement in the 
Agreement for a contribution towards the franchisor's 
advertising costs from the franchisee equal to 0.5% of 
turnover is not enforced. Instead# the franchisor pays 
all of his costs and makes discretionary expenditures. 
The decision not to enforce is an understanding backed by 
market governance. It must be worth collecting the 
contribution which would amount to around 2100,000 at 
current turnover levels. The franchisor probably feels 
that to do so would discourage the recruitment of 
franchisees. Mr. Dell cannot give a precise reason for 
the practice. 
The second implicit aspect Of the contract concerns 
the sales territory awarded to each restaurant. Nothing 
is written in the Agreement about thiss no doubt due to 
worries about contravening legislation on restrictive 
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trade practices. In practice, there in an understanding 
that an existing franchisee will always be offered first 
refusal on a new site which is likely to encroach on his 
market. There is much room for franchisor discretion in 
interpreting this understanding. Its value to the 
franchisor arises from market conditions: franchisees must 
be reassured in this respect or else recruitment may 
suffer. 
3(iii) Enforcement and monitoring 
Mr. Dell states that Pizza Express tries to build a 
good management relationship based on trust and avoids 
quoting clauses of the Agreement to franchisees. I was 
told that "Waving the contract about would end the trust". 
pizza Express is well aware that a franchisor cannot 
afford to gain a reputation for being heavy handed over 
his interpr*etation of the Agreement. Termination is 
therefore regarded as a last resort in settling any 
dispute. Failure of a franchisee for any reason would be 
likely to adversely affect recruitment. 
I. 
Franchisees report their sales turnover each week. 
Honest reporting is encouraged by the requirement for them 
to buy all supplies from Pizza Express (unless the company 
cannot supply an item). The company has a good idea of 
how much turnover will be generated from a given input of 
its products. A centralized complaints system means that 
a franchisee runs the risk that a complaint would alert 
the franchisor to a bootlegged sale. Given his very large 
investment, which he is unlikely to wish to Jeopardize, a 
franchisee should be less inclined towards fraudulent 
practices compared with an employed manager. Honest 
practices within the restaurant will be policed by the 
franchisee who has an incentive to monitor his own staff 
as it is he who is the residual claimant. 
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Standards of presentation and service are checked by 
Pizza Express management at roughly monthly intervals and 
through the medium of surprise visits. A checklist is 
used to ensure that the correct items are on menus or in 
refrigerators, and that cleanliness is achieved throughout 
a unit. 
Mr. Dell claims that the franchise system does not 
generate many serious disputes but accepts that there are 
occasional "gripes" - An example of a gripe would be when 
a franchisee might not wish to serve capuccino coffee 
although it is policy to do so. Mr. Dell can cite only 
one serious dispute which arose when a franchisee wanted 
to design his restaurant on the cheap. This case led to 
the only termination of an Agreement in the history of the 
company. 
No franchisee has left the system either by not 
renewing an agreement or by selling out. 
4. Why franchise? 
Pizza Express originally began to franchise in 1972 
as a means of retaining a restaurant manager who wished to 
set up his own business. Subsequent experience with the 
system showed that it fulfilled a need. Whilst there are 
12 company-owned units in Central London, most recent 
expansion has been through the creation of franchises. It 
is notable that the company-owned restaurants are 
geographically concentrated. Over longer distances 
detailed supervision is avoided by using franchising. 
However, Mr. Dell does not rule out opening further 
company-owned units: each case would be considered 
individually. 
Mr. Dell believes that Pizza Express benefits from 
franchisee entrepreneurship at the local level. 
Franchisees would be more likely to make efforts to drum 
up business compared with company managers. Mr. Dell also 
feels that honestly problems are less worrying in a 
franchise system# for the reasons which I, discuss. 
The franchisor also perceives capital-raising 
advantages to franchising although arguments of this kind 
do not bear close scrutiny. Drawing in outside funds need 
not require investors to participate in the management of 
restaurants, unless they set this as a condition of making 
an investment. 
Mr. Dell believes that the main advantages to 
franchisees of belonging to the system is the chance to 
trade under the brand name. Apart from this, the tied-in 
sales from the company warehouse give one-stop shopping 
possibilities which should save transactions costs for 
franchisees, 
Fees and returns 
The initial lump-sun franchise fee of 2129600 (in 
1987) is described by Mr. Dell as embodying a 20% profit 
element. This is regarded as small. Otherwise the fee is 
spent on launch promotion and on administering the start 
of the new franchise. 
Mr. Dell states that the mark up on tied-in sales is 
very small: only normal business returns are made on them. 
Interestinglyt the same transfer prices are used between 
the warehouse and company-owned restaurants. This 
practice is consistent with rational transfer pricing but 
does not mean that profits from the retail end of the 
business are not being shifted back to the warehouse. The 
comparison which matters is with market prices. if 
franchisees could buy more cheaply from elsewhere, then 
either resources are wasted buying from genuinely dearer 
company sources or else profits are being shifted. A 
further option is that franchisees cannot buy more cheaply 
and the mark up on the franchisor's goods is simply a 
return to his procurement skills. A final option is that 
they cannot buy more cheaply and, as claimed, the 
franchisor's mark up is negligible; so that he simply 
operates his sales as a service for franchisees. In this 
case, the restrictions on purchasing may operate simply to 
control quality. It could even be that the franchisee is 
made to suffer a little inefficiency over costs in order 
to control quality. 
The sales royalty levied at 4% on turnover is not an 
high proportion but accounts for the main source of the 
franchisor's revenue, according to Mr. Dell. This is set 
in the renewable Agreement and could not be varied as a 
means of extracting any economic rent appearing at the 
retail end of the business. 
The company aims to pass on the commercial rents for 
property leases at cost with the addition of an 
administrative charge of 5%. The charge could be varied 
at rent-review periods which are written into lease 
agreements; these are normally at five-year intervals. 
Pizza Express has lease charges, the initial fee, the 
royalty level and the transfer prices of tied-in sales as 
devices which it could set to extract any economic rent 
which might be present at the retail end of the business. 
However# once agreements are in place, only the transfer 
prices of products and lease charges can be varied. 
Sales targets are set for franchisees and depend on 
the compaur's view of growth prospects for a particular 
market. There is no uniform growth rate which in expected 
of all units. 
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Mr. Dell believes that profits are well above the 
average for the restaur ant trade, both, for Pizza Express 
and for franchisees ' No figures were quoted. He argues 
that this is reflected in the high demand for franchises: 
he receives 40 enquiries a week and has a problem finding 
sites. 
Franchisee Gi 
G, began as a Pizza Express franchisee in 1986 in 
partnership with XXXX. I interviewed G, in his restaurant 
which is based at X= in London. The restaurant seats 
around 40 customers and employs four people not counting 
the franchisees. Gi was previously self-employed as an 
entertainment promoter and XXXX continues to be an 
accountant. The restaurant was started after the two 
franchisees saw a company-owned unit, heard of the 
franchise arrangements, and pursued their enquiries with 
pizza Express. 
Gi was the only franchisee whom the company 
encouraged me to interview. 
All products are bought from Pizza Express. This is 
not always agreeable to G, who believes that he could 
purchase equivalent products more cheaply from elsewhere. 
There have been some minor disputes over this. Git has 
responded to the franchisor's exhortation and does not try 
to use other suppliers as he believes that he must 
maintain a good relationship. Interestingly, I was told 
that the only franchisee who is some distance from London, 
the one for Jersey, is given greater freedom over his 
supplies. This suggests that standards can be achieved 
with outside supplies. However, tying down inputs may be 
a cheap way for the franchisor to encourage proper 
standards. If G, could save on input costs and still meet 
objective criteria for recipes and presentation, as he 
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claims, then the franchisor is controlling standards at 
the franchisee's cost. . It should be noted that some 
monitoring would need to be added to the existing system 
if purchasing freedom were given to franchisees. This 
would not be costless and could result in greater fees to 
franchisees compared with any higher prices currently 
faced: it still does not follow that the franchisor must 
be extracting economic rent. 
G, sees his obligations in the franchise system as 
paying his fee and maintaining standards in his 
restaurant. He expects Pizza Express to provide general 
support and training, and to monitor the system to prevent 
poor units arising to tarnish the brand image. Overall, 
the franchisor "Was very helpful at the start although a 
bit hidebound". Gi finds that innovations which he 
proposes are not drawn on to the extent he would like to 
see. However, he experiences no onerous monitoring or 
regular quotation of his Agreement. 
The franchisee sees the brand name of Pizza Express 
as an important advantage to his business. He believes 
that people do . --. set out for an evening out intending to 
finish up at their neighbouring Pizza Express restaurant. 
In addition to this, he feels that his risks are reduced 
by being a franchised business. G, is aware that the 
failure rate for franchised new businesses is lower than 
for new businesses in general. In his particular case, 
Pizza Express has made it clear that they would buy him 
out rather than see his unit close: the franchisor 
believes there is a sound prospect for the business in 
XXXX and would not wish to a publicised failure if the 
franchisee could not produce good results. 
G. t confirms the structural details of the franchise 
system which were reported by Mr. Dell. He is convinced 
that the initial fee does contain a substantial profit 
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element because no major cost items or services were 
provided at the start-up by Pizza Express. Nevertheless, 
G, is happy with his profits, especially as his restaurant 
is only recently established. He hopes in time to add a 
further unit. 
My observations were of a quality restaurant which is 
becoming established in the village setting of XXXX. 
j 
Company Outlet 
I was able to compare the day-to-day operation of the 
company-owned restaurant in Wardour Street, where I met 
Mr. Dell, with Gi's franchise in XXXX. Whilst the Wardour 
Street and XXXX restaurants differ slightly in their 
individual design this is to no greater extent than would 
be expected to take account of the features of local 
markets. The external appearance and the interior 
decoration is similar for both. XXXX aims for more of a 
village restaurant image than Wardour Street. Menus, 
staffing levels and procedures are identical in both 
cases - 
Mr. Dell states that company-owned restaurants 
automatically achieve the laid-down operating standards, 
once managers have applied company procedures. Franchises 
require more delicate treatment as they are self-employed 
businessmen. They must be kept feeling that it is always 
worth fitting in with the. franchise system. Some problems 
of monitoring like checki ng on honest reporting of results 
and ensuring sufficient running, recede with the franchise 
system. However ' maintaining an harmonious long-term 
relationship, largely through assisting an independent 
businessman to make profits, adds an important extra 
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CAPITAL COST 
The costs of establishing a PizzaExpress outlet are 
naturally subject to variations. The following costs 
are a general guide to the cost of setting up a 60 
to 80 seater restaurant. 
I EQUIPMENT 
2C 
16,000 - 18,000 
2 FITTINGS (neon sign, flooring, 
lighting, paintings, blinds). 10,000 - 12,500 
3 SUNDRY (Franchise purchase 
price, working capital, legal 
and architectural fees). 27,000 - 30,500 
53,000 - 60,000 
4 SHOPIFITTING AND DECORATION - in 
addition to the above, capital sums will be 
required for shopfitting and decoration. This will 
vary from site to site, depending on the extent of 
the work that has to bg done. Due to this no 
accurate cost can be projected but it is unlikely 
that this type of work will cost less than C45,000 
to ! 260,000 on even the most suitable site. 
5 PROPERTY ACQUISITION COSTS - no 
allowance is made in the above for leasehold 
premium payment which may be required to 
obtain a suitable site. 
6 TOTAL CAPITAL COSTS - the total capital 
investment, exclusive of property acquisition, is 
likely to be in the range of 9-98,000 to 
C 120,000. We would require a prospective 
franchisee to have a minimum of 50% of the 
total estimated investment available in liquid 
assets. 
FEES 
The franchisee's investment covers the full capital 
cost of setting up his outlet. Nevertheless, there is 
investment required by PizzaExpress in the form of 
service and administrative facilities and design and 
promotilon. 
The fees are as follows: 
V 2,500+VAT initial licence fee, which covers 
the franchise purchase price; 
a fee of 4% of the franchise's gross sales 
(exclusive of VAT) to be paid monthly to the 
company; 
a contribution towards the company's 
advertising and promotional fund equal to one 
half of one per cent of the gross sales. 
PROFITABILITY 
The main appeal of a franchise is, of course, its 
profitability and we are naturally just as concerned 
with achieving a good return as are our franchisees; it is the goal towards which we both 
work. 
At the lower levels of turnover the franchise is best 
managed by the franchisee himself. As 'owner- 
operator', he is in the best position to control costs 
and administration. What is more, he can absorb a 
substantial percentage of the wages bill as a result 
of his own efforts. 
At higher levels of turnover, however, although it is 
equally suited to the owner-operator, franchising becomes of greater interest to the investor who is 
prepared to delegate the outlet to a full rime 
manager - an option which may become more 
attractive as the turnover of a particular outlet 
grows. 
No two outlets perform identically; but all conform 
to a pattern once a profitable turnover has been 
achieved. Here is a breakdown of costs and profit 
as percentages of turnover: 
PURCHASES (food, drinks) ............... 32% 
WAGES (staff & management) ............ 30% 
ESTABLISHMENT COSTS (Lighting, 
heating, repairs & maintenance) .......... 4 Y2 % 
INDIRECT COSTS (hire of equipment, 
cleaning materials, paper, 
sundry expenses) ..................... 02% 
RENT & RATES 
....................... 10% 
FRANCHISE FEE ....................... 4% 
NET PROFIT 
......................... 15% 
Some of these costs are capable of reduction, 
especially wages, the control of which is 
particularly important at lower levels of turnover. 
APpeudix G 
Pizza Express Projections 
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CASE H BALLY GROUP (UK), LIMITED 
The franchisor 
1. Background 
Bally is an established company dating back to 1867 in 
Switzerland and to 1887 in London. The company 
manufactures shoes in addition to acting an a wholesaler 
and as a retailer. In the UK, manufacturing began in the 
1930s as a means of circumventing restrictions on 
importing from the Continent. Since 1977, Bally has been 
part of the Oerlikon-Buhrle holding groupt a Swiss public 
company with diverse manufacturing interests. In addition 
to Bally shoe factories, there are specialized contracts 
with separately owned Italian factories for supplies of 
shoes. Around 50% of all shoes sold by Bally in the UK 
come from coinpany factories located either in the UK or on 
the Continent. 
In the UK, Bally became active in franchising in 1982 
an part of a strategy meant to improve the company's 
profitability. In 1975, Bally had made losses and this 
led to management changes. By 1979, the new management 
included individuals with experience of franchising. in 
addition, it was diagnosed that the company was too 
dependent on open-market sales of shoes to independent 
retailers: there were then just six or so Bally shops 
mostly in the West End of London. In recent years, brand- 
name shops have developed in footwear retailing and are 
considered to be the quality end of the market. Bally 
wished to expand its chain and to develop what was felt to 
be a quality-brand image. Given the expertise in 
franchising of some managers, the creation of a franchise 
system became an important aspect of expansion. 
. -ýO 
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Bally continues to operate larger shops with turnover 
greater than 2500,000 as company-owned units but prefers 
to franchise medium-sized shops or shops-within-shops. 
Franchising is used outside of the London area. A minimum 
turnover of 9150,000 a year is needed to make a 
specialist-brand shop viable in the provinces. Such a 
shop is unlikely to achieve a turnover greater than 
9500,000. Where local population is not expected to 
support a sufficient level of sales, Bally may enter into 
contraacts for specialised displays within shoe shops. 
Apart from sales to the West End shops, to franchises and 
through the contracts, Bally sells to any retailer who 
wishes to mix the shoes into his stock. 
There are currently 40 company-owned shops and 11 
franchises. Bally's UK annual sales amount to S40 
million, of which 40% are through coMpany-owned shopaq 10% 
are through' franchises and the rest are sales to 
independent retailers. Recent company policy has been to 
enhance retailing capacity and to increase the relative 
size of the franchise network. 
The product range principally comprises modern, 
lightweight shoes with classic rather than hiah-fashion 
features. There is a modest fashion element added to the 
rande sold in company shops. The stocks held by 
independent retailers cover a smaller range of shoes. In 
addition to shoes, company-owned and franchised shops 
carry accessories like handbags and ladies' hosiery. 
Bally does not limit franchiseve to one shop. A 
dramatic instance of multiple franchising in the case of 
Hi which is discussed below. He has six Bally franchises 
located in the north of England and in xxxx. Fractional 
franchises do not exist in that no franchisee operates a 
unit as part of his larger business. However, sites do 
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not always stand alone and often they are shoPs-within- 
shops in department stores. 
The franchisor is a member of the British Franchise 
Association. There is an active franchisee association, 
although not all franchisees belong to this. 
2. Nature of the franchise 
I interviewed Mr. Philip Peters, Franchise Development 
Manager for Bally (UK), at the company's London 
headquarters. He believes that franchisees' obligations 
are to achieve high levels of sales and to maintain the 
Bally specialised image of their shops. In return, Bally 
should give them full management and market support, and 
should monitor the chain to prevent the appearance of any 
poor shops. 
When a franchise is started up, Bally will always 
provide a shopfront and all moveable shopfittings; the 
franchisee pays for decorating, fixed signs, alterations 
and carpets. In addition, the franchisee must purchase an 
initial stock of shoes which costs about 260,000. On top 
of this, there may be a premium to pay to obtain a lease, 
which is then always held an an underlease through Bally. 
in total, it costs around 9120,000 to start up a typical 
franchised shop. The sort of shopfitting paid for by a 
franchisee is leasehold improvement and represents a sunk 
cost if the landlord will not allow transfer of the site 
to another user who values the improvements. Stock can 
always be resold at market value, which, allowing for odd 
lines, might be 80% of its cost. Any premium on the lease 
or unexpired portion of a commercial rent paid is also 
sunk expenditure if a landlord will not allow transfer. 
The underlease arrangement leaves Bally with control over 
the disposal of the business premises, should a franchisee 
wish to close down. Consequently, around 970,000 of the 
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starting costs may represent sunk expenditure by a 
franchisee, which provides him with a powerful incentive 
to make his business succeed. Much of the initial 
investment is transformed into highly specific assets at 
the start of a franchise. 
There is no initial lump-sum franchise fee, although a 
franchisee is expected to reimburse Bally for any 
professional charges which are incurred during the start 
up. Bally does not offer financial help to franchisees, 
other than by providing moveable shop fittings. The 
company can direct franchisees to financial packages which 
are offered by the major commercial banks. 
Bally offers a full business-format franchise with 
operating systems covering shop management, stock-keeping 
and sales. A manual has not yet been produced although it 
is detailed In the Franchise Agreement. 
The franchisee is expected to purchase almost all of 
his shoe stock and most of his accessories from Bally. 
Whilst there is nothing in the Franchise Agreement to 
limit the franchisee's normal freedom to choose whether to 
serve a particular customer, he acts very much as a 
channel for selling the franchisor's product. The only 
real exceptions to this are certain accessories like 
ladies' hosiery and the Barker range of traditional shoes. 
It is understood that hosiery may be sold by franchisees 
even though its source sometimes lies outside of the 
company. Purchases from Barker, which plug a gap in the 
Bally product range, are allowed for in the agreement. 
The Bally franchise system is illustrated in Figure H, 
where arrowheads show the direction of sales. 
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Contract 
3(i) The Agreement 
Bally uses an extensive Franchise Agreement which runs 
to 45 pages and contains 36 full clauses. The Agreement 
appears to attempt (the impossible) to cover all 
eventualities. Yet Mr Peters proudly told me that Bally 
ran the franchise system for one year without using any 
agreement. There now follows a simplified outline of the 
main clauses. A copy of the Agreement is available for 
inspection should this be required. 
The Agreement begins by defining the Bally products to 
be footwear and related accessories. The franchise is 
granted for 26 years in conjunction with an underlease 
arrangement, 
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where Bally acts as the franchisee's superior 
lessee. The franchisee must take his premises through 
Bally and this condition acts to provide control of the 
property for the franchisor should the franchisee wish to 
close his business: the franchisee's investment in shop 
fittings can be made completely specific to his Bally 
franchise. In addition, five-yearly rent reviews which 
are written into the sub-lease could be used. along with 
the initial setting of the property changes, to extract 
economic rent from the franchisee. Mr. Peters claims that 
franchisees would not obtain leases fully in their own 
name on high-street sites. 
The franchise may be renewed at no extra cost to the 
franchisee, provided Bally is able to obtain a renewal of 
the full lease on the premises* 
The franchisee undertakes to trade under the name 
'Bally at ... ' but not to use the Bally name in his own 
registered company name. All goodwill generated for the 
network is to be held in trust for Bally by the 
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franchisee. Only the Bally range of goods should be sold 
on the premises, with the exception of Barker shoes which 
may also be sold. The hours of opening must be those 
normal for a locality. The franchisee may run no other 
competing business without the franchisor's consent. The 
premises must be kept in good repair. The franchisee must 
make any improvements to the shop which are implied by the 
designs supplied by the franchisor free of charge at the 
start of business. 
The franchisee also undertakes to complete Bally's 
initial training program along with his staff. He will 
pay the travel and subsistence costs incurred except for 
courses covering stock management, public relations, shop 
layout, staff training and sales promotion, where the 
franchisor picks up the entire bill. No staff are to be 
enticed from the franchisor; nor may anyone be employed by 
a franchisee"who has worked anywhere within the chain over 
the preceding year. 
Employer-liability, public-liability and key-man 
insurance must be taken out by the franchisee. This last 
mtist protect the business against loss of the services of 
senior managers: one franchisee has himself insured for 
z500,000 in this respect. Also the franchisor must be 
completely indemnified against accidents affecting staff 
or members of the public in the shop. 
The franchisee agrees to share equally the cost of an 
Epson computer system which is used for stock control in 
the shop. Sales and'stock in formation must be supplied 
to the franchisor when he requests this. Sales are to be 
reported each week. All charge cards which are approved 
by Bally should be honoured by the franchisee. Bills from 
the franchisor are to be settled promptly. Interest at 3% 
more than Barclay's Bank base rate in to be charged on 
overdue payuents. 
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The franchisee agrees to pay a 3% royalty on his sales 
turnover, excluding VAT and any refunds to customers. 
This is to be paid monthly. He also accepts that Bally 
may set a sales target for him which will be at least 
equal to his previous year's sales increased by the change 
in the Retail Price Index for that year. All payments to 
Bally will incur VAT which the franchisee can reclaim from 
the tax authorities. 
A professional-limitation clause established that the 
franchisee will not compete for one year within his old 
market area should he leave the system. The franchisee 
also agrees not to employ his old employees or the 
employees of other franchisees during this period. 
The franchisee undertakes to respect Bally's 
intellectual property rights in the methods of doing 
business andOnot to divulge these to others. 
The franchisor's undertakings are of a more general 
kind in the Agreement. Bally agrees to provide the 
franchisee with paperwork systems for invoicing customers. 
Also a shop front and all moveable shop fittings will be 
provided free of charge at the start of the franchise. In 
addition, Bally agrees to be available for reasonable 
amounts of consultation over running the franchised 
business and to supply a 
-, 
manual giving operations 
guidance. 
Bally gives franchisees a sales territory by 
covenanting to locate no retail shop within a market area 
which is specified in a schedule attached to the 
Agreement. In addition, no contracts for specialised 
displays in independent shops will be entered into within 
the area. No set market area is used: this varies from 
town to town according to population characteristics. 
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However, sales for general stocks at independent. shops are 
not ruled out. 
The franchisor undertakes to promote the launch of a 
franchised shop by discretionary amounts of local 
advertising. However, all advertisements which 
franchisees intend to use must first be vetted by Bally. 
The lower of 50% of his local advertising costs or 1% of 
his wholesale turnover will be reimbursed to the 
franchisee. 
The franchise may be sold with Bally's approval. The 
franchisor has first refusal on the business which is 
taken to include fixtures and goodwill. There is a 
formula for valuing stock and a clause requiring 
compulsory arbitration if Bally disagrees with a 
franchisee oyer the worth of a business. Arbitration is 
to be by a Chartered Surveyor, with his fees being equally 
divided between the parties. Bally is not obliged simply 
to match any market price which may be bid for a franchise 
in exercising the right of first refusal. The underlease 
would be surrendered to the franchisor when the franchise 
changes hands; here too a Chartered Surveyor must settle 
any dispute over valuation. 
If the franchisee becomes seriously incapacitated, 
Bally can impose a manager on the franchisee. If there is 
no recovery within 12-months of the manager taking over, 
Bally can insist that the business is sold under the usual 
conditions. Similarlyp if. the franchisee diest after a 
three-month period during which his beneficiaries can 
decide whether to run the business themselves and during 
which a manager may be supplied, Bally can insist on sale 
under the normal conditions. No mention in made in the 
Agreement of the cost of such management assistance. 
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The franchisor can terminate the Agreement with three- 
months notice if there is any breach of contract other 
than failure to reach the agreed minimum sales turnover. 
This also applies if the franchisee becomes insolvent, if 
he suspends payments, closes or threatens to close the 
business, if the ownership structure of the franchisee's 
business changes in an unacceptable manner, or if the 
underlease expires. In these cases, the franchisee has 30 
days in which to correct matters and cancel the notice. 
If the minimum turnover is not achieved, Bally can give 
the franchisee 12-months notice. 
In the event of termination, the franchisee must cease 
business, surrender the underlease, vacate the premises, 
return the manual and trade-marked display items, and 
transfer telephone numbers at Bally's discretion. This 
last requirement appears to serve no practical purpose in 
this case ana is not doubt borrowed from other agreements 
where businesses take telephone orders and the retention 
of a telephone number implies retention of customers. 
Finally, there are a number of technical conditions in 
the Agreement: no partnership or agency relationship is 
implied between the parties; the Agreement is held to be 
the entire contract; non-exercise of the franchisor's 
rights does not constitute their vvaiver; clauses are 
severable; and the Agreement is to be governed by English 
Law. 
The Agreement has no striking omissions but is 
noticeable for verbosity. One important clause in the 
copy given to me, giving Bally the right to revise the 
terms, is crossed out with the words "An unfair term" 
written in the margin. There are other handwritten 
alterations throughout the document suggesting that it is 
under revision. 
The franchisee is completely free to follow his own 
pricing policy. 
3(11) Implicit aspects of the contract 
Mr. Peters believes that there are two examples of 
implicit aspects of the contract between franchisor and 
franchisee which are important in practice. These are 
business understandings which are governed by the long- 
term value of the relationship to both parties. It is 
possible to easily observe further implicit aspects. 
First, Mr. Peters points out that franchisees carry 
small stocks of some accessories like ladies' hosiery. 
These are items not well provided for in company supply 
lines but which help franchisees in building their 
businesses. It is too small a matter for the franchisor 
to wish to disrupt good relatins with franchisees over it. 
Secondly, it is understood that franchisees will pay the 
franchisor's professional charges incurred in starting up 
the franchise shop. This is not contractually specified 
but is worth accepting by a franchisee; his acceptance of 
this is just part of his cost of obtaining a franchise. 
It may also be 
products are not set 
are a means through 
from franchisees. Th, 
on such extraction: 
franchisees would be 
well above comparable 
observed that the transfer prices of 
in the Agreement even though these 
which economic rent can be extracted 
e market place sets definite limits 
in the long run, recruitment of 
adversely affected if prices rose 
market prices. 
A number of franchisees have expectations that property 
rents should be passed on at cost, that any premium on the 
lease should be returned to the franchisee if his lease in 
surrenderedt and that Bally stands ready to buy back any 
franchise which is in danger of failing. An far as the 
lease matters are concerned, it is true 
of franchisees could be reduced if R 
reputation for making large profits on 
incentive to buy back arises because 
publicity which would surround cases of 
matters are discussed further below. 
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that recruitment 
ally developed a 
leases. Bally's 
of the adverse 
failure. These 
Finally, franchisees accept that they may not sell the 
more fashion-orientated part of the range. 
Mr. Peters points out that Bally had a network of seven 
franchises before an Agreement was drawn up. For one 
year, trading was on the basis of understandings and 
exchange of letter. 
3(iii) Enforcement and monitoring 
Mr. Peters claims that Bally would only quote the 
Agreement to franchisees as a last resort. The Company 
prefers to proceed by active management contact with 
franchisees and by exhortation in cases of disagreement 
over issues or outcomes. The avoidance of detailed 
citation of the Agreement is confirmed by franchisees. I 
The franchisor monitors sales on the basis of weekly 
reports submitted by franchisees. In time, Bally hopes to 
use the Epson stock system for computerised point-of-sales 
monitoring. Product inputs are observed through tied-in 
sales to franchisees: these also act an a check on honest 
reporting of sales. 
The franchise system encourages honest reporting of 
sales by giving franchisees a profit incentive to monitor 
their own employees. The high sunk investment at the 
start also gives a franchisee a lot to risk if he attempts 
fraud, relative to an employed manager. Bally can 
concentrate upon monitoring the franchisee leaving the 
0 
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branch staff as his responsibility. The franchisee only 
benefits from saving a small royalty payment through 
hiding a sale, wherea a an employee benefits from the 
entire purchase price. Anyway, an long as Bally shoes 
cannot be bought from elsewhere, the franchisee cannot buy 
shoes from outside of the system without losing any brand 
advantage that he enjoys: this condition is broadly 
satisfied. 
There are four area supervisors for the franchise 
network. These visit franchisees about once a month. The 
costs of this part of the system are thought to be 
acceptable by Mr. Philips. In time, Bally hopes to use 
the same area management structure for both franchised and 
company shops. A mystery-buyer technique, in which Bally 
employees visit franchised shops and study service levels 
an purchases are made has been used. 
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At the time of my interview with Mr. Peters (March 
1987) he was only aware Of minor trading gripes within the 
franchise system. In particular, some franchisees had 
expressed dissatisfaction with parts of the product range. 
Mr. Peters is concerned that one franchisee, Hi has 
developed a sub-chain of six shops. There in a worry that 
B611Y might be vulnerable to take-it-or-leave-it 
bargaining strategies over prices or terms of sale. 
4. Why franchise 
Mr. Peters believes that Bally confers a major brand- 
name advantage on a franchisee. The footwear in regarded 
an an high-quality product at least comparable to shoes 
produced by Clarks or Kay Shoes. The franchisor knows 
that the franchise package enables a small businessman to 
benefit from trading as part of a specialist chain. In 
addition, Mr. Peters states that the franchise 
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arrangements embody useful stock-control systems and 
beneficial purchasing arrangements for a franchisee. 
Finally, he thinks it is most unlikely that hixh-street 
leases would be obtained without Bally's involvement. 
The franchisor mainly benefits from franchising by 
being able to call on the entrepreneural skills of 
franchisees, according to Mr. Peters. Whilst it is true 
that both company-owned and franchised " shops preserve 
Bally's brand image, franchisees have less demand for 
management involvement in their local business affairs 
compared with company managers. Franchising is seen as 
allowing greater specialisation with the franchisor 
concentrating on property acquisition, manufacture, 
marketing and purchasing, and the franchisee becoming 
increasingly skilled in local operations management. Mr. 
Peters points out that the comr, pany particularly f -avours 
franchising in the provinces where long lines of 
communication make direct management more costly. Bally's 
own shops are concentrated in areas which are near to hand 
in London, where turnover is higher and can support more 
supervision costs, and where leases are probably too 
expensive for a franchisee to take on. 
Lease costs could stand in the way of franchising 
because, if Bally had to pay for the lease, the 
franchisee's specialised invenstment could be lower and he 
might be less committed to the success of his business. 
Mr. Peters knows that Bally could easily raise its own 
finance for expanding a network of shops. Capital-raising 
advantages are not perceived for himself by the 
franchisor. 
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5. Fees and returns 
As considered above, Bally charges no initial lump-sum 
franchise fee and only requires franchis'ees to pay 
professional fees which Bally incurs at the start of a new 
franchise. A sales royalty of 3% is charged on monthly 
turnover, as detailed in the Agreement. Other than this, 
the franchisor has the transfer prices of tied-in sales 
and the commercial rents attached to leases as sources of 
business revenue. Mr. Peters states that there is a 
profit element for the franchisor in the transfer prices 
but describes this as "modest". Rebates are given on an 
increasing scale to franchisees for large purchases of 
shoes. Leases are passed on at cost, including costs 
incurred by the ultimate. landlord in making period 
inspections. The royalty, transfer prices and lease 
charges could all be used as means to extract any economic 
rent arising"at the retail end of the business. Once an 
Agreement is in place, however, only tied-in sales and 
commercial rent reviews could be used to redistribute 
profits to or from the franchisor. 
. Mr. Peters is satisfied that franchisees obtain good 
financial returns from their shops. No projections were 
given to me, however. He is also happy that Bally is 
achieving good profits from operating the franchise 
system. 
The franchisees 
1. Franchisee H, 
H, has developed a group of six franchised shops since 
being approached by Bally in the early 1980a to open the 
first franchise. This 'was started, initially as a shop- 
within-shop at xxxx department store, in rur, in 1982. 
H, had previous experience of establishing his own shoe 
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shops in the north of England. He had sold a number of 
previous businesses but retained interests in two Kay- 
Shoes franchises at the time of the approach by Bally. 
The franchises are located within department stores at 
xxxxt xxxx and xxxx, and as stand-alone units at xxxx, at 
a second xxxx site and (since 1987) at xxxx. Hi operates 
his shops as "Bally at ... " in accordance with the 
Agreement. His business was registered as a public 
limited company in 1986. 
xxxx has an annual sales turnover of approximately 
z500,000 and employs 90 people. At the end of 1986, xxxx 
offered 9750,000 worth of shares to the public under the 
Business Expansion Scheme (through which investors receive 
personal tax relief on their investments). Part of the 
basis of the offer was that H, had options on a further 12 
Bally franchises. In fact, during 1987, Bally appears to 
have had some second thoughts about this level of 
expansion of xxxx. Hi has added two shops to his chain 
but these have been franchises with Kay Shoes, building on 
his earlier interests. 
I. 
H, believes that he has an obligation to pay his 
royalty on turnover but otherwise should run his business 
as he sees fit. The franchisor should earn this royalty, 
aecording to Hi, by providing marketing support including 
product development; the s, in should be to give the 
franchisee a range that will sell. The main advantage of 
belonging to the franchise network in thought to. be the 
enhancement of Hi's reputation with independent department 
stores. He believes that he could not have obtained areas 
of such stores for his shops-within-shop units without the 
benefit of Bally's names 
H, is somewhat critical of the Bally franchise network. 
He claims that business projections which are made at the 
start of a franchise are too Optimistic. He also reports 
that some advice he has received turned out to be ill 
iudoed. He once considered lemal antinn ovar th... 
matters. In general, he sees no difficulty in 
simultaneously pursuing a business relationship and 
litigation. . 
other points of dissatisfaction for Hi are advertising 
by the franchisor and the level of management expertise 
which appears to be available to him. He claims that due 
to the manufacturing and non-franchise retailing 
activities of Bally, it is difficult to identify 
advertising aimed at building up the sales of the 
franchise network. The contractual obligation for 
reimbursement of 1% of the franchisee's advertising costs 
is difficult to assess, as Bally offsets local advertising 
which may have originated from company-owned shops. Hi 
also alleges that no franchise manual has yet been 
provided forohis shops. * This suits him as he is naturally 
very independently minded over operations managementp but 
it indicates an excessively casual attitude to him. 
HiL confirms the structural details covering franchise 
feest internal sales and operationalcts-1-mSements which are 
reported by Mr. Peters. However, Hi believes that he 
could have traded more profitably as an independent 
retailer; although it must be remembered that he could not 
have obtained floor space with independent department 
8 tores on his own. He alleges that sales targets are 
fixed on no obvious basis and are unrealistic. The 
transfer prices of shoes are identical for franchisees and 
independent retailers, according to HI, who clearly has 
olose-knowledge of the trade. His business in profitable, 
and his intention to remain with Bally suggest that 
profits are satisfactory to him. Leases are never a point 
of contention. 
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My observations of Hi's xxxx unit were of a busy, high- 
class shoe shop which fitted in with the Bally image. 
Customers would have no means of knowing that the outlet 
is franchised. 
Franchisee Ha 
Ha established his franchised shop in 1986p having 
worked for 16 years in shoe retailing. ' His shop is a 
stand-alone site in a busy shopping centre. H2 is 
realising a long-held ambition to run his own business, 
having worked previously for a retailer who stocked Bally 
shoes and discovering that franchises were available. He 
has formed a limited company with his xxxx; both work in 
the shop which employs a further five people. -H2's sales 
turnover is approximately zj5o, 000. 'Some non-Bally 
accessories Are sold in the shops. 
The xxxx shop holds stocks worth around 975,000 at any 
one time. H21S other starting costs amounted to 
approximately 160pOOO. He realises that over half of the 
total of 9135,000 is sunk expenditure and feels that his 
determination to make his business succeed reflects this. 
He readily points out "I have 'everything tied up in this 
business", and believes that he can offer the franchisor 
local entrepreneurship which would be lacking in a paid 
manager. 
H2 believes that the. Bally name is of great value. 
Customers regard the product an being of high quality. 
Also, he is able to obtain an hixh-street lease through 
Bally. On his own, he thinks he would have to locate less 
prominently and would have an altogether less profitable 
business. H2 is impressed with the shop design and with 
the product range. He believes he has an obligation to 
maintain operating standards at least equal to those 
elsewhere and insists that "It is important that customers 
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think it is a Bally shop". The franchisor is expected to 
give full marketing and product support, and to respond to 
requests for advice. 
This franchisee and his staff participated in two- 
weeks initial training at one of Bally's London shops. H2 
had never seen a franchise manual, howeverv and believes 
that none yet exists. 1% of his advertising costs are 
paid by the franchisor as specified in': the Agreement. 
Like Hi, H2 initially operated without an agreement. He 
is generally happy with the franchise arrangement and with 
the level of support which he receives. In time, he hopes 
to add a further franchise to his business. 
H2 confirms the structural details of the franchise 
system which Mr. Peters reports. He is happy with his 
business returns so far and anticipates early profits. 
Lease costs are not contentious: H2 understands that 
commercial rents are passed on at cost. He in also aware 
that the transfer prices that he pays are identical to 
those paid by an independent retailer for Bally shoes. 
This franchisee knows that there are some occasional 
disputed between Bally and franchisees over things like 
sales targets. He also knows that in 1987 Bally bought 
back three of the franchised shops to run an company-owned 
units. However, his own experience has been of plain 
sailing. Ha believes that Bally will always buy back a 
franchise which looks like it might fail. He understands 
that the company cannot afford the bad publicity that shop 
closures would generate for the franchise system. -This 
knowledge, borne out by recent buy-backs, would reduce the 
sunk part of the investment H& has made and could lessen 
his commitment to success- 
My observations were Of 1ý familY-run business which 
fully occupied the franchisee. Custoners would not know 
the shop was franchised unless they enquired. 
3. Franchisee Hs 
H3 established shops in 19859 found that their 
financial performance was not what he had expected, and 
sold them back to Bally in 1987. 
The two shops employed seven people and offered a 
standard Bally range plus Dior ladies' hose and some shoes 
by Barker. The range was fully approved by Bally. The 
franchises were standard in every respect in relation to 
the structural details which Mr. Peters describes. HS's 
main complaint is that not enough management support was 
forthcoming from Bally. H3 believes that his obligations 
were to maintain Bally standards in his shops and to 
respect the company's trading policy. In return, he 
expected full support including ready access to stocks of 
their better-selling shoes. When he became a franchisee, 
having previously been in retail management, he felt that 
the brand name was a good one which was also under- 
represented. He thought that there would probably be 
advantages to joining at an early stage in the development 
of the brand. 
This franchisee, along with H, and Hat also knew of no 
franchise manual. In additions he had received little 
advertising support beyond a 50% contribution towards his 
own advertising costs; the franchisorls advertisements 
were usually for shoes only sold by OoUp&nT-owned shops. 
For traininsp H3 and his staff received three-days 
instruction at the London shops and the Norwich factory. 
He describes the training as "poor". 
Hs was able to retrieve his investment when he realised 
that he wanted to close his shops due to their poor 
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performance. In accordance with the understanding which 
in described above (Section 3(ii)) he sold back to Bally 
sore or less at his investment costs, including the lease 
premium. Howevers Ra points out that valuation clauses in 
the Agreement virtually rule out capital gains for a 
franchisee. The operation of this understanding in likely 
to dilute franchisees' commitment to their businesses. 
Like other franchisees, H2 operated his shops for olme 
year without a franchise agreement. His lawyer thought 
this to be unenforceable when it did arrive. Overall, Hs 
gained the impression that Bally "Is not too concerned 
about franchisees". He cites as further evidence for this 
the failure to find new franchisees for his old shops and 
the establishment of a company-owned shop in Leamington 
Spa, & medium-sized market. 
H3 believes that the Bally franchise system can run 
without disputes if franchisees have a "shopkeeper 
mentality". However, he did have problems: his own shop 
disPlaYs were rejected by the company and he often felt 
that initiative was squashed. He confirms that leases are 
not points of contention between rranchisor and 
franchisees. 
Cb*iD&ny SholDs 
convany Manaster H4 
I interviewed H4 in order to compare operational 
aspects of company-owned and franchised shops. The xxxx 
shop in one of those which has been sold back to Bally. 
H4 was the shop manageress both when the shop was 
franchised and now that it in company-owned. Sh& is in & 
good position to compare Operational details. 
The main change that H4 reports is an increase in head- 
office involvement with the shop. She now sees an area 
manager at least once a week whereas this would have 
happened at roughly monthly intervals, although the 
franchisee would have fulfilled many of the roles now 
undertaken by company management. H4 is happy to be able 
to call on the stocks of the other 40 company-owned shops, 
which is an arrangement that did not exist before. 
R4 now sells exactly the same range containing more 
fashion itemst as is sold by the other company-owned 
shops. The full range sells well in xxxx and it in hard 
to see why franchisees are not generally permitted to 
sell it. H4 and her staff of 3 enjoy sales commission in 
addition to their salaries. It is thought that the 
business is likely to achieve profitability within the 
next few years. 
It 
The shop's appearance remains unchanged from its 
franchised days. 
Summary 
Bally has established a network of franchised shops 
over recent years as part of its expansion into retailing. 
This network in used to sell a slightly restricted range 
of shoes mainly outside of London. There appears to be 
little logic to the decision to restrict the range; 
although it may act to preserve a separate identity for 
company-owned shops. In general, Bally has sought 
individuals with retail shoe-trade experience to act an 
franchisees. 
The franchisor has a number of instruments available to 
move profit from franchises shops to Bally central runds, 
Howevert once agreements have been setq only the transfer 
process or tied-in products and rent reviews can be used 
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to vary the distribution of returns. Franchisees are not 
anxious over the use of superior-lessee arrangements an 
devices to extract economic rent. Transfer of tied-in 
products occurs at market prices, according to 
franchisees. Franchisees do not feel vulnerable on these 
points. 
Franchisees report a number of points of 
dissatisfaction with the system. Bally ! in perceived an 
having a casual attitude towards franchisees: agreements 
have been slow to arrive and no manual has been 
distributed to date (1987). Three franchisees have left 
and sold back their franchises to Bally. 
It may be that the franchisor has been conducting an 
experiment having observed the success of franchising 
elsewhere. Bally may be reconsidering a decision to build 
up the franchise network, given that promised expansion 
for a major franchisee has not been forthcoming and that 
bought-back shops have been kept under company operation. 
if Bally in reconsidering, it would suggest that the lower 
management costs attached to franchising are too small a 
benefit in this case. Franchisees with little support may 
be unable to generate adequate sales to Justify the 
system. 
The franchisees initial expenditures in starting up 
contain an high proportion of expenditures which either 
are sunk by their nature or can be made sunk by the 
franchisor. The franchisor's Practice of readily buying 
back weak shops dilutes the Potential power of these sunk 
costs as devices to increase the franchisee's commitment 






























CASE I NATIONWIDE INVESTIGATIONS LIMITED 
The Franchisor 
1. Backirround 
Nationwide Investigations was established in 1963 by 
Stewart Withers in partership with his brother. The 
partnership broke up in 1975 over the question of whether 
to begin franchising the business. Mr. Withers formed the 
present version of the company in 1975 and started 
franchising in 1978. There are now 10 franchisees 
covering most major English cities. Each franchise 
employs two people on average. With the franchisor's 20 
direct employees, this means that around 40 people are 
employed in the Nationwide network. It in a small-scale 
business which often deals with work requiring great 
discretion. 
The work is very specialised and consists of debt 
collection, divorce cases where large settlements are 
involved and it in worth arguing over blamev and crime 
detection in cases where public prosecution would be 
undesirable for the victim. An example of the type of 
crime which needs very careful handling in theft within a 
bank by one of its employees. The bank will not want the 
theft publicised an the bank will not want to undermine 
public confidence in its servants. If the police are 
called in a prosecution must follow once a crime in 
detected. By using private investigatorst the offender 
can be stopped and reparations can usually be-exacted an a 
condition for not prosecuting: this makes such more 
economic sense for the bank. In fact, banks tend to have 
their own investigation departments but similar work is 
required by insurance Companies and other firms. 
Interestinglyp Mr. Withers decided to venture into 
franchising after he was engaged by a practising 
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franchisor to investigate the background of potential 
franchisees. He still does this type of work notably for 
Nissan. 
Much work, if it would involve out-of-town travel for 
Mr. Withers or for a franchisee, in sub-contracted to 
other agents using the British Directory of Private 
Investigators. There are no significant examples of 
multiple franchises. Mr. Withers does run company-owned 
offices in areas not covered by franchisees. He also runs 
offices under different names (for example: Intercity 
Investigations, Associated Detectives and Premier 
Investigations) in areas which are franchised under the 
Nationwide trade name. In all, there are around 10 
offices of one sort or another which are run by the 
franchisor. Alone with the franchised Nationwide offices, 
these give some scope for the geographical transfer of 
work without resorting to separate sub-agents. 
Nationwide belongs to the British Franchise 
Association. There is no franchisee association but 
annual franchisee seminars are held. 
2. Nl&ture of the franchise 
. 
No products are sold by the franchisor nor by any 
franchisee. The franchise relationship in this case 
ariies over very specialised services which the franchisor 
supplies. First, he supplies a brand name which suggests 
national coverage by a chain of offices. This does result 
in business being generated for franchisees an most 
enquiries originate through the Yellow-Pages directory: 
customers tend to select Nationwide, or similar companies 
in preference to obviously local firms. This in due to 
the customer's fear of finding himself in the hands of 
less reputable operators. Secondly, the franchisee in 
trained in methods of operation, including sail-shot 
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advertising techniquest how to trace missing persons, and 
surveillance routines. Finally, enquiries for his area 
but received elsewhere in the network should be routed to 
the appropriate franohisee. The Nationwide franchise 
system is illustrated in Figure 1, where arrowheads show 
the directions of sales. Nothing in his contract prevents 
a franchisee from freely choosing whether or not to take a 
case. 
I interviewed Mr. Withers at his London offices in 
Southwark. He believes that franchisees' obligations are 
to undertake all assignments which come to them, to 
portray the Nationwide image of an integrated networko and 
to operate discreetly and efficiently. In return, he 
hopes to offer comprehensive training and a full back-up 
to franchisees. 
It is a 'full business-f ormat f ranchise with manuals 
covering investigative, promotional and administrative 
procedures. No financial assistance is offered now since 
changes in credit law rendered the franchisor's credit 
company uneconomic to operate; there is also a liability 
problem if the franchisee fails. Franchisees are directed 
to sources of bank finance. Mr. Withers pays for training 
of the franchisee and his staff from the initial Jump-sun 
fee which he charges. Advertising in at the franchisee's 
discretion except for & Yellow-Pages insertion which must 
be made using the company format. 
It costs about 914,000 in total to start up an a 
Nationwide franchisee. This figure includes the initial 
jump-sun franchise reep the cost of launch advertising, a 
maintenance insurance payment, a deposit placed with the 
franchisor equal to 13-weeks royalty payments, and the VAT 
which is due on all fees paid to the franchisor. The 
figure does not include any premium which a franchisee 
night pay to obtain a lease. Such payments would probably 
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not azise in the case of the offices likely to be rented 
by a franchisee. Unexpired portions of any lease would 
not be of great value as a typical rental might be around 
9700 paid quarterly. There would be no significant 
leasehold improvements to make. All of the outlay, except 
for about 14,000 consists of payments to the franchisor. 
It is all absolutely sunk expenditure without the need for 
any kind of reinforcement through contractual 
arrangements. The sun is not large compared with the 
initial outlay for some franchises, but any represent & 
considerable commitment to an investigator just starting 
up his own business. Essentially, the franchisee is 
investing in his own training and in obtaining the brand 
name, both of which are specific assets. 
The only additional 
the provision of a 
franchisee. 'This would 
value and would most 
private car. It would 
asset. 
3' (i) The Agreement 
start-up expenditure would be on 
suitable company car for the 
have a considerable second-hand 
likely just be the franchisee's 
not amount to an highly specific 
Nationwide uses a fairly straightforward Franchise 
Agreement which runs to eight pages and principal ol&uses. 
A simplified outline of this now follows. A copy of the 
Agreement in available for inspection should this be 
required. 
The franchise is granted for an initial term of five 
years with an automatic right of renewal for one further 
10-year period providing the franchisee in not in breach 
of his contract. The initial franchise fee in set at 
97,500 and an additional sum Of 91,950 must be deposited 
with the franchisor. This deposit in forfeited if the 
franchise failst giving the franchisor 13-weeks 
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guaranteed royalties. The royalty is not levied an a 
percentage of turnover but as a flat-rate weekly charge of 
9150. All these figures attract VAT which may be claimed 
back by the franchisee. The renewal of the Agreement 
incurs a charge which may not exceed the existing 97,500 
fee. The royalty is linked to the Retail Price Index and 
subject to review every 30 months. 
The franchisor undertakes not to open up an office 
under the Nationwide logo within the franchisee's 
territory, to provide traininit at the start-up, and to be 
available for consultation over any operational matter. 
The territory is written into a blank space in the 
Agreement, and consists of a Yellow-Pases area. 
Nationwide will rent and have title to all telephone 
lines, with the franchisee paying for all calls. 
The francIiisor retains the right to insist that any 
lease held in the franchisee's name should be assigned to 
Nationwide, providing the landlord agrees. This could 
enable the company to retain any goodwill attached to a 
site should a franchisee wish to close down and move on. 
The control of telephone lines performs & similar 
function. Later in the Agreement, the franchisee 
convenants not to compete with Nationwide within his old 
territory for one year after any termination# which helps 
the company to keep goodwill and client lists. 
All employees of the franchisee must be approved by 
Nationwide before they may be hired. 
The franchisee undertaken to 
days of the date on which 
paying the initial fee, the 
royaltyv he accepts liability 
advertising, telephone calls he 
system operated by Nationwidi 
pay all fees within seven 
they fall due. Apart from 
deposit and the weekly 
for the cost of his local 
receives on the Freephone 
a, and for maintaining his 
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computer system. He also agrees to Pay a fair proportion 
of the cost of any insurance taken out by Nationwide but 
also covering the franchisee against professional- 
negligence risks. Clearly, there is room for debate in 
interpreting this last clause of the Agreement. In 
addition, any accounting services provided by Nationwide 
must be paid for. The franchisee accepts the right of the 
franchisor to charge interest at 4% more than Barclay's 
Bank base rate on overdue fees of whatever kind. 
The franchisee accepts a number of clauses which are 
designed to ensure he operates in a manner which in 
consistent with the rest of the network. He must keep 
proper accounts and comply with the operating procedures 
laid down in the manuals. He grants the franchisor the 
right to vet his advertisements and agrees to place at 
least one Yellow-Pages advertisement. A reliable motor 
vehicle must be run. 
Importantly, the franchisee agrees to charge the 
standard rates published by Nationwide. Such an agreement 
would probably be unenforceable in the courts. Its 
function must be to prevent the franchisee from 
undercutting the prices charged by other Nationwide 
offices, including company-owned ones and by offices run 
under other names by Mr. Withers. No customer would 
complain if he found a franchisee charging less than 
centrally advertised rates: the discount would be gladly 
accepted and not taken as an indication that no national 
network existed. Furthermore, unless he in concerned 
about competition for his owned offices, the franchisor 
should only be interested in ensuring that the franchisee 
does not charge prices which are to() high and which would 
prevent his business from growing: that would adversely 
affect the recruitment of new franchisees. An example of 
the 1987 standard charges is given in Appendix Il. 
ltý 
The franchisee convenants not to have any kind of 
involvement in a competing business without the 
franchisor's written approval. No public statements are, 
to be made through any medium, concerning the franchise, 
without Nationwide's permission; in particular, methods 
should not be divulged. The franchisee states that he 
will not commit acts of bankruptcy or criminal offences. 
He will neither solicit business outside of his own area 
nor entice employees of the franchisor or of any other 
franchisees to come and work for him. Finally, he 
indemnifies the franchisor against all liabilities arising 
from operation of the franchisee's business. 
The Agreement may be terminated by the franchisor if 
payments are more than seven days late or for breach of 
any other clauses by the franchisee. In addition, this 
can follow if the directors of the franchisee's business 
P 
change in a manner which is unacceptable to Nationwide. 
If termination occurs, the franchisee must cease trading, 
pay all outstanding debts and hand over his business 
telephone lines. No period of notice in specified for 
termination of the agreement. 
The franchisee may sell his business with the 
franchisor's written consent; 10% of Resale price in to 
be paid to Nationwide. If the franchisee then then his 
b6neficiaries may take over the business. No details of 
the transfer to beneficiaries are provided. 
There is only one purely technical clause which states 
that no agency in conferred by the Agreement. 
Mr. Withers describes his Agreement an straightforward 
and having been altered over time in the light of 
experience. The need for some clause* became apparent 
whilat others emerged an redundant. There are no striking 
omissions although sore details could be useful over 
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procedures for inheritance of the franchise. The 
Agreement has a number of unusual terms: the deposit held 
by Nationwide against fees owed by the franchisee: the 
weekly flat-rate royalty: and the exact fixing of prices. 
3. (ii) Implicit aspects I the contract 
The franchisor has comparatively recently written new 
conditions into the Agreement which incorporates business 
understandings into the explicit contract. This should be 
borne in mind when considering the few implicit aspects of 
the contract reported below. 
The franchisor came to feel that territorial 
restrictions which he originally set, in which business 
originating outside of a franchisee's or company-operated 
territory would be transferred at a commission to the 
appropriate office, were largely ignored,, The breaches 
were not acted on as Nationwide did not regard the matter 
as sufficiently serious to warrant jeopardising the long- 
term benefits of an association. The territorial 
arrangements have now changed: an office may take 
business from anywhere but must not seek customers outside 
of the territory. 
I 
Another understanding which existed for some time 
concerned under-reporting of turnover in franchised 
ofices. Investigation is a business with a lot of cash 
payment where it is easy to hide revenue. Up until 1983, 
Nationwide charged a 10% turnover royalty and tolerated 
under-reporting, again not wishing to disrupt long-term 
benefits from the franchise network. This understanding 
disappeared in an odd sense: the franchisor moved over to 
the flat rate weekly commission having decided that no 
cost-effective means existed to police the old system. 
10 
An implicit aspect of contract which currently exists 
covers equipment loans between offices. It is accepted by 
all parties that loans are to be made when requested at 
hire rates which are set by the franchisor- The matter is 
not in the Agreement but is governed by the reciprocal 
benefits to franchises and Nationwide from operating such 
a system. 
It is also currently understood that modest amounts of 
business may be directed by the franchisor to his other 
companies. Franchisees believe that this happens when 
enquiries come into the London office of the franchisor. 
This type of thing would be virtually impossible to prove 
and may anyway not be worth policing by franchisees. 
However, reputation effects hold the practice in check: a 
reputation for large amounts of redirection would 
adversely affect the franchisor's recruitment of 
franchisees, 
Enforcement and monitorins 
Mr. Withers claims that he seldom refers to the 
Agreement in his dealings with his franchisees. 
Nevertheless, franchisees are aware of occasional citation 
of the Agreement. Furthermore, in two cases, Mr. Withers 
sued franchisees to prevent then from continuing to trade 
under the Nationwide name after they had stopped their 
payments. The franchisor does not shy away from legal 
enforcement of his rights. 
The franchise system is not dispute free. Conflicts 
have &risen in four main areas. First, some franchisees 
have come to feel that they could manage without the 
franchisor once he has trained then. They have thus 
attempted to trade without paying fees. Secondly, the 
f ranchisor has f elt that under-reporting of sales has 
occurred in the past under the old sales-royalty system. 
(69 
Thirdly, some franchises have had difficulty in paying 
fees to Nationwide. Finally, franchisees do not initially 
realise that the clause of the Agreement which prevents 
Nationwide competing with franchises still permit Mr. 
Withers to operate other companies. They often find these 
others competing with them. 
Disputes have been resolved by a number of means. The 
royalty system has been changed so that under-reporting 
incentives no longer exist. Ex-franchisees have been 
taken to court over continuing use of the name and 
injunctions have been granted. Three franchisees with 
payment problems have had their Agreements terminated. 
Sometimes disputes are not resolved: franchisees simply 
tolerate the franchisor's competing companies, once they 
are discovered. 
Given the'design of the 
need for franchisees to 
franchisor. In addition, 
practice to observe his 
work. 
royalty system, there is no 
report their returns to the 
it is not the franchisor's 
franchisees whilat they are at 
Mr. Withers states that a total of six franchisees have 
not renewed their Agreements. This in a very high 
proportion relative to the 10 who are left. 
4. Why franchise? 
Mr. Withers believes that franchisees are more 
entreprensurially inclined than paid managers . In 
particular, they are more likely to seek business in times 
of recession. The quality of relationship likely to be 
built up between the franchisee and his clients in also 
thought to be better, compared with employing a manager, 
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However, the franchisor emphasines that franchising 
solves problems of under-reporting of business returns 
which he knows affect company offices. Given the unusual 
weekly fixed royalty, the franchisee has zero incentive to 
under-report. Mr. Withers believes that even a sales- 
royalty system would reduce incentives for 
misrepresentation. This in because the returns from 
dishonesty are reduced to the small percentage sales 
royalty in place of thewhole fee which may be retained by 
a manager. Also, the franchisor can concentrate his 
monitoring on the franchisee alone. The long-term value 
of the franchise link also helps to reinforce honest 
reporting. 
Mr. Withers also perceives capital-raising advantages 
for himself from franchising. He decided to franchise 
after observing sYsteas- in practice whilat undertaking 
'ther franchisor. work for anO He felt at the tine that 
franchising could remove a capital constraint on expansion 
which he faced. This view, widely held among franchisors, 
runs counter to economic analysis, as noted in other 
Ousesq and in further analysed elsewhere in this work. 
Mr. Withers believes that his franchise system given 
two advantages to franchises. First, he train* 
franchisees in highly specialized procedures; we can note 
that this is not a long-term basis for the franchise 
relationship. Secondly, he believes that the Nationwide 
brand name is Of value as it in well recognized. 
Conversations with franchisees supported the importance of 
these benefits. 
6. Fees and returns 
A lump-sun initial franchise fee of 97,500 is charged, 
For this, a franchisee receives training at Nationwide's 
head of f Joe and a (second-hand) Sirius computer system. 
I 
It seems likely that some of 
Nationwide, given that training 
unpaid employment of the franch 
computer systems appear to have 
cost for the franchisor. 
1ý0 
this fee is a profit for 
is on the job in the 
isor, and aiven that the 
a very low opportunity 
As described above, Mr. Withers also charges a deposit 
equal to 13-weeks royalty Payment. This amount appears to 
act as a permanent interest-free loan to the franchisor. 
In part, it simply assures him a minimum return on the 
effort of setting up a new franchise. It also acts an a 
performance bond for the franchisee: if he fails or breaks 
the Agreement, the amount is given up. The device 
increases a franchisee's commitment to business success. 
As described in Section 3(i) above, a weekly fixed-sum 
royalty payment is levled. This is index linked and 
subject to teview every 30 months. The reasons for 
adopting this method of continuous royalty are discussed 
in Section 3(iii). Briefly, the weekly charge removes all 
requirements for monitoring a franchisee's returns. It is 
interesting to note that Mr. Withers has not simply 
increased his initial fee to achieve this end: the weekly 
system leaves the franchisor with an incentive to at least 
ensure that franchisees remain in business if this is at 
all possible. 
The franchisor claims that franchisees should be able 
to earn a good living from a franchise and provides an 
annual business projection illustrating this to potential 
franchisees. The 1987 version of this in given as 
Appendix 12, which shows a combined profit and wage 
('drawings') of around 9159500 for the franchisee. This 
would be a good annual return for a small businessnan 
working in the U. K. Interviews with franchisees revealed 
that their performance varied considerably: one sakes a 
1+1 
good living whilst others do not achieve the projected 
earnings. 
The franchisor has a number of devices which may be 
used to extract any economic rents which may arise at the 
franchisee's end of the business. In principle, he could 
vary the initial fee and the weekly royalty when 
establishing an agreement. Once this has been done the 
scope for responding to changing market conditions becomes 
limited: the royalty is index linked and the renewal fee 
is specified in the existing Agreement. 
The Franchisees 
1. Franchisee I, 
I, was a 313= prior to establishing his franchise in 
1984, taking"over an established . conpany-owned office. He 
is typical of the kind of franchisee that Mr. Withers 
tries to recruit: he has a background in some kind of 
investigatory work, is Younst and has a strong wish to be 
self-employed. He claims that the 1CM office has, under 
company ownership, suffered from absconding managers who 
had made off with equipment and money. The move to a 
franchise accords with Mr Wither's claim that franchising 
overcomes problems of monitoring honest reporting. Ii 
undertakes the range of matrimonial, industrial crime, 
insurance and search work which the franchisor describes 
an normal for a branch. His full-time employees consist 
of one agent and one secretary. In addition, six part-- 
time agents are employed. Although Nationwide prefers a 
strictly singie-site operation, Ii works alongside a 
separate debt collector and does not undertake this type 
of work himself. . Both he and the debt collector are 
located within -a solicitor-'a office suite; I, believes 
that the arrangement leads to complimentary services being 
available for clients at the same location. I observed 
I 17. 
that this in fact diluted the business identity of the 
Nationwide operation: it is very difficult to locate Ills 
office by enquiring after Nationwide Investigations in 
0 
The franchisee believes that his principal obligation 
in to follow the Agreement in his operations. In return, 
he expects the franchisor to provide full managerial 
support for his activities by, for example, being 
available for consultation over problems which may arise. 
I, received much training at the start of his franchise 
but now claims "Just to get on with it". He perceives the 
franchisor as "Someone who would be merciless if crossed" 
and is aware that contractual requirements have been 
enforced through the course in the past. Neverthelesso he 
feels that he could not have become established without 
the training and support. Although some franchisees feel 
that they receive little in return for their fees, It in 
personally satisfied and intends to remain within the 
network. 
The main benefits of belonging to the Nationwide 
organisation are the training and the brand name, 
according to Ii. The name does reassure clients in his 
experience, as claimed by Mr. Withers. Ii believes that 
his business is better an a result and seen his fees &a 
buying this improvement. His. franchise fees are a little 
lower that those currently charged by Nationwide: he pays 
sloo a week and paid a 25,060 lump sun. He believes that 
the lump sun was fully spent on starting his business. 
Interestingly, the franchisee believes that there are 
territorial limits on sales and not just on seeking 
business. This in because -he has an older (pre-1986) 
version of the Agreement. The older contract also 
explains the difference in fees. 
143 Franchisee 12 
Is began as a franchisee in 1980 having previously 
worked for Nationwide an a senior investigator in London. 
He has two branches: one in employing two agents and 
a secretary and another in XXXX with one agent and a 
secretary. A small number of part-time agents are 
casually employed. The business consists of enquiry work 
and debt collecting. 
It's two offices are leaned on annual contracts and are 
not high-street premises. He believes that he has little 
capital tied up in the business. Most of the expenditures 
which act to comit his to Nationwide consist of payments 
to the franchisor. He confirms the structural details of 
the franchise system which are reported by Mr. Withers. 
It has renewed his Agreement, which now contain the 
current details. He pays a total of 2300 each week an a 
royalty and paid the current franchise fee to renew each 
agreement in 1985. 
The franchisee describes the main benefit of belonging 
to the Nationwide network an the ability to use the brand 
name. However, he also states that there in a strong 
negative incentive to remain within the Organisation an a 
professional limitation clause in the Agreement would 
prevent him from trading in his areas for a period of one 
year were he to leave. Furthermore, the contractual 
requirement that client lists should be returned to Mr. 
Withers in the event of termination reinforces the 
difficulty Of independent trading. It states that the 
franchise system is fraught with conflict. In particular, 
financial projections are not borne out and franchisor 
support in low- He describes his experience an that of 
becoming looked into a relationship which in of little 
positive benefit but where he has accepted contractual 
provisions restricting his ability to work alone. He in 
literally buying the right 
client list that he has built 
stitched up", as he puts it. 
1ý(t 
to be in the business with a 
up. "They have me well 
12 confirms that the franchisor does quote the terms of 
the Agreement occasionally. He has been in dispute with 
Mr. Withers over payments. As 12's business was not 
profitable for some years (it now breaks even) he has 
fallen behind on his payments from time to time. 
Nationwide charged interest on the lapsed payments as 
permitted by the Agreement. At one point Is was met at 
his office by company agents who had been sent up to take 
over his business and run it as a company branch. He 
states that he literally threw them out and regards such 
an attempt to take over the client list that he had built 
up as opportunistic. In the event, he managed to find 
sufficient funds to meet his immediate debts with the 
franchisor and eventually broke free of his indebtedness 
altogether. 
It is noteworthy that 12 believes that it was better to 
remain in the network as a means of clearing his debts to 
the franchisor. At the time he signed his second met of 
Agreements he could have simply declared himself bankrupt. 
He felt that continuing to buy access to his client lists 
gave him the beat opportunity to clear his debts. It is 
also notable that the franchisor could have closed his 
down by treating the payments problem as a breach of 
contract. Mr. Withers must also feel that the franchise 
arrangement in of net benefit despite the difficulties. 
Franchisee Is 
13 took on his franchise in 1981 when the franchisor 
sold off what appeared to be his principal business area. 
PreviouslY 13 had been for the franchisor and had 
then spent time helping and monitoring new franchisee= in 
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the early days of Mr. Withers' operations. When the 
franchise system was revised so that af ixed weekly sun 
replaced a sales royalty, I3's monitoring role became 
redundant. Mr. Withers offered him the XXXX franchise 
after he turned down an expensive share offer in Mr. 
Withers' company. Until 1986,13 Was in partnership with 
another ex-Nationwide employee. He has four full-time 
employees and uses a number of part-time agents. 
At first glance, Is appears to have a very substantial 
business concession from Mr. Withers. Is states that his 
annual business turnover is around 220o, 000 which is well 
above the performance targeted for or achieved by other 
branches. However, he does compete with the franchisor in 
3=X. It was from Is that I learned of the franchisor's 
separate companies. After Is had signed an agreement, Mr. 
Withers set up Associated Detectives in XXXX. The 
Agreement st: ates only that Mr. Withers will not compete an 
Nationwide with his franchisees. Not surprisingly, this 
train of developments is regarded by Is as a case of post- 
contract opportunism on the part of the franchisor. 
Nevertheless, Is renewed his Agreement for a further 10 
years in 1986. His reasons are similar to those put 
forward by 12- Only by staying with the network could he 
continue to operate within XXXx using the client list 
which he has built up. In I3's cases this in not seen an 
the efficient way to deal with debts: rather his income 
from the business is good. However his Agreement rules 
out operation in the area to all, practical purposes if he 
were to leave Nationwide, * In negotiating a now Agreement, 
13 concentrated on enhancing his own security of tenure in 
his busiskess: settling for a new 10-year term with an 
automatic right to renew for a further 10 years and with a 
limit of 220,000 on the fee for the future contract. He 
paid double the standard fee for this contractual 
variation. He in resigned to the franchisor's competition 
in XXXX and to his suspicion that enquiries received by 
Mr. Wither's Nationwide headquarters in YX , but which 
should be redirected to 13 if they are for the Nationwide 
service, are in fact absorbed by one of the 
franchisor's companies. The business remains sufficiently 
valuable for him to wish to remain in the network. 
Is confirms the structural details of the franchise 
system reported by Mr. Withers. He also reports his 
understanding that the franchisor is orientated towards 
citation of clauses of the Agreement from time to time. 
He knows that franchisees have been taken to court. He 
also feels that since letting XXXX become franchised, Mr. 
Withers has had second thoughts and would like to regain 
control of XXXX operations under the Nationwide name. Is 
believes that any excuse would be used to claim a 
contractual breach as the basis for walking away with his 
fees and hiý client list. This prospect is reinfor ced by 
the franchisor's right to remove files from his office, an 
detailed in the Agreement. 
Mr. Withers holds the lease on 1318 Office- This in 
not a problem as 13 could relocate if he wished. There is 
no restriction in the Agreement to prevent this. Title to 
the telephone lines attached to the business, which 
resides with the franchisor, in another matter. Together 
with a limitation on post-termination competition in his 
area this reinforces the franchisee's wish to remain 
within the network. Ist like Is, believes that he 
receives little for his fees &part from the right to 
continued access to a client base that he has built up. 
13 received no training at the start of his franchise. 
This was principally due to his existing level of 
knowledge. He describes continuing support from the 
franchisor as minimal. 
jlý 
My observations were of a busy XXXX office operating on 
a much larger scale compared with other branches. 
Summary 
Nationwide Investigations gives rise to an interesting 
case study of franchising. Over time the franchisor has 
minimised his monitoring of the operations and performance 
of franchisees: monitoring staff have become redundant as 
a weekly flat-rate royalty system has been adopted. 
Despite misgivings by franchisees that, once trained, 
there is little positive advantage to being part of. the 
franchise network, they often negotiate new Agreements 
when these are due for renewal. This is so as not to lose 
access to a valuable client base. 
Attempts 
A 
by some ex-franchisees to continue to operate 
under the Nationwide trade name have been stopped in the 
courts by Mr. Withers. It is important to him that theme 
moves should be policed. Given that he offers little 
continuing support to franchisees after any initial 
trainingo the franchise relationship can only continue if 
access to an established client base in strictly by 
membership of the Nationwide network. 
I The lump-sum initial franchise fee and the weekly flat- 
rate royalty can be used by the franchisor to extract any 
economic rent which might occur at the franchisee's end of 
the business. The experience of the three franchisees 
interviewed in this case suggest that a haphazard transfer 
of profit occurs: Is is left with a very good income after 
paying his fees; It makes a modest income; and Is has made 
a substantial loss. There is no systematic extraction of 
all economic rent, viewed from the franchisee0a 
perspective. This is curious since the contractual clause 
limiting competition from an ex-franchisee enables the 
franchisor to do this in principle. He may be concerned 
(7t 
over the need to attract future franchisees (although this 
does not fit in with his practice of competing with 
franchisees through other comnpanies which he owns) or he 
may be unable to calculate a suitable schedule of fees. 
The rent transfer which occurs may be regarded as a fee 
for using a brand name or initial training facility, both 
of which the franchisor owns. 
It is interesting to note that whilst there is no 
contractual reinforcement needed to turn initial 
investment sums into sunk costs, things are different with 
the franchisee's investment of effort in building up his 
client base. This goodwill asset can be rendered 
worthless by the franchisor through the clauses limiting 
post-termination competition from a franchisee who chooses 
not to renew his Agreement. The franchisor's control of 
telephone lines and his right to remove files should also 
be viewed in this light. 
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Appendix Il Nationwide Recommended Fees 
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CASE J BUDGET RENT A CAR (UK) LIMITED 
The franchisor 
1. Background 
Budget was founded in 1958 in the USA as a. one- 
location 12-car operation. It has since. grown into a 
major international car-rental business with 3,100 outlets 
spanning 101 countries. Virtually all outlets are 
franchised, following a policy adopted in 1960 when 
serious expansion began. Budget Rent A Car (UK) Limited 
-operates as a wholly owned subsidiary of Budget Rent A Car 
International which is incorporated in the USA. The UK 
company has responsibility for Europe, Africa and the 
Middle East, issuing master franchises outside of the UK 
as well asirecruiting individual franchisees in the home 
market. 
There are 115 outlets which are owned by 65 franchisees 
in 1987. On average each of these stations employs around 
30 people. The franchisor also has approximately 100 
direct employees, mostly engaged in running the central 
administration at Hatfield. Budget is a major car-rental 
firm comparable to Avis in the UK but with rather more 
reliance upon franchisees. Current market share stands at 
about 10% of national car rentals (the total UK market is 
worth about 1275 million in 1987). The business arises in 
roughly equal proportions from corporate and . private 
users. About 15% of revenue accrues on van rentals. Like 
other national car-rental o perations, Budget does not hire 
out heavy commercial vehicles. 
The franchisor prefers to recruit franchisees who 
intend to operate single-use sites.. In practice many 
stations are established on motor-trade sites. Budget 
iZ 31 
rule out fractional franchises but 
dilution of its broad image and to be 
fortunes of the general motor trade. 
experience of the recession in the VK 
early 1980's when Budget lost 50% 
sites. 60% of stations still fall int, 
strives to avoid 
independent of the 
The policy follows 
motor trade in the 
of conjunctive-use 
this category. 
Some franchisees have multiple franchises. A number 
have become quite large chains as in the case of J2 which 
has the xxxx-Airport franchise among others. 
The franchisor is an established member of the British 
Franchise Association. Franchisees have an association 
and participate in annual conferences. 
2. Mature of the franchise 
Budget offers a full business-format franchise with 
manuals covering operating, sales and administrative 
procedures. A computerised central-reservations system 
(Bracenet) operates and is linked by satellite to overseas 
reservations. Budget does not normally assist franchisees 
with finance but has occasionally given help for special 
reasons. A national sales team is employed to develop 
corporate accounts. 
A franchisee has the exclusive right to use the Budget 
trade name within a sales territory, to participate in an 
one-way rental system, and to benefit from centrally 
recorded reservations. Company supply lines may be used 
to purchase or leave vehicles from major manufacturers 
(principally Ford and Vauxhall). As with Avis (Case C) 
the terms are favourable as manufacturers regard car- 
rental fleets as good advertisements. Figure J 
illustrates the Budget franchise systems, with arrowheads 
showing the direction of sales. Strictly speaking, the 
franchisee is not free to choose whether to service any 
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particular customer as he is contractually bound to accept 
central bookings. Vehicles arriving on the one-way rental 
system from other franchisees are serviced and returned at 
the originating franchisee's expense. 
I interviewed Mr. Keith Harman, Director of Franchise 
Development at Budget's headquarters in Hatfield. He 
believes that the franchisee's principal obligation is to 
maintain the standards of service specified in the 
franchise manual. In return, he sees Budget's 
responsibilities as providing maximum management support 
including the policing of operating standards throughout 
the network. 
There are no stocks of products which would be specific 
to the Budget operations of a franchisee. Uniforms and 
display items are provided by Budget. Vehicles are either 
hired or would anyway have a reasonable second-hand value. 
Premises are leased or bought by the franchisee and can be 
easily adapted to other uses. Start-up costs for a 
franchisee are not quoted by Budget but, from franchisees' 
comments, it would seem reasonable to suppose that they 
are similar to those for Avis (Case C) and stand at around 
230,000 (excluding franchise fees) for a basic station 
starting up with around 25 cars and 10 vans. Bearing in 
mind fleet lease costs, at most around 50% of this sun 
would represent sunk expenditure with the remainder being 
retrievable expenditure on non-specialised buildings and 
equipment. This amount, whilat significant, does not 
represent a large sunk investment. 
125 
Contract 
3 (i) The Agreement 
Budget uses a standard franchise agreement which is 
called the Licence Agreement following the practice in 
the car-rental industry. There now follows a simplified 
outline of the principal clauses of the Agreement. The 
terminology of franchisor/franchisee will' continue to be 
used. A copy of the Agreement is available should this be 
required. 
The Agreement is extensive and has 22 pages covering 70 
principal clauses. 51 of the clauses refer to 
undertakings by the franchisee. The Agreement grants the 
franchisee the right to operate a vehicle-rental business 
under the Budget trade name within a specified territory. 
This grant is for an initial period of 5 years. The 
franchisee is required to abide by the provisions of the 
Agreement and of an operating manual in operating his 
business. 
.. 
Budget undertakes to supply an operating manual 
covering sales, administration and fleet management 
procedures. Initial and continuing training is to be 
provided at the franchisor's discretion. Budget further 
undertakes to provide a business analysis of performance 
repo rts which are to be submitted monthly and annually (as 
certified accounts) by the franchisee. Central 
reservations are to be transmitted to the appropriately 
located franchisee. Budget agrees to spend at least 25% 
of annual f ranChise fees on marketing. 
The franchisor takes the right to negotiate national 
sales contracts with businesses, government agencies and 
travel agents. The franchisee will service such contracts 
although the Agreement is carefully written to avoid any 
I UO 
explicit retail price fixing. Pricing advice is contained 
in the franchising manual. 
The franchisee agrees to participate in both the 
systems of central reservations and of one-way rentals. 
In participating in nationally negotiated contracts with 
travel agents and others, he may charge his own rates 
although these must be heavily constrained by the 
recommended charges published by Budget. /Similarly, the 
franchisee must honour standard vehicle reservations made 
by Budget on his behalf but without prior confirmation. 
There are a nunber of minimum requirements which a 
-franchisee agrees to meet. A minimum initial fleet and 
associated five-year growth plan is specified in the 
Agreement. Also listed is the name of an approved manager 
whom the franchisee must employ and who must follow 
Budget's initial training course (along with the 
franchisee). At least two telephone lines must be rented 
which the franchisee agrees to put in Budget's name. A 
facility for collision-damage waiver is to be offered to 
customers at a fee which the franchisee may determine. 
Standard rental agreements and accounting systems are to 
be used. 
- The franchisee agrees to PaY an initial Jump-sum 
franchise fee. The amount of this is not specified in the 
text of the Agreement but is entered into a blank space. 
The franchisor must also be reimbursed for separate 
expenses incurred at the start-up, including the cost of 
signs and uniforms but not advertising (the franchisor 
agrees to spend at least 50% of the first annual franchise 
fee on advertising). The annual sales royalty is set at 
10% of the gross rental for cars and 5% for vans. Gross 
revenue is defined as revenue minus fuel, collision costs 
and taxes. 15-days grace is allowed on payments whereupon 
interest charges may be levied at 5% above the base rate 
of the Midland Bank. The franchisee agrees to honour 
credit cards approved or operated by Budget. He also 
undertakes to spend 2% of gross revenue on local 
advertising and to give prominence to Budget's promotional 
material when this is supplied (free of charge). Budget 
is to be indemnified by the franchisee against any 
liability arising on the franchised business. 
The Agreement is normally renewable, at , the end of its 
five-year term, on an annual basis. Both parties may give 
notice of termination of the Agreement. The franchisee 
may give six-months notice during which time he must 
continue to perform his undertakings or be liable to pay 
damages to Budget. The franchisee may give 22-days notice 
if the franchisee fails to pay his franchise fees and 37- 
days notice for other failures. However, if the 
franchisee becomes bankrupt Budget may terminate without 
notice. Where notice periods are given by Budget, the 
franchisee may rectify his failures and avoid the 
termination. Also during a notice period given by the 
franchisor, the franchisee is liable for damages if he 
fails to perform his duties. 
The consequences of termination are that the franchisee 
should pay all outstanding fees, stop trading under the 
Budget logo, return all trademarked items and hand over 
the use of the telephone lines referred to in the 
Agreement. In addition, the franchisee undertakes not to 
compete in-a similar business within his old territory for 
a period of six months following the end of his Agreement. 
Budget may freely sell or assign the franchise. The 
franchisee may sell or assign it subject to the 
franchisor's approval of & Purchaser. Also, the 
franchisor has the option of first refusal on the 
franchise at a price offered by a third party. Any 
dispute over the value of assets is to be settled by 
compulsory arbitration using a Chartered Accountant. The 
franchise may be inherited by a franchisee's 
beneficiaries. No management assistance with a transition 
is detailed in the Agreement. Inheritence is treated 
analogously to sale except that the first-refusal clause 
could not apply as it is currently written. 
Finally there are a number of technical clauses. The 
Agreement is said to represent the entire /contract (which 
in practice is not likely to be true in any business 
situation). The franchisee is not given agency powers in 
the legal sense and cannot therefore commit the franchisor 
by his actions. If the franchisor waives a clause there 
is no implication that the clause is forfeited thereafter. 
Clauses are severable. The Agreement is to be governed by 
English Law. 
A personafl gua: 
The purpose of 
liability for any 













attached to the Agreement. 
maintain the franchisee's 
the franchisor even if his 
liability. This device 
seels commitment to his 
Although a lengthy document, this Agreement in 
relatively straightforward and does not try to cover all 
eventualities. Much of the Agroement is used to clarify 
the definition of terms. 
Vii) Implicil aspects of the contract 
Mr. Harman believes that unwritten understandings lead 
to problems in running a business and strives to avoid 
them. Nevertheless, he points out that some 
understandings have emerged. I interpret these to be 
implicit aspects of the contract as they are nowhere 
written down yet they form part of the relationship 
1&q 
between franchisee and franchisor. They are governed by 
the long-run value of the franchise relationship to both 
parties. 
First, it seems to be understood that the franchisor 
will not enforce the clauses in the Agreement which impose 
penalties for late payment of franchise fees. Budget has 
not imposed interest charges and has been slow to persuade 
franchisess to become up to date over payments. It would 
seem that extreme caution has been exercised not to 
disrupt the long run franchise relationship over possibly 
short-term payment problems. Franchisees confirm that 
this attitude is now expected of the company. 
Secondly, it 





is understood that franchisees will pay 
and subsistence costs incurred whilst 
ing courses provided by the franchisor. 
make every effort to follow such training 
incur these costs, rather than risk 
franchise relationship. 
Finally, payments for cars hired on the one-way system 
eke not detailed in the Agreement but are revised from 
time to time by Budget less formally. Currently, the two 
hire fees involved are shared equally between the 
orginating and receiving franchisee if the vehicle can be 
returned to base through hiring it out. Otherwise the 
ori ginator receives all of the fee but must incur recovery 
costs. One-way fees are higher than regular tariffs. If 
a vehicle is used by a receiving-franchisee prior to its 
return as a one-way hire, then 80% of the hire fee must be 
paid to its owner. 
The contract is relatively free of implicit aspects, 
reflecting the franchisor's attitudes in this area. 
Ho 
3(iii) Enforcement and monitoring 
Mr. Harman states that Budget would only 
clauses in the last resort: in one case, a 
not pay fees for nearly two years before 
taken using the Agreement. In general, 
strives to build a close management re. 
franchisees emphasising partnership aspects 
quote contract 
franchisee did 




Franchisees report their performance details each month 
as required in the Agreement. Occasionally additional 
observations are made of the franchisee's business by the 
franchisor. Sometimes mystery-buyer techniques have been 
used for this purpose. Accurate reporting of sales in 
encouraged by the possibility of centrally received 
complaints revealing any bootlegged sale. Further 
reinforcement to honesty is given by the nature of the 
franchise artrangement: the franchisee only saves a modest 
royalty by hiding a sale and risks seriously disrupting 
his relationship with the franchisor. 
An interesting feature of the Budget franchise system 
is that franchisees have the right to make a 20-minute 
unannounced spot check of any other franchisee. 
Franchisees voted to adopt this system through their 
association. It reflects the importance that franchisees 
as well as the franchisor attach to controlling poor 
outletst which would have negative external effects on the 
reputation of all outlets. The franchisee's right to 
inspect his fellow franchisees adds an additional low-cost 
layer of monitoring which is liekly to make use of the 
close knowledge of practising franchisees. 
Mr. Harman describes the costs of monitoring and 
enforcement as "acceptably low,,, given the size of the 
network. 
jqj 
There have been few real disputes with franchisees, 
according to Mr. Harman. Some franchisees have felt that 
they have not benefited from the activities of national 
sales teams. Only one franchisee has voluntarily left the 
network (and moved to Avis). There have been some 
inefficient franchisees who have been encouraged to sell 
their franchises. Mr. Harman offers no figures for the 
number of encouraged exits but emphasises that this method 
of ending the franchise relationship in always preferable 
to litigious routes. In general, the franchisee aims to 
use exhortation and to rely on the advantages of good 
performance to the franchisee to encourage acceptable 
conduct of the business. 
Why, franchise? 
Mr. Harman thinks that Budget offers franchisees a 
major brand-Aname advantage. Lesser but still important 
advantages are the discounts available on vehicles and 
insurance if franchisees use company supply lines. 
Central reservations and a sales team operated by Budget 
to boost business rentals generate revenue for 
franchisees. Mr. Harman emphasises the brand-name 
advantage. 
. Capital-raising advantages 
for the franchisor are not 
perceived by Mr. Harman. These were felt to be part of 
the benefit of franchising in Budget's early days. 
However, the company is now so large that it would have no 
difficulties in raising finance, according to Mr. Harman. 
The main advantage to the franchisor from franchising 
arises from the recruitment of financially committed 
franchisees: these are able to concentrate on building 
good local business relationships. Mr. Harman believes 
that Budget benefits from such local entrepreneurship. 
jqz 
Fees and returns 
A 10% sales royalty in levied on the gross revenue of 
franchisees in the case of car rentals (5% for vans) an 
detailed in the Agreement. A lump-sum initial franchise 
fee of about 220,000 is charged. The initial fee varies 
from area to area reflecting the cost differences which 
Budget may face over such things an advertising at the 
start of business. Mr. Harman states that there is no real 
profit element in the initial fee: "Sometimes we make a 
small profit and sometimes we make a loss. " VAT is added 
to all fees charged by Budget and may then be reclaimed 
from the authorities by franchisees. 
Sales targets are set for franchisees and depend 
largely on the history of the area within which they are 
located. No sales projections were provided by the 
franchisor. This is because Budget prefers to make 
projections for specific sites when they are proposed. 
Mr. Harman believes that franchisee returns are good: 
currently the average return on sales stands at 12%. 
The franchisees 
Franchisee J, 
j, is the principal Budget franchisee for xxxx and 
operates a total of five franchises His business in 
large, employing around 30 people. -All of the sites 
except for xxxx are single use. The xxxx office in 
located on one of the xxxx car dealerships which J1 also 
runs. He began as a franchisee in 1966 after seeing a 
circular which was sent to all xxxx dealers. 
The nature of Ji's business varies frou site to site. 
x=x rentals, including airport work* require a peak fleet 
in the sumýmer of 75 oars and 10 vans. Two-thirds or this 
work is for business accounts. xxxx has a similar peak 
fleet but almost all of the rentals are to private 
individuals holidaying at the resort. In totalt including 
xxxx and xxxxv a fleet of around 270 cars and 40 vans 
operates. Budget central reservations generates 
approximately 30% of all rentals, according to J1. Two- 
thirds of the total fleet comprises Ford vehicles which 
are leaned through Budget supply lines. 
J, se*s his obligations an "Giving the right service" 
in relation to the Budget brand name under which he 
operates. He expects the franchisor to operate an 
efficient central-reservations system, to promote sales 
nationally and to establish good supply lines for vehicles 
and insurance. 
The main advantage of being a Budget franchisee in the 
ability to 0 trade under the established brand name, 
according to Ji. The next most important benefit in seen 
as the central-reservations system, which in important to 
him as his rentals arise in airport and maJor-city 
locations. Still important are the discounts on vehicles 
and insurance negotiated by Budget, the notional sales 
team, and the one-way system Of vehicle hire. However, 
the franchisee does not emphasise these last three 
benefits and they seen less valuable to him than may be 
thought by the franchisor. J1 finds Budget operating 
manuals to be useful in his business. 
j, confirms that Budget in not heavy handed in 
enforcing franchise contracts. He cites instances where 
the clause of the Agreement which requires that an ex- 
franchisee should not compete in the same line of business 
for six months after leaving the network in not enforced. 
Also, he feels currently activated to complain about the 
perf ormanoe of a neighbouring f ranchisee who # he Judges 
in not being brought up to standard by Budget. 
ii describes the central-reservations system an having 
been badly organised a few years ago. The franchisor was 
responsive to exhortation from franchisees and has now 
improved this. The system's shortcomings, with 
reservations often simply becoming lost, was a major 
source of conflict within the Budget network. Ji believes 
that the major incentive for both franchisee and 
franchisor to settle any differences steam from the long- 
term value of their business relationship:,, '"They receive a 
lot of money from me and I enjoy business generated on 
their name and systems. " 
J, confirms the structural details of the franchise 
system which are described by Mr. Harman. Based on his 
knowledge of equipment and advertising costag J& believes 
that the franchisor makes a modest profit at best from the 
initial fee. The franchisee considers his own returns to 
be good andintends to remain in the network. 
I interviewed Ji at his xxxx offices. My observations 
were of a busy local vehiole-rental outlet with some 
personnel shared with the oar dealership occupying most of 
the site. The Budget identity in not lost. 
xxxx. General Manager. Jt 
J2 was established in 1960 an an xxxx-xx-xx company* 
It bought the Budget franchise for xxxx in 1977 and has 
since then added franchises at xxxx, xxxx, , and xx=. 
This franchised operation in very large with a total fleet 
of about 800 cars and 50 vans. There are 130 employees of 
whom 90 are based at xxxxq which in by far the largest 
part of the operation. ja in currently owned by zx=, 
the Budget master franchisee for xz=. I interviewed xxxx 
at the xx= unit- 
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XXXX sees the franchisee's obligations as preserving 
Budget's corporate image and conducting the business in an 
honest manner. In return, he expects Budget to give 
marketing support, to obtain good supply lines, to provide 
a central-reservations system, and to monitor franchisee 
performance throughout the network. 
The main benefit of belonging to the Budget system 
comes from trading under the brand nwoe, according to 
xxxx. Less important benefits are the central- 
reservations system and the discounts obtained by Budget 
on vehicles and insurance. XXXX believes that the 
importance of vehicle discounts has grown recently. In 
1986t Ja moved from negotiating directly with vehicle 
makers concerning leases to relying on Budget supply 
lines. This has saved them a great deal of negotiating 
costs in terms of management time. Nevertheless, it in 
the advantage of the brand name which in emphanined. 
xxxx uses the franchisor's manuals in operating his 
business. These are found to be useful but are augmented 
by his own experience. In accordance with Budget's 
wishes, all sites operated by J3 are single use. 
The franchisee's experience confirms that Budget in 
easy going in enforcing aspects of the Agreement. xxxx 
and xxxx are very expensive-to-operate but lucrative 
airport markets which suffer from "poaching" of customers 
by neighbouring franchisees. xxxx complains that the 
franchisor does little to stop this beyond exhortation, 
and believes that Budget's managers are too concerned not 
to seen heavy handed over enforcement of details like 
operating territories. He also claims that sales revenue 
was not monitores for some months prior to our interview. 
xxxx confirms the structural details of the franchise 
system which are described by Mr. Harman. Along with J19 
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and based on his trade knowledge, he believes that no more 
than a modest profit is made by Budget on the initial fee. 
is's profitability is good and there is no intention to 
move away from the current set of operations. 
My observations were of a major car-rental operation 
which is fast taking on the characteristics of a large 
company. Nevertheless, the Budget image is not 
compromised. 
3. Franchisee Js 
J3 became a Budget franchisee is 1983. He has two 
sites: one at xxxx and the other in xxxx city centre. The 
city-centre site is shared with Js's other business 
venture, a commercial vehicle dealership. He employs 10 
people in his Budget operations and runs a peak fleet of 
46 cars and 45 vans over the two sites. Only 20% of his 
business is generated through central reservations. He 
believes this, together with his greater use of vans 
compared with other franchisees, is explained by his 
location. 
The franchisee sees his obligation an operating within 
the standards set by Budget nationally. In return, he 
expects the franchisor to promote the brand name at home 
and abroad, to provide a central-reservations system, and 
to establish supply lines for vehicles and insurance. 
The main benefit of being a franchisee is still seen as 
the ability to trade under the brand name even though is 
benefits less from centrally generated bookings in w=x. 
He emphasises that "Much local business in because of the 
Budget name" - Only 25% of his vehicles are leaned through 
Budget supply lines# with the rest being purchased 
directly from manufacturers. The supply lines are not 
considered to be a maJor benefit by is. Budget's 
Iq 
operating manuals are found to be useful, especially for 
calculating the prices to be charged on any centrally 
generated rentals. 
J3 confirms the easy-going nature of the franchisor 
when it comes to enforcement of the Agreement. He has 
never had his Agreement referred to in any way. It is 
definitely filed away although 'It in not forgotten. ' J2 
makes monthly sales-revenue returns and seen an area 
manager every two months. He in aware that there were 
worries over the efficiency of the central reservation 
system and that franchisees succeeded in obtaining a 
better service from Budget. 
J3 also confirms the structural details or the Budget 
franchise system given by Mr. Harman. Along with the 
other franchisees, he feels that the initial franchise fee 
could not haove contained much or a profit element for 
Budget. J3 is happy with his own financial perforsance 
and intends to remain with the Budget network. 
My observations were of busy sites which have the 
appearance of snail-business outlets. The Budget 
corporate image is maintained because of the prominence 
given to the standardized signs. 
Summary- 
Budget Rent A Car in 
operation in the U-K- In 
experienced problems with 
outlets which were dependen- 
the general motor trade. 
this position although 
conjunctive-use sites. 
an entirely franohise-based 
the early 1980'sp the company 
the lose of some franchised 
t on the depressed fortunes of 
There has been recovery from 
the company still accepts 
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Franchisees principally benefit from the ability to 
trade under the Budget trade name and in return provide 
local entrepreneurship for Budget. Supplies discounts are 
not as valuable to franchisees an Budget managers may 
believe. Franchisees have some concern over the policing 
of standards throughout the network and have taken the 
right to mount their own spot checks or one another. 
The franchisor can extract economic rent from the 
retail end of the business through the setting of the 
initial fee and the royalty payment. However, once these 
are set no possibility exists for varying the division of 
profits as market conditions change. 
It is interesting to note that the fees which accrue to 
franchisees for returning vehicles arriving at their 
premises on the one-way rentals system, or which &rise if 
their vehicles are used by other franchisees, seen to lead 
to reasonably harmonious operation of the system. In 
comparison with Avis (Case C) these fees are higher. Avis 
does experience franchisee dissatisfaction over the 
operation of its one-way system, which I would suggest 
arises because of the extension of operating practices 
developed during its days &a a oompany-station-only 
system. Budget has always been a franchised sYstem and 
has a system which better suits franchisees. In time, I 
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CASE K MIDAS 
The franchisor 
Midas (Great Britain) Limited was established in 1967 
by its US parent company. In the USA, the company has 
franchised its network since 1954. Worldwide there are 
now around 2#000 outlets. Midas's advertising material 
claims that the company is the world's largest retailer of 
vehicle exhaust, brake, and similar fast-fit services. 
Franchising did not begin in earnest until 1981 in 
the UK. An early attempt in the 1970s was not a success. 
There are currently.. (1987) 12 franchisees with 15 
outlets plus another 37 company-owned service sites. Each 
employs arocnd five people so that the UK network of 52 
outlets has approximately 260 employees. There are the 
franchisor's head office staff of around 20 to add to this 
estimate of size. Most branches are based in London, the 
South East and the Midlands. 
Principal markets which are served are those for 
exhaust and brake servicing on cars and vans. Some 
outlets sell tyres, and undertake suspension work. of 
these marketst growth is being experienced in brake, tyre 
and suspension services. Exhaust work is in decline. 
Midas is a. member of the British Franchise 
Association. There is a franchisee association which 
meets regularly. 
There are no fractional franchises at the present 
time, although the f ranchisor has no strong objection to maq - OAC these. Franchiseealhave more thanýfranchise. 
2.01 
Nature of the franchise 
In return for paying his fees, a franchisee receives 
the use of the Midas trademark on his premises, uniforms 
and equipment, and the full marketing support of the 
franchisor. In the UK, Midas supply lines have been 
established so that franchisees can obtain discounts on 
parts. The franchisee's source of parts is subject to the 
franchisor's approval. This contrasts with USA practice, 
where the franchisor makes the parts. The franchise is of 
the full business-format kind, with manuals covering all 
operating procedures. 
The Midas franchise system is illustrated in Figure 
K, in which arrowheads show the direction of sales. There 
is nothing in the franchisee's contract which limits his 
freedom to choose whether to service any particular 
vehicle. 01 interviewed Mr. Ken Phillips. Midas's 
Marketing Manager, at the company's head offices in 
London. He sees a franchisee's principal obligation an 
maintaining standards and practices in accordance with 
guides given in the franchise manuals. In return for 
this, Midas gives full managerial systems support, 
including a national advertising effort and training. 
A franchisee would need around 9100,000 to set up his 
business. Most of this would be spent on the design and 
fitting out of his premises. Perhaps 40% would be spent 
on equipment which has a fair second-hand value. The 
premises must be leased through Midas who then have the 
abilitY to prevent the franchisee from adapting them to 
other uses. At least one-half of the initial investment, 
plus the lump-sum initial fee which the franchisor 
charges, can be regarded as sunk expenditure on the part 
of the franchisee. 
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Midas gives no financial help to franchisees. At the 
start of their business enquiries, franchisees are 
directed to standard franchisee packages which are offered 
by the major banks. 
Mr. Phillips states that Midas is aiming to sell 
virtually all of the company-owned outlets to franchisees 
in the near future. Any which remain wi. 11 be based in 
London. 
Contract 
3(i) The Agreement 
Midas uses a comprehensive Franchise Agreement which 
runs to over 40 pages and contains 28 main clauses. There 
now follows & simplified outline of the principal 
contractual'clauses. A copy of the Agreement is available 
for inspection should this be required. Some clauses show 
an unusual degree of precision in their terms. The 
Agreement shows the commonly observed bias towards 
specifying conditions covering the franchisee's 
obligations: 21 of these are directly cited compared with 
12 for the franchisor. 
The Agreement grants the use of Midas's trade marks 
and systems to the franchisee for a period of five years. 
The term is renewable subject to the franchisor being 
Satisfied with the franchisee's performance, including the 
upkeep of his premises. The grant is specific to the 
franchisee's location but no surrounding territory is 
awarded. No lump-sum fee is charged for renewal. 
The franchisor's obligations are stated in very 
general terms. He must be available for consultation and 
advice# and must make standard premises# designs and 
operating manuals available for the rranchise*ls use. He 
also undertakes to use 'best endeavours' to build up the 
brand through national advertising, Expenditure on this 
advertising is left to the franchisor's discretion. Midas 
pays the cost of training -franchisees, excluding travel 
and subsistence. The franchisee agrees to use the 
franchisor's designs for his site layout and to abide by 
the operating procedures that are laid down in franchise 
manuals. He must not sell unauthorised products or use 
unapproved equipment. Trademarked display-items and signs 
must be used in a manner which does not dilute the brand 
image. The franchisee undertakes to exercise his 'best 
endeavours' in diligently building his business. 
He agrees to give the franchisor access to customers 
for the purpose of checking standards of workmanship. The 
franchisee also must send a copy of every invoice to 
midas's head offices. The franchisor is to hold the title 
to any telAphone lines but all bills for these will be 
paid by the franchisee. The franchisee undertakes to have 
no other business interests without the franchisor's 
consent. 
The franchisee agrees to attend training courses 
provided for him and to send his site manager, if any, to 
these. In addition, he must co-operate with advertising 
O&mpaigns mounted by Midas. He also agrees to take at 
least two inventories of stock and to have drawn up at 
least two sets of audited accounts each years and to send 
copies of final reports of these to the franchisor. 
A Jump-sum franchise fee and a continuing royalty 
payment are written into blank spaces in the Agreement. 
These are currently (1987) Z10POOO for the lump sum and 6% 
for the royalty. In addition a further 6% is levied to 
pay for the franchisor's advertising. The amounts carry 
an additional VAT charge which the franchisee may reclaim 
from the authorities. The royalty and advertising levy 
are charged on sales revenue less VAT and must be paid on 
the Tuesday of each week. overdue payments incur a 2% per 
month interest charge. 
The franchisee agrees to take out "adequate" 
property, public-liability, and employer-liability 
insurance. Precise amounts are not specified. The 
franchisee is responsible for parts and labour guarantees 
which he must issue to customers. 
The franchise is transferrable with the franchisor's 
consent. If he sells, the franchisee must pay Midas 5% Of 
the agreed sale price. The term which is transferred must 
be greater than or equal. to any unexpired portion of the 
Agreement but less than or equal to any unexpired portion 
of any attached property lease. 
0 The franchisor may terminate the Agreement for 
breaches of its terms by the franchisee. Breaches of 
quality requirements result in 72-days notice of 
termination during which time the franchisee may rectify 
matters. If the franchisee becomes insolvent or fails to 
make payments, the franchisor may terminate without 
notice. Any other breach is followed by 30-days notice 
which is also rectifiable as in the case of matters of 
quality. As consequences of termination, the franchisee 
must cease trading under the Midas name and return all 
trademarked items. There is a professional-limitation 
clause 118CMI which stops the franchisee from competing 
within one mile of his site for two years following 
termination: this makes any local personal goodwill 
worthless to the franchisee should he leave. 
The franchise maY be inherited by a franchiseess 
heirs subject to them meeting the conditions of the 
earlier clause covering transfer of the franchise. They 
have 26 weeks to choose to take On or sell the franchise. 
25 
3(ii) Implicit asT)ects of the contract 
Mr. Phillips was able to describe a number of 
business understandings that have grown up within the 
Midas franchise system. These are treated as implicit 
aspects of the contract: aspects which rely on the long 
term value of the franchise relationship to both parties 
for support. 
First, franchisees are always required to take their 
property leases through Midas. The Agreement is silent on 
this but it is a condition of entering the network. Mr. 
Phillips states that this ensures that goodwill built up 
at a particular site under the brand name remains easily 
available to the franchisor if the franchisee leaves the 
system. There are other possibilities here. The 
franchisor may wish to use periodic rent reviews to 
extract econoomic rents from franchisees. Alternatively, 
he may use lease control to ensure that any leasehold 
improvements are rendered worthless to the franchisee if 
he leaves; the lease can be an instrument of increasing 
the specificity of the franchisee's initial investment. 
gometimes a franchisor finds it easier to obtain property 
than would a franchisee. 
Secondly, a territory is conferred on the franchisee. 
This is allocated in a completely discretionary manner by 
the franchisor and refers to an area in which no other 
branch will be located. The Agreement does not refer to 
this. The franchisor would be tempted to add in a new 
franchised branch as long as any increase in sales revenue 
resulted in total to his network. He is constrained from 
doing this where the franchisee's profits would suffer by 
a reputation effect that might make franchisee recruitment 
difficult. A related understanding in that franchisees 
who perform well are given first refusal on neighbouring 
ne, w locations as these &rise. 
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A third area of implicit contract concerns in 
completely defined areas of the franchisor's services to 
the franchisee. A 6% sales levy is charged to pay for 
national advertising. Midas must be seen to advertise 
sufficiently or risk losing franchisees and experiencing 
recruitment difficulties. The same thing may be said 
concerning supply lines, if these do not support efficient 
branch operation then recruitment and retention problems 
may follow. 
A final understanding which emerges below from 
interviews with franchisees is that additional minor 
services (like clutch work) may be offered if this 
supports a franchisee's profitability. 
3(iii) Enforcement and monitoring 
Mr. PHillips describes the relationship between 
franchisees and Midas as one of "consultancy". The 
franchisor does not aim to regularly quote the Agreement 
at franchisees. Help would always be offered to improve 
poor performance. Termination of a contract would be a 
last resort in an extreme situation. There would always 
be a preference for encouraging the sale of a franchise 
where the relationship did not work out. 
Weekly sales reports are studied and compared with 
the performance of company outlets. Mr. Phillips believes 
that a fair idea of attempts to under-report sales would 
arise from this exercise. 
There have been disputes within the network from time 
to time. Mr. Phillips States that these have been due to 
poor quality performance by some franchisees. In turn, 
this may have been due to bad siting. In many cases such 
managerial support and some debt rescheduling have been 
used to try and turn situations around. In Midas's 
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franchising history, there have been three contract 
terminations and a further three cases where franchisees 
have "taken the signs down". Two voluntary exits occurred 
when Agreements came to an end and were not renewed, and 
one happened with an Agreement still running. The exits 
arose in cases where Midas had not insisted on control of 
leases, hence the current practice was adopted. 
4. Why franchise? 11 
Mr. Phillips believes that the brand name is the 
major advantage to franchisees of belonging to the system. 
In particular, he argues that customers are reassured that 
---they are not dealing with some back-street operator and 
that there are economies of scale in advertising. These 
factors mean extra business for the franchisee compared 
with going it alone. In addition "They can Jump the 
learning cdrve" and benefit from the franchisor's 
experience in the business. Also, parts discount and 
training are better in the system compared with 
independence. 
The major advantage to the franchisor from 
franchising is perceived by Mr. Phillips to be the local 
entrepreneurship which is drawn into Midas. He states 
"There is no way we could get such a high quality of 
manager at the salary we would pay". It is felt that 
franchisees are committed to their businesses and work 
hard developing sales at-the local level. 
A corollary is that Mr. Phillips believes Midas is 
saved any need to be involved in the day-to-day running of 
branches. This can be left to the seir interest or 
rranchisees. It is interesting to note that the remains 
or the company-owned outlets will be in London; they will 
be concentrated so that supervision costs legs. 
tot 
Mr. Phillips believes there are capital-raising 
advantages to franchising but that these are not central 
to the relationship. ' A copy of one of Midas's 
advertisements of its franchise opportunity is shown as 
Appendix K. This demonstrates that Midas emphasises non- 
capital aspects of the relationship. 
Finally, it is thought 
honest reporting of business 
low incentive to under-report 
compared with an employed 
value). Also, the franchisee 
into the business and a 
discovered. 
that franchising encourages 
results. A franchisee has a 
sales (the royalty he saves) 
manager (the entire sales 
has much of his wealth sunk 
t stake if cheating were 
Fees and returns 
As mentioned in Section 3 on the contract above, a 
jump-sum initial franchise fee of Z10,000 is charged 
together with a sales royalty of 6% and an advertising 
levy of 6% on sales. There are no tied-in sales and no 
franchisor returns from arranging supply lines. The only 
additional charge is for lease management. On new leases, 
Midas asks for a 7% levy on turnover to cover service 
charges. On some existing leases, the charge has been 
negotiated as a fixed annual sum which is added to the 
rent. 
Mr. Phillips states that both the lump-sun initial 
fee and lease service charges are fully spent by Hidas. 
The alternative possibility is that they are usedt along 
with the royalty as devices for transferring economic rent 
to the franchisor. Any such transfer is fixed at the time 
an Agreement or lease is issued. Revisions can then only 
occur at fairly lengthy intervals. 
\, tog 
No projections were given by Midas to show how a 
typical franchisee might perform financially. Mr. 
Phillips states that returns are above average for Midas 
and for some franchisees. 
The Franchisees 
1. Franchisee Ki. 
I 
K, began as a Midas franchisee in XXXX in 1981 in 
partnership with XXXX. The XXXX franchise was added in 
1986 and XXXX was established in 1987. In total, he has 
18 employees. All the sites are single-purpose operations 
selling exhaustst suspension and brake services. Tyres 
are also carried at XXXX and XXXX. I observed the XXXX 
site to be a busy, up-to-date, fast-fit establishment. 
Parts are usually bought from Midas supply lines although 
occasionally purchases have been made, with approval, from 
other sources. 
Ki sees his obligations as running his business as 
successfully as possible whilst fitting in with Midas's 
corporate identity. In return, he expects Midas to obtain 
good parts' discounts and to provide management support. 
He describes their performance as "Reasonable but not in 
the first rank". Ki believes that he offers Midas a much 
more committed local business effort than they could 
achieve with a paid manager. He does not believe that he 
benefits greatly from the brand name at his local level. 
He is enthusiastic about franchising and understood when 
he started that new-business failure rates, are lower for 
franchised businesses. 
The franchisee confirms the structural details of the 
franchise system described by Mr. Phillips. In addition 
he is able to illuminate some aspects of practices with 
leases. Many franchisees stopped PayinS their fees in 
L(O 
1983 over the franchisor's wish to impose a 7% turnover 
levy as a lease service charge. This was considered too 
high. There was "A lot of aggravation" between 1983 and 
1984, not just over leases but because franchisees 
perceived a lack of support. Some franchisees left but 
lease-management charges did come down. Ki now faces a 
fixed service charge of 91,000 a year. He understands 
that Midas is still looking for the 7% on new franchises. 
KjL is also able to add information on some implicit 
aspects of the contract. First, he is not aware that he 
hag any territory however loosely this could be defined. 
He also adds that the Agreement is loosely interpreted: 
for example, late payments are simply tolerated in many 
instances. Finally, there was originally a 5% mark-up on 
parts bought through Midas supply linest with all 
paperwork going through head office (as with the Garage 
Door Company described in Case B). The franchisees 
successfully had this practice abolished; among other 
things, it implied extra paperwork. 
Since 1984, Ki has enjoyed "above average" business 
returns. He intends to remain with Midas. K, believes 
that his initial fee would have been spent by the 
franchisor in setting up his business. 
Franchisee Kz 
Ka established his franchised outlet in 1981 in 
partnership and using redundancy money. His site is 
a busy fast-fit operation with a wide range of services 
showing common dependency on the use of inspection ramps: 
exhausts, brakes, suspension work and clutch replacement. 
Ho has three employees on his single-use site. His clutch 
work is not standard for Midas outlets but is permitted by 
the franchisor. Components mostly come from Midas supply 
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lines but sometimes he uses other sources with the 
franchisor's approval. 
He sees his obligations as paying 'his royalty and 
making his business as successful as possible. He expects 
Midas to negotiate good discounts on quality parts. Ka 
feels that the franchisor's brand name was important at 
the start of his business but that his own local 
reputation is now relatively high so that it has become 
less important. He believes that his quality of local 
business management exceeds what the franchisor could get 
from a paid manager. His major investment gives him a 
strong incentive to succeed. 
K2 confirms the structural details of the franchise 
system described by Mr. Phillips. He is also able to 
throw light on some of the changes that have evolved in 
0 implicit aspects of the contract. He reports that it was 
the franchisees' "united front". which they presented 
through their association, that successfully fought off 
the 5% handling charge on parts purchases. He also points 
to his own interesting experience concerning the lease. 
When this came due for renewal, Midas claimed that the 
ultimate landlord (Petrofina) wanted 213,000 a year. 
Subsequent negotiation reduced the figure to 211,000, 
suggesting that Midas had tried to extract some economic 
rent. It happens that the rent was not really there: 
until 1984 the business was not profitable and then only 
became just profitable. 
However, K2 speakswell of Midast pointing out that 
for three years his debts were often tolerated. In 
general, the franchisor is not heavy handed in enforcing 
the Franchise Agreement. Ka is aware of an understanding 
over territory. This is "vague" and often not relevant. 
In one case a franchisee was offered first refusal on a 
zu 
neighbouring site which affects his sales but could not 
afford the investment. 
K2 believes that Midas. must have made profit out of 
his initial feet basing this view on his knowledge of 
industry costs. 
His business is growing in profitability and he 
intends to stay with the system. 
K3p Manageress, Hall Green 
The XXXX franchisee turned out to be unavailable for 
interview so his manageress stood in. It is illustrative 
to compare the data K3 could supply, which is largely 
about structural aspects of the local business, with the 
more relational data given by franchisees. In a way, this 
reassures that generally, the correct people have been 
approached. Also, an extra category of data is provided 
covering staff employed by franchisees. 
The franchisee established his business in 1981. it 
sells suspensiont exhaust, braket clutch and steering rack 
services. K3 has been with the business since 1982 and 
handles most of the administration. Parts are mostly 
purchased through Midas's supply lines except for the 
steering-rack and clutch work which are not standard. All 
components and the services offered are approved by Midas. 
There are five employees. 
K3 is unable to comment on the franchisor's or 
franchisee's expectations of each other, or about explicit 
and implicit contractual details. She in able to comment 
on the franchisor's day-to-day involvement with the 
brancht and has the impression that this is minimal. 
Apart from monthly visits from head office the branch has 
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"Not much to do with Midas". Relations seem harmonious. 
Furthermore, employees perceive little difference between 
working for a franchisee and working for a company 
established in its own brand name. Working for a 
franchisee is thought to be more secure than working for 
an independent businessman; the brand name is valued by 
employees. 
Company Outlet 
K4, Manager, Midas company-owned outlet 
K4 manages a company-owned outlet in XXXX and wishes 
not to be identified in the study. Superficially this 
shows no differences compared with franchised outlets. 
Trademarked items and layout are identical as might be 
expected from reaching the Agreement used with 
franchisees. This branch sells brake, tyre, suspension, 
and exhaust services. All supplies come directly from 
makers on company supply lines. As with the franchises, 
there are procedure manuals and training courses. 
However, there are differences. K4 sees an area 
manager two or three times a week rather than just once a 
month. He states that he cannot try new ideas quickly but 
must refer then back to the centre for approval. Local 
initiative is "slowed down". K4'S observations support 
Mr. Phillips' assertion that franchising removes many 
monitoring and other management costs for Midas. 
summary 
Midas operates a franchise system which suppligS 
brand-name, parts-buying and management services to 
franchisees. Of these, the franchisees value the parts 
services and, surprisingly, do not emphasise brand-name 
aspects. There are company-owned outlets. 
A number of instruments for redirecting profits to 
the franchisor's end of the business exist. These are the 
jump-sum fee, royalties, an advertising levy, and lease 
charges. Franchisees mus t take their leases through the 
franchisor. Once these instruments are set in the 
Agreement or a lease document, there! is no scope for 
variation until renewal dates arise. There is some 
evidence in this case for the view that the franchisor has 
been attempting to discover the value of his franchise 
services by varying lease and other changes until 
franchisee protests set an appropriate level for these. 
The franchisees have not been especially profitable. 
One reflection of this is the extra lines. carried by some 
franchisees, ý and simply tolerated by the franchisor. 
Another is the tolerance shown to some franchisees' debts. 
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Appendix K Midas Promotional Material 2.16 
RUN YOUR OVM 
BUSINES, S 1 
(WITH ALITTLE HELP FROM THE 
WORLD'S LARGEST EXHAUST AND 
BRAKE SPECIALISTS). 
Midas are the worWs WSW spWalists in bnOww 
exhaLgft and undw-car servwg A larp part at ft btm*xu 
is conducted throuO a higl* succewful kamhftv opwaWm 
Midas's UX bwm is gowing fast and t1my're now 
lookiing for franchisees both to take OW exftq Was centrn 
and to start own and run new cen' es from scratch. You could buy into an already proftWe cerft we 
currently have opportunities at LoicesM &wWft 101hpoltoW 
Ybink Langbrklw CheftwAm% G4wpW Garnstmi" 
VVwxmPw44w@6 Ex@W 1 low1we and Now Cross 
Altemativ* you mq0t already ovm a Sava whose 
poterroal you could expand. Or you mqpt own a 9AWe sft or 
property wtwh could be developed into a centre, 
Whie youl need Nwxe. v4re not looking for tamem 
We're looking for people who are prepared to take an acWe 
day-to-day W in the running of thew business. Our success is 
based on ft quality at our service, and we] expect you to 
implement ths. in retum wel pe you all the tramig, back-up 
and advice you nee(i 
The challenge is conskleral: NL but so too can be ft 
ewardt youl be taking part in an established and proftable 
success twY 
If you're up to the Was challorige, write to: 
Mr K Fhdlip& Markftq MamM. MkIn (Grgst i3rftin) LVnjt9d. 
107 Mortlake HIM Street LorAim SW14 8HH. 
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MIDASS 
EXHAU -13RAKES - TYRES ; -SHOCK ABSORBERS 
CASE L OLIVERS 
The franchisor 
2(-+ 
Olivers was established in 1982 in Scotland by Ian 
Mckechnie who is a well known Scottish entrepreneur. The 
first franchise was opened in Elgin in late 1982, although 
the first shop was a company-owned one opened in Stirling 
earlier in the year. In 1983, Ladbrokes bought Olivers 
from Mr. Mckechnie and temporarily had a policy of opening 
company-owned shops, and of taking some back from 
franchisees. Company policy is now back to franchising 
but the result of these changes is a chain of 30 shops of 
-which 12 are franchised. Head offices are now in Bedford. 
In 1987, and after interviewing Mr. Allan (below) Paradise 
Holdings took over Olivers. 
Some shops are straightforward bread shops. Others, 
and all franchisest are bread and coffee shops. All of 
them depend on passing trade but would be thought of as 
traditional cafes rather than as fast-food establishments. 
Olivers have a total of 450 employees throughout the 
network. Each franchisee has around 20 full-time- 
equivalent employees. This gives a total of about 680 
people employed throughout the system. Shops are now 
spread throughout the UK. Olivers is a significant 
national brand name in UK high streets. The market for 
eating out is currently growing at 10% a year, according 
to the Family Expenditure Survey published annually by the 
Central Statistical Office. Olivers in aiming to expand 
its franchise network to take advantage of this growth. 
The franchisor has a preference for single-site 
operations and for franchisees not owning too many shops. 
The brand should not be diluted as it would be with 
fractional franchising. A multiple franchisee might 
Lis 
become overpowerful within the network, it is feared. 
Only one franchisee has two shops. 
Olivers is a British Franchise Association member. 
There is a franchisee association which meets thrice 
yearly. 
2. Nature of the franchige 
Olivers offers a full business-format franchise with 
manuals covering all aspects of operations# administration 
and sales. The franchisees enjoy the benefits of trading 
under a national brand name. The franchisor provides no 
product directly but instead negotiates discounts with 
major food supporters. A central warehouse is used for 
distribution. A franchise usually contains a bakery and 
an associated cafe with an attend ed service. 
No finance is offered to franchisees by Olivers. 
Franchisees are directed to independent bank sources at 
the start of their enquiries about a franchise. According 
to franchisees, it costs around 9300,000 to start up a 
franchised cafe with around 90% of this sum being spent on 
obtaining and adapting a site. Contractual details mean 
that at least 30% of site-specific expenditure represents 
sunk investment. Individuals are likely to have a 
considerable lump of personal wealth at stake in their 
businesses. 
I interviewed Mr. Nick Allan, who in Olivers' 
Franchise Manager based at Bedford. Mr. Allan seen the 
franchisee's obligations as "Accepting that the franchisor 
ultimately knows beat" and preserving the corporate image. 
In return, Olivers gives full training and marketing 
support to franchisees. Monitoring standards throughout 
the system is &180 seen as an important role for the 
franchisor. 
Franchisees always locate on prime high-street sites 
where premises are difficult to obtain. The franchisor 
insists that leases are taken through him although this 
may be needed anyway as high-street landlords are often 
reluctant to let to small businessmen. Lease control 
gives Olivers a device which could be used to render some 
of the franchisee's assets worthless should he choose to 
leave the network. Also, lease charges could be used to 
extract economic rent from franchisees. Another advantage 
to the franchisor is that any goodwill attached to a site 
remains available to him if he controls the lease and the 
franchisee leaves. Insistence on head-lease arrangements 
suggests that they are not just a service to help 
franchisees obtain high-street sites. 
The Olivers' franchise system is illustrated in 
Figure L, where arrowheads show the direction of sales 
flows. Nothing in the Franchise Agreement limits the 
franchisee's normal freedom to choose whether to serve any 
particular customer. 
Contract 
3(1) The Agreement 
Olivers uses a comprehensive Franchise Agreement 
which runs to 21 tightly written Pages and to 31 principal 
clauses. Howevert much of the material is verbose and the 
Agreement is not especially onerous. There now follows an 
outline of the principal clauses. A copy of the Agreement 
is available f or inspection should this be required. 
The franchisee is granted the right to use the 
trademark and systems of the franchisor at a speciried 
location for a term of 10 years. The territory is 
detailed. The term is renewable at no additional cost 
subject to the franchisee's satisfactory perrormance. The 
IZO 
Agreement shows a slight bias in favour of specifying more 
of the franchisee's obligations in greater detail than is 
the case for the franchisor. 
The franchisor undertakes to make himself available 
for consultation by the franchisor at all reasonable 
times, to make any special ingredients available, to 
supervise the conversion and fitting, out of the 
franchisee's premisest and to provide franchise manuals 
covering operating and other procedures. He agrees also 
to act as an avenue to suppliers who will lease some items 
of equipment (such as soft-drinks machinery) to the 
franchisee. He will pay training costs excluding the 
franchisee's travel and subsistence. 
Olivers insists that a franchisee leases his property 
from them under an head-lease agreement. The Franchise 
Agreement Aates that the rent will be simply passed on as 
the amount charged by the ultimate landlord. The 
franchisor cannot add to this and cannot therefore use 
lease charges as a device to extract economic rent from 
the franchisee. 
The franchisee agrees to operate according to systems 
which are laid down in the franchise manuals. He must use 
his "best endeavours" to build up his business and will 
undertake any training that the franchisor requires. The 
franchisor's prices are to be used as maximum ones. The 
franchisee agrees to pay the rent on telephone lines that 
are in the franchisor's name at the franchised outlet. He 
also accepts the franchisorls right to contact customers 
in order to check on standards. The franchisee will show 
his business to other Potential franchisees who are 
directed to him. He will use only approved sources for 
his supplies. 
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There is a 910,000 lump-sum franchise fee paid when 
the franchisee joins the system. In addition, he must pay 
a 6% royalty which is due on the Tuesday of each week and 
is calculated on gross sales receipts less VAT. Late 
payments attract interest at 2% a month. An unusual 
feature is that Olivers may estimate overdue payments 
where sales are not declared; the estimate is to be based 
on the last sales data submitted plus no more than a 25% 
increase. The franchisee is to use proper accounting 
procedures and to submit a profit and loss account to 
Olivers each month. All franchise fees attract VAT 
charges which the franchisee may claim back from the 
authorities. 
The franchisee's local advertising is at his 
discretion, and is subject to franchisor approval of its 
details. A 2% levy on gross sales is paid to the 
franchisor towards national advertising costs (this is not 
charged in practice). The franchisor must issue annual 
audited accounts of his disposition of such sums. 
The franchisee must take insurance that the 
franchisor arranges on his behalf covering the 
franchisee's property and liabilities to the public and to 
employees. He agrees not to have other business interests 
without the franchisor's consent. 
The franchise may be sold with the franchisor's 
approval of any buyer. 5% of the sale price is passed to 
the franchisor, who anyway has first refusal at the 
proposed price. 
In the event of the franchisee's deaths beneficiaries 
have 26 weeks to decide whether to take on or sell the 
franchise. Sale &gain implies the requirement for the 
franchisor's approval and to offer him first refusal. The 
franchisor will provide a temporary manager if so 
requested at cost 
beneficiaries do not 
the franchisor can 
the franchise at 20% 
over valuation are 
clause. 
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plus statutory overheads. If the 
resolve matters within the 26 weeks, 
terminate the Agreement and buy back 
below its market -value. Disputes 
subject to a compulsory arbitration 
The franchisor may terminate the Agreement with 48- 
hours notice in the case of the franchisee's failure to 
correct defective products that he has sold. Any other 
defect to do with the quality of the franchisee's 
performance may result in the franchisor issuing 10-days 
notice. These notice periods enable the franchisee to 
correct any deficiency providing no repeat situation is 
involved. Termination without notice is implied by the 
franchisee's insolvency, any misrepresentations he has 
made, or any disclosures of know-how to unauthorised 
persons. * 
The consequences of termination (and presumably of 
non-renewal of the Agreement by a franchisee) are that the 
franchisee ceases trading, returns all trademarked items, 
hands over any customer listp and stops using the 
telephone lines registered in the franchisor's name. In 
addition, the franchisee undertakes not to compete within 
a 12-mile radius of his old location, and within a 13-mile 
radius of any Olivers' location for two years following 
his leaving the system. This last consequence means that 
any local business goodwill is worthless to the franchisee 
should he leave voluntarily or otherwise. 
if the franchises complies with termination 
consequenceso the franchisor will return & proportion of 
his initial investment. A scale in used starting at 70% 
if the franchise in a year old and sliding down a further 
10% a year for four more Yearst and then reducing from a 
figure of 25% in the sixth year at 5% a year to 1% in the 
10th year. This reduces the amount of sunk investment 
made by the franchisee at the start. Disputes in this 
region of the Agreement are also referred to compulsory 
arbitration. 
There are technical clauses: non-exercise of a 
franchisor's right does not imply its waiver; clauses are 
severable; the franchisor does not guarantee results; and 
the franchisee must not make unauthorised warranties. The 
franchisor is free to sell his business. Compulsory 
arbitration is subject to the rules of the Chartered 
Institute of Arbitrators. No details are given of the 
allocation of arbitration costs. 
Implicit aspects of the contract 
Mr. Allan is able to describe business understandings 
that have Aerged over time. These depend on market 
sanctions and the long-term value of the franchise 
relationship for their support and are here treated as 
implicit aspects of the contract. 
First, Olivers has agreed with franchisees not to 
take the 2% advertising levy detailed in the Agreement. 
This has been reduced to 1% following discussions with 
franchisees through their association. As part of this, 
the franchisor now has dis. keretion over his advertising 
expenditure. Olivers has- agreed to this rather than 
disrupt the long-term value of the franchise relationship. 
Secondly, the franchise royalty is not paid if 
projected profits do not materialise for a franchisee. One 
franchisee has not paid royalty for two Years. The 
franchisor is worried about the bad reputation effect that 
franchisee failure would have on recruitment. 
Finallyp it is normally expected that franchisees 
will purchase products from approved supply lines, passing 
all bills through head office where they incur a 5% 
handling charge. The Agreement has nothing on this. 
Franchisees often find the arrangement economical anyway. 
However, purchases away from Olivers' supply lines are 
tolerated if there are "good reasons" for this. The 
franchisor will not insist on uniformity to the extent of 
putting serious obstacles in the way of franchisees' 
profitability. 
3(iii) Monitorins and enforcement 
Sales are monitored through weekly notification by 
franchisees. Mr. Allan believes that Olivers' experience 
of operating shops helps in assessing the truth of these 
reports. Also, he believes that franchising gives more 
incentive th honest reporting: the franchisee benefits 
only by the royalty he saves from under-reporting, whereas 
he risks his entire sunk investment. Visits to 
franchisees' premises are made by area managers on a 
weekly basis; these also tend to give a check on 
performance. 
Mr. Allan emphasises that franchisees take up very 
little management time relative to company-owned shops. 
Also t given the existence of company-shops, "The marginal 
cost of supervising franchisees is very low". 
Olivers aims to avoid quoting the Agreement and tries 
to avoid a reputation for heavy handedness in dealing with 
franchisees. There have been some disputes when a few 
franchisees have either not paid rents or have not paid 
royalties. There have been one termination and one 
amicable separation since 1981. Generally, relations are 
harmonious apart from occasional gripes about particular 
pieces of advertising. 
Why franchise? 
ZZ5 
Mr. Allan believes that franchisees benefit from the 
brand name above all else, especially in Scotland where it 
is better known. In addition, leases are easier to come 
by, shop fitting experience is to hand, and extensive 
management expertise is available. The supply lines 
established for franchisees are also of value to them. 
The franchisor believes that franchising brings in a 
committed local entrepreneur in place of the employed 
manager. The large personal investment followed by years 
of hard work ensures that franchisees have every incentive 
. -to succeed. Mr. Allan can be very precise about the 
benefits from this as he has recently mounted some market 
research. In a comparison of franchised and company 
shops. customers perceive better service, product quality 
and value for money in franchised outlets. A summary of 
this market research is given in Appendix L. 
Management cost savings are more important the more 
distant from head office is an outlet, according to Mr. 
Allan. There is a "slight tendency" for franchised cafes 
to be in the North. The long-term plan is to increase 
franchising regardless of location. 
Finally, the franchisor does perceive capital-raising 
advantages but does not regard these as a central reason 
for franchising. 
Franchising fees and returns 
As described in the section on contract, a 110tooo 
franchise fee is charged as an initial luuP sun &long with 
a 6% sales royalty. In addition, there is & 1% lOvY for 
advertising and a 5% handling charge on bills, both of 
which are governed by the, implicit contract. Mr. Allan 
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states that there is no profit element for Olivers in 
either the lump-sum, advertising or handling charges. 
Sales targets are set at the time of a business 
projection for a site. Many franchisees do a lot better. 
No projections were provided for this study. 
The franchisor and some franchisees are "very happy" 
with profitability. Some franchises are "satisfactory". 
The terminations were of outlets where a franchisee was 
"struggling". Franchisees support this description. 
The-franchisees 
1. Franchisee L, 
L, established his XXXX business in 1984 and expanded 
into XXXX ifi 1986. Both are coffee shops and bakeries. 
In general, he believes it is not practical to run more 
than one franchise; his are close together and therefore 
are easier for him to supervise. He has the equivalent of 
about 40 full-time staff; alsop all of his family are 
employed in the businesses. 
He sees his obligation to Olivers as making his 
business "As successful as possible". As long as this 
happens both he and the franchisor should be happy. He 
expects full marketing and managerial support in return 
for this. The main benefit from belonging to the system 
is the franchisor's buying power with suppliers. The 
supply lines have been "Very good" in the. past although 
there have been recent price increases. Moreover, central 
negotiations save a lot of buying time on his part. 
Li confirms the structural details of the franchise 
reported by Mr. Allan. He is also able to clarify some of 
the implicit aspects of the contract. 
His understanding is that there are no tied-in sales. 
This corresponds with Mr. Allan's statement that the idea 
of approved suppliers is interpreted loosely. LI uses 
central supply lines as long as they prove cheaper and 
more convenient. He states that when Ladbrokes took over 
Olivers a centrol warehouse was built to handle supplies 
to franchisees. This persists, in Ladbroke's ownership, 
even though Olivers has again been sold (to Paradise). 
LI accepts that the franchisor is not heavy handed in 
interpreting the Franchise Agreement. The network has not 
always been harmonious as successive ownership changes 
have occurred. There have been franchisee worries about 
---opportunities for consultation with head office, product 
development and advertising. The worry that there was too 
little advertising of the right quality led to the 
reduction in advertising they described above. He 
confirms thlit three franchisees have been subjected to 
legal action over fees; one reached an amicable agreement 
before court. 
Li states that his returns are good being "Better 
than money in the bank". He intends to remain a 
franchisee and has enjoyed business growth in opening his 
second shop. He is Scottish representative for the 
franchisee association. He appreciates that he could 
retrieve little of his initial investment if he were to 
leave, given that the lease is held by the franchisor. 
Franchisee L2 
Lz established his coffee shop and bakery in 1986 
having had an interest in becoming a businessman since the 
1970s. His business is an extremely busy one located in 
0 When we sets in the early afternoon of a weekdays 
it was difficult to find seating to complete the 
interview. He employs a total of 56 staff of whom one- 
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third are full time. He believes that it would be 
possible for him to add another outlet now that he is 
established. 
He sees his obligations as maintaining standards in 
relation to the rest of the network and maximising his 
sales revenue. He expects a full back up from Olivers, 
particularly over sales advice and over. supplies. -He 
feels that a major advantage to being a f/ranchisee is the 
central supplies facility, which saves him time, and the 
help he receives in obtaining his lease. He states that 
his rent would be higher without the backing of a larger 
company: so really this is a brand-name advantage. He 
--knows that his Agreement means that Olivers must Just pass 
on any property rent charged without any additions. 
Lz is aware of an understanding over territory. He 
believes that the franchisor has a rough idea of a 
territory applying to each franchisee even though nothing 
is written down. He thus feels that any developments of 
new shops in Dunfermline or Dundee affect his business 
interests. It is not possible to be sure how far this 
view is shared by Olivers. 
The franchisee confirms the structural details of the 
system recorded by Mr. Allan. His experience of the 
franchisor is as an easy-going enforcer of the contract. 
He has not experienced quotation of the Agreement but 
knows that this has happened in a very few cases. In 
general, he argues that "All business is a matter of 
compromise". 
Lz is very happy with his business returns. These 
proved to be much better than even the most optimistic 
projections for his site, once he was past his first year. 
He believes that-Olivers must have spent the lump-sun fee 
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in setting his business up. As mentioned he now wishes to 
expand and will certainly remain in the system. 
ComiDany-owned outlet 
Manasteregg L3 
L3, who wishes to remain anonymous, granted an 
interview in order to allow some compar. asons to be made 
between company-owned outlets and franchised ones. The 
xXXX outlet was franchised for two and one-half years 
before 1984. Then it was taken back into company 
ownership during the policy change discussed at the 
beginning of this case. It stands on a busy site in XXXX 
near XXXX'S central station. It consists of a coffee shop 
and bakery. There are 25 full-time staff. 
L3 states that she sees her area manager at least 
once a week although contact may be daily quite regularly. 
She must make weekly sales reports just like a franchisee. 
No visible differences exist between the XXXX cafe and 
franchised ones and L3 argues that there are none. She 
uses the same company supply lines that supply 
franchisees. 
Differences do exist. Franchisees see area 
management less frequently. L3 is also aware that market 
research is tending to support franchised operations. As 
a Company manageress, she is keen to encourage the highest 
standards within her shop. 
summary 
olivers is a coffee-shop and bakery operation which 
has experienced alternating phases of enthusiasm for 
franchising and for cOmPanY-owned operations. Ownership 
has changed and the originating entrepreneur for the 
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business has moved on. The company is currently expanding 
franchising and points to its market research showing 
increased customer perception of value for money to 
justify this. 
Franchisees may obtain some brand-name benefits even 
if these arise in terms of more easily and cheaply 
obtained central supply lines; these are not tied in but 
are freely used. Because of a curiious history of 
ownership changes these supply lines are owned (by 
Ladbrokes) separately from Olivers. 
The franchisor has a number of devices available to 
--extract economic rent from franchisees. He sets a lump- 
sum initial feet a sales royalty, an advertising levy and 
a handling charge for supply lines. All except the 
handling charge, which is only governed by an 
understandifig, cannot be easily varied upwards once 
Agreements have been signed. There is some evidence that 
the Jump sum is spent by the franchisor in setting up a 
new franchisee. Lease charges must be passed on at cost. 
The value of leasehold improvements may be partly 
recovered by franchisees if they leave the system. 
Nevertheless, they sink a substantial investment. 
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AlDvendix L Results of Olivers's Market Research 
Franchise 
M 
C com OmP&nY M Excellent Good Fair Poor* 
Quality of 40 39 
/ 
13 
Food & Drink 
:ý 
29 33 99 19 13 






3 0 2 0 
Service Speed 36 39 15 10 
22 38 22 18 
Value for 15 29 28 28 
Money 
10 25 30 35 
Cleanliness 41 37 15 7 
V, 
333 ! 19 25 23 
*Includes those with no opinion 
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CASE H QUIKFRAME 
The franchisor 
1. Background 
Quikframe was established in Edinburgh in 1984 by 
David Peacock. The business uses modern equipment to 
frame pictures without the use of specialist craftsmen. 
Following the pilot operation in 1984, three franchisees 
were recruited. In addition to these outlets, Mr. Peacock 
ran a second shop, which failed, in Edinburgh for a period 
of five months in 1985. This franchise has not been a 
success. At the time of interview, Mr. Peacock spoke of 
difficulties with his franchisees. Subsequently it 
emerged that they have left the system and that the 
network has broken up. Currently (1987) Mr. Peacock runs 
his Edinburgh shop. The franchisees continue to run under 
the Quikframe trademark but independently due to an 
unusual legal situation which is explained below. 
The markets for this type of service are the passing 
high-street retail trade and contract work for local 
authorities and architects. The competitive advantage 
possessed by Quikframe, and similar companies , -like 
Fastframe, is that a Picture-framing job can be turned 
around within an hour. Traditional methods can take 
weeks. 
All of the franchisees operated single site shops, 
although one was contiguous to the franchisee's art shop. 
The franchisor has a preference for single-site operations 
as he believes this provides a clear incentive for a 
franchisee. 
Quikframe is not a British Franchise Association 
member. There is no franchisee association. 
2. Nature of the franchise 
A franchisee buys the right to use a trademark and 
must take his equipment and supplies from the franchisor. 
Prior to the start of business, the franchisee is trained 
in techniques of using the specialised equipment. His 
business is on the small side and might employ three 
staff. No estimates are available of the initial cost Of 
starting up a franchise. Some of this would not be sunk 
expenditure as the franchisee controls his own lease on 
the premises; so he could reallocate any leasehold 
improvements to another business. 
Mr. Peacock sees the franchisee's obligations as 
honouring the Franchise Agreement, seeking maximum sales 
revenue, and operating as efficiently as possible. In 
return, he believes that he can offer substantial brand- 
building marketing support along with a full managerial 
back up. 
Quikframe is a full business-format franchise with 
manuals covering sales, operating and administrative 
procedures. No financial assistance is offered to 
franchisees who must use independent bank sources. The 
Quikframe franchise system is shown in Figure M. where 
arrowheads show the direction of sales. Nothing in the 
franchisee's contract limits his normal freedom to choose 
whether or not to serve any particular customer. 
Contract 
3(i) The Agreement 
Quikframe uses a comprehensive Franchise Agreement 
running to 18 pages and 19 major clauses. There now 
follows a simplified outline Of the Main clauses of the 
Agreement. A copy is available for inspection should this 
be desired. 
The franchises is granted the right to operate under 
the trademark at a specific site. No surrounding 
territory is given. The term is for seven years and is 
renewable at no additional cost subject to the 
franchisee's satisfactory performance. 
The Agreement is not precise in its treatment of the 
franchisor's obligations. Quikframe must bear the cost of 
training the franchisee, excluding travel and subsistence. 
General advice must be made available along with manuals 
covering all operations. The franchisor will provide 
equipment and "usables" to the franchisee. Centralised 
advertising is left at the franchisor's discretion: he is 
to use his "best endeavours". Quikframe may publish a 
list of maximum shop prices to be used by franchisees. 
The franchisee undertakes to use only Quikframe 
equipment and other supplies, including his stationery and 
sales receipts. He agrees to provide access to customers 
to that the franchisor can assess the quality of his 
operation. Any complaints must be passed to the 
franchisor. The franchisee also agrees to take a minimum 
of 9250,000 public-liability insurance and "normal" 
amounts of property and employer-liability insurance. 
Weekly sales returns are to be sent to the franchisor. 
The cost of any Yellow-Pages advertisement for his 
location is to be paid by the franchisee. Proper accounts 
must be kept for the franchisor's inspection. The 
Agreement avoids very general exhortations to the 
franchisee to do his best. 
An initial 1UMP-sum franchise fee of 26,000 is 
charged along with a 12.5% sales royalty. The royalty is 
due on weekly gross sales receipts (less VAT). VAT is 
charged on all franchise fees and may be reclaimed by a 
franchisee from the authorities. Overdue payments 
attract interest at the rate of 0.5%$ a week. 
The franchise may be sold by the franchisee subject 
to the franchisor's approval of any purchaser. A fee of 
5% of the sale price is charged by the franchisor to cover 
the administration of this. The franchisor has the right 
to first refusal on the franchise at any price which is 
offered. 
If the franchisee dies or is incapacitated, his 
representatives or beneficiaries have 28 days to decide 
-----whether to take on or sell the franchise. This is then 
governed by the conditions covering sale of the franchise. 
if requested, the franchisor will provide a manager at 
cost plus statutory overheads to assist representatives or 
beneficiaries of the franchisee, whilst they find a buyer. 
If after a further six months no buyer has been found then 
the franchisor has the right to terminate the Agreement or 
to buy the franchise back at its market value. If the 
franchisor introduces a buyer to the franchisee an 
additional 5% of the sale price is charged to cover 
administration costs. 
The franchisor may terminate the Agreement without 
notice if the franchisee breaches clauses covering 
protection of the trademark, payment of franchise fees, 
purchases of equipment and other supplies, sale of the 
franchise, and the keeping of records. Summary 
termination may also occur if the franchisee is found to 
be insolvent. Lesser breaches (for example attempting to 
solicit the franchisor's employees) entitle the franchisee 
to 28-days notice during which he may rectify the breach. 
The consequences of termination are that the 
franchisee ceases trading as Quikframe, hands over control 
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of his telephone lines to the franchisor, returns the 
manual, and returns trademarked items in exchange for 
their market value if requested to do so. There is a 
professional-limitation clause which requires that the 
franchisee does not compete in any capacity with Quikframe 
for one year after termination. 
There are a number of technical clauses: the clauses 
are severable; non-exercise of a right does not indicate 
its waiver by the franchisor; the Agreement is stated to 
be the entire contract; no agency is conferred on the 
franchisee; and no guarantees of returns are given by the 
franchisor. The Agreement is governed by Scottish law. 
The Agreement is a relatively straightforward 
document which is written in plain terms and does not 
appear particularly onerous. Interestingly, it has turned 
out to be unenforceable as discussed below. 
Vii) Implicit aspects of the contract 
Mr. Peacock believes that informal understandings are 
dangerous in a franchise relationship. This suggests that 
he has a preference for using explicit contracted devices. 
Nevertheless the prices charged for equipment and 
materials are not specified in the Agreement. Mr. Peacock 
states that there is no profit for him in these sales 
which are made to assist franchisees in maintaining 
uniformity. A requirement that the franchisor should keep 
prices within reason in relation to market prices appears 
to be an understanding that is supported by his wish not 
to disrupt the long-term value of a relationship. 
Mr. Peacock is also aware that failure to develop 
public awareness of his brand could pose problems for the 
retention and recruitment of franchisees (as indeed it has 
- see below). 
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3(iii) Enforcement and monitoring 
The franchisor receives a weekly sales report from 
franchisees. This, together with occasional visits that 
he makes to franchised shops provides monitoring for him 
of sales and the quality of franchisees' operations. Mr. 
Peacock claims that his own experience of running shops 
gives him a shrewd idea of what should be achieved by a 
franchisee. 
The franchisor does quote the Agreement from time to 
time in his dealings with franchisees. Disputes have 
arisen over the methods of advertising used by the 
franchisor, although no details were forthcoming here. 
The low rate of growth achieved by Quikframe between 1985 
and 1987 has also been of concern to franchisees. 
Disputes were unresolved at the time of the interview with 
Mr. Peacock. 
Why franchise? 
Mr. Peacock believes that franchisees benefit from 
belonging to a multiple-store operation with a brand name. 
Also, as franchisor, he has an interest in supporting 
franchisee activities and is able to provide advice based 
on his own experience. 
He believes that there are no capital-raising 
advantages to franchising for the franchisor. He 
describes franchising as "An expensive way to expand a 
business". Franchising creates economies for the 
franchisor by reducing monitoring and supervision costs 
relative to running company-owned shops. Mr. Peacock 
thinks these benefits are greater the more geographically 
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A franchisee pays a lump sum of 16,000 and a sales 
royalty of 12.5% on gross sales, as detailed in the 
Agreement. These may be varied to alter the distribution 
of the economic rent arising at the retail end of the 
business between the franchisor and franchisee. However, 
variation can only happen when contracts are renewed. The 
price of tied-in sales gives a more flexible instrument of 
rent extraction. 
The franchisor states that the lump sum is spent in 
setting up a new outlet. It is difficult to see how this 
could be: administrative costs must be approximately those 
indicated by the lower fees attached to any sale of the 
franchise; no design services are provided; and no assets 
are provided by the franchisor. 
No sales targets are set for franchisees at present 
(1987). The franchisor intends to introduce them. Mr. 
Peacock states that returns are above normal for both the 
franchisor and franchisee. 
The lump sum is a sunk investment from the 
franchisee's point of view. It is quite unrecoverable 
should he choose to leave the franchise system. However, 
little else becomes a sunk cost for the franchisee. He 
controls his own property and would therefore reallocate 





MIL has an established art shop in XXXX. Until 1984, 
he had a total of five shops and a drawing office in 
Scotland. All except the XXXX shop have been sold off. 
In late 1984, M, decided that space at the front of his 
shop could be better used as a separate business of some 
kind. He looked at various options and came across the 
Quikframe franchise. He established his franchised outlet 
in February 1987. It has a prominent sign and shopfront 
and looks very much a separate business. 
M, thought that the layout and design of the 
franchisor's model shop in Edinburgh was excellent, and 
still thinks that the business is complementary to his art 
shop. Becoming a franchisee meant that he could develop 
the new use for his site very quickly. He states that he 
believed that the business could be set up with less 
initial involvement on his part. 
The franchisee asserts that "It soon became apparent 
that the franchisor's operations were very young and 
financially unsound". He began quickly to become 
dissatisfied with his relationship with Quikframe and 
started to look for ways of ending it. Within two years 
of starting, M, was looking for a way out. In particular, 
he felt that the franchisor had not built up the brand, 
that he received little support in his operation, and that 
returns were poor, given the need to pay a royalty. 
Training turned out to be available anyway from equipment 
makers. 
M, confirms the structural details of the franchise 
reported by Mr. Peacock. He also states that an 
understanding existed over territory whereby the 
franchisor would not locate another shop in XXXX. 
M, eventually bought himself out of his Franchise 
Agreement. In May 1987, he and Mr. Peacock made a net- 
present-value estimate of the worth of the franchise 
contract to the franchisor, and negotiated around this 
figure. M, continues to trade under the Quikframe name, 
but this is "Only until we have time I to take down the 
sign". 
The two other franchisees have now also left, 
according to Mi. After he had bought his way out, one of 
them discovered that Mr. Peacock had not registered his 
Franchise Agreements with the Office of Fair Trading under 
the Fair Trading Act. This means that the Agreement 
cannot be enforced in law (either side of the border). 
Consequently, the other franchisees have simply left. It 
is not known whether they continue to use the franchisor's 
trademark. 
guMmary 
Quikframe was a franchise system that had little to 
offer franchisees except for a tradename. The franchisor 
did not build this and, not surprisingly, ran into 
difficulties with franchisees all of whom have now left to 
go independent. Franchisees faced modest sunk costs 
consisting only of the initial lump sum payment plus any 
depreciation of their initial investment. A clause of the 
Agreement restricting the franchisee from competing with 
the franchise network after leaving it would normally 
render the franchisee's built-up goodwill worthless to 
him. As the Agreement turns out to be unenforceable due 
to a legal oversight, professional limitation does not 
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CASE N CURB 30 
The franchisor 
1. Background 
Cure 30 Limited was originally set up in 1969 by John 
and Carole Darley as two separate companies. These were 
known as the Woodworm and Dry Rot Company Limited and 
Dampcure Limited. The Darleys ran the companies using 
direct employees from their head offices in the Watford 
area. In 1980, they saw a documentary on franchising and 
decided that this was a good way to organise the business. 
They now have 43 franchisees operating as branches of 
Dampcure - Woodcure 30 ("Dampcure" in what follows). A 
further 25 franchisees work in other subsidiaries of Cure 
30 known as Crimecure, Plumbingcure, Electricure, and 
plastercure. 
Dampcure offers a range of property damp-proofing and 
timber-preservation services to builders and the general 
public. Key features are that these are based on chemical 
products and carry 30-year guarantees. The other 
franchises offer the specialist services that their names 
suggest (for example, Crimecure offers security services 
and began in 1982). Franchisees work from vans operating 
from either their homes or from small workshops and 
stores. The franchisor runs all branches in the Watford 
area as company-owned operations as a means of keeping a 
check on costs. Otherwise the entire network across all 
of the companies is franchised. This case study 
concentrates on the more established Dampoure side of the 
business. 
Each branch of Dampaure has an annual sales turnover 
of approximately 975,000 Siving a total of 93.3 million 
for the network as a whole. This in run by the franchisor 
4, ýý 
with a total direct staff of 12 employees (1967). Total 
employment throughout the network amounts to approximately 
150 people. Branches are located throughout England with 
some concentration in the South East. 
Dampeure prefer single-site operations. There are no 
multiple or fractional franchises. In some cases# 
Dampcure and Crimecure franchisees operate alongside one 
another as there are thought to be complimentarities in 
demand for the services; in such casess they are 
encouraged to remain separate businesses. 
Cure 30 belongs to the British Franchise Association. 
There is a franchisee association. 
2. Nature of the franchise 
A franchisee buys the right to operate under the 
Dampeure tradename at a particular locations In essence, 
he surveys customer's property, undertaken remedial 
building work, and injects damp-proofing or post 
eradicating fluid into building structures. Materials are 
bought from sources which must be approved by the 
franchisor. In the case of chemicals, Dampoure deals with 
one company, Solignum, and franchisees must buy these 
products through the franchisor. Mrs. Darley states that 
this is because of guarantee considerations. Deliveries 
are direct to franchisees from Solignum. Bills go 
directly to the franchisee. 
Chemical dampeourses and timber treatments are 
guaranteed for 30 years. The guarantee on materials is 
from the manufacturer, Solignum. The guarantee on 
workmanship is provided by the f ranchisor. Thus the 
franchisor and SOlignum need to be certain that only the 
approved chemicals have been used. The least-cost Means 
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for Dampcure of establishing this is to insist on tied-in 
sales. 
At the start of his franchised operation, a 
franchisee receives advertising support from the 
franchisor, in the shape of Yellow-Pages, local-newspaper 
and bus advertisements. The franchisor also provides an 
Amstrad computer and associated business software for some 
of the systems that the franchisee uses. 
Mrs. Darley sees the franchiseeS obligations an 
showing honesty in his operations, maintaining standards 
of workmanship and being fully committed to building up 
the business. In return, she aims to give a full 
managerial back up. Mrs. Darley believes that it is 
important that she monitors standards of franchisee 
operations for the good of the network as a whole. 
Dampcure offers a full business-format franchise with 
manuals covering all aspects of operations, sales and 
administration. There are no highly specific assets 
initially invested in the business. Franchisees control 
their own property and until recently the initial lump-sun 
franchisee fee of 216vOOO provided the first three-months 
lease of a van, all specialist equipment# and initial 
stocks of chemicals. Most of this would have a reasonable 
second-hand value. Around 210,000 could be spent by the 
franchisee on things such as adaption of promises - but 
again this investment could be moved to other uses. 
The Dampcure franchise system in illustrated in 
Figure N, where arrowheads show the direction of sales 
flows. It is not known whether the contract restricts the 
franchisee's normal freedom to choose whether to service 
any particular contract; this is not likely to be the came 
and freedom has been assumed in the figure. 
Contract 
3(i) The Franchise Agreement 
Z4t 6 
Dampeure uses a Franchise Agreement with franchisees. 
Unfortunately# Mrs. Darley is not willing to supply a copy 
of this for analysis here. Some features are apparent 
from conversation with Mrs. Darley and with franchisees. 
Franchisees pay a lump-sun franchisee fee which was 
916,000 until 1987 when it became 19,000; the franchisee 
then became responsible for more of his initial 
investment. A sales royalty of 15% is based on the 
franchisee's gross turnover excluding VAT. The Agreement 
also specifies a 2.5% levy on turnover as a contribution 
to the franchisor's central advertising costs. Weekly 
sales figures must be sent to Dampcure. Full accounts 
must be submitted every six and twelve months. VAT is 
paid by the franchisee on all fees but may be reclaimed by 
him from the authorities. In explaining the change in 
initial fee, Mrs. Darley states "We were aware of other 
franchises on the market". 
The franchise may be sold subject to Danpcure 
approving any purchaser. The franchisor may terminate the 
Agreement if the franchisee breaches it. A professional- 
limitation clause prevents the franchisee from competing 
in his old area for a period after termination; this acts 
to retain all goodwill for the franchisor so that any 
which properly belongs to the franchisee becomes a sunk 
investment. 
3(ii) ImiDlicit asvects of-the cantract 
Mrs. Darley states that in some instance* Dampoure 
provides more support for franchisees than in required by 
the Agreement. An OX&Mple regularly s, risen when a stand 
is mounted at building-trade exhibitions, although this is 
not specified in the Agreement. This may be understood as 
an example of the franchisor undertaking brand development 
motivated by the long term value of retaining and 
recruiting franchisees. 
The Agreement contains nothing which defines 
territories for franchisees. Dampeure has to consider 
whether additional franchisees threaten the livelihoods of 
existing ones in selling franchises. Thus, a tendency 
simply to sell franchises an long as this benefits the 
franchisor is controlled by the need to avoid a reputation 
for poor franchisee support in this respect. 
Franchisees are able to Point to a further 
understanding. Since late 1987, the 2.5% advertising levy 
has not been taken. Representations to the franchisor 
were made by the franchisees' association. The franchisor 
makes entirely discretionary expenditures on centralised 
advertising as a result of losing the levy. Previously, 
Dampcure paid for a Yellow-Pages advertisement for each 
franchisee. 
3(iii) Enforcement and Monitoring 
Apart from weekly sales returns which the franchisee 
must make according to his Agreement, the franchisor has a 
number of checks on the level Of sales achieved. He buys 
his principal materials for chemical injection from one 
source which may be monitored to see whether materials 
consumption is consistent with output levels claimed. The 
number of Guarantees issued also acts an a check on honest 
sales reporting. The franchisor also makes occasional 
inspections of each outlet using a field manager. The 
experience of operating locally assists Dampeure in 
assessing the validity of performance reports. Occasional 
inspection is the principal means of assessing service 
quality at the branches. 
Mrs. Darley claims that she aims not to be too heavy 
handed in interpreting the Agreement. Quoting the 
contract is regarded as a last resort and she generally 
relies on a process of exhortation to alter undesirable 
aspects of a franchisee's conduct of his business. 
There are few disputes in the network according to 
Mrs. Darley. These usually revolve around franchisees 
being late with payments. Only one franchisee's contract 
has been terminated and this was because he becane 
bankrupt and did not pay his fees. 
4. Why franchise? 
Mrs. Darley believes that the main advantage to 
franchisees of belonging to Dampoure is the ability to use 
the brand name. This works in at least two ways. 
Firstly# customers are reassured that they are not dealing 
with some f ly by night who may not honour guarantees. 
This should bring business to the franchisee. Secondlyt 
Dampcure is a member of the relevant trade associations 
(British Wood Preserving Association, British Chemical 
Dampcourse Association, and Federation of Master 
Builders). Franchisees are thus automatically accredited 
to these and therefore quality for materials guarantees 
offered by manufacturers. 
Mrs. Darley considers training and systems support an 
lesser but still significant advantages to franchisees. 
The main benefit from franchising for Daupoure is 
perceived to be the quality of local principal operator 
recruited. This is thought to be such higher than would 
occur under company-owned outlets. Mrs. Darley believes 
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that individuals become committed to their own businesses 
and are more likely to develop local trade an a result. 
Another benefit to the franchisor is thought to be 
that franchising allows specialisation to occur. Dampcure 
has become expert at marketing and monitoring, whereas 
franchisees specialize in operations. Mrs. Darley further 
believes that her monitoring costs are "Much lower than if 
we ran the branches direct". She agrees that franchisees 
have an incentive to behave honestly an well an diligently 
as their business efforts to build their businesses are at 
stake. If a contract were terminated it could be 
difficult for a franchisee to raise funds to start in 
business again; also, he would lose any business goodwill 
he might have built up due to the professional- limitation 
clause in the Agreement. 
Mrs. Darley does not perceive capital-raininS 
advantages from franchising for the franchisor. 
S. Fees and returns 
As mentioned above, & 99,000 lumP sun is charged for 
a franchise along with a 15% sales royalty. There are no 
charges raised by Dampeure for tied-in chemicals. The 
franchisor just has the lump sum and royalty an relatively 
inflexible means of shifting any economic rent from the 
branches to the centre. Mrs Darley states that the lunp 
sum is more than spent by Dampcure in starting up a now 
franchisee. 
The franchisor projects that a franchisee should be 
able to establish a sales turnover of around 980,000 
within two years. Bearing in mind chemicall wage and 
other costs this would give a franchisee a reasonable 
income for a small businessman. Mrs. Darley describes not 
returns to franchisees as "variable". 
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The franghisees 
1. Franchisee NjL 
N, set up his Dampeure operation in late 1984. He is 
a sole proprietor and works directly from home. He 
confirms the structural details of the franchise system 
reported by Mrs. Darley. He also confirms that he would 
lose "very little" of his initial investment if he were to 
leave the network. He has three employees. His business 
is a busy, home-based, building specialism. 
N, j believes that his obligations to Dampoure are to 
pay the royalty# to expand his businesso and to maintain a 
high standard of work. In return, he expects instant 
support over any problem that he encounters. He describes 
the franchisor's performance in this respect as very good. 
Training is also described as excellent. He believes that 
his initial lump-sun fee had little of a profit element in 
it for the franchisor. 
The franchisee confirms that Dampcure is not heavy 
handed in enforcing the contract: "They have never quoted 
the Agreement at us and seem fair going". The Darley8s 
look at his books twice a Year. Ni is aware that 
guarantees act an a check on his sales reports. The only 
area of dispute he is aware of within the system concerns 
operating- territory boundaries: the franchisees would like 
these defined and find the current understanding that the 
franchisor will consult with. then before starting a new 
franchise too uncertain an arrangement. 
N, agrees with Mrs. Darley that it is the brand name 
which is of benefit to his compared with independent 
operation. It does reassure customers. He does not think 
that he could provide guarantees on his work if he were on 
his own- 
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M, is happy with his franchise and believes that his 
returns are higher than in any option open to his. He 
intends to stay within the system. 
Franchisee N2 
N2 began as a franchisee in late 1982 having 
previously worked in the timber trade. His business is 
home based and employs two people. He undertakes the full 
Dampeure range of damp-proofing and timber-preservation 
work. He confirms the structural details of the franchise 
system reported by Mrs. Darley, except that he has an 
unwritten agreement that he may undertake flood-damage 
repairs under the brand name but paying just a 5% royalty 
on the work. 
Like Nit he feels that there are no significant sunk 
investments in a Dampcure franchise. The most significant 
item of this type he describes as his efforts in building 
up the business. He believes that his built-up goodwill 
would be his major loss if his contract ever ended.: "This 
gives a major advantage to Dampcure". He believes that 
the franchisor fully spent the initial fee at the start of 
his business. 
He agrees that the franchisor does not behave in a 
heavy-handed manner over interpreting the Agreement. 
Generally, this is not cited. He makes his weekly sales 
returns and occasionally sees one of the Darleys or a 
manager. N2 is generally left to get on with his business 
without interference. . He is aware of concern among 
franchisees over territories but believes that Dampeure 
will have to be trusted to see that the franchisorts 
interest ultimately coincide with those of the franchisees 
on this issue- 
The major advantage of 
able to use the brand name. 
his customers that his i 
building company. Guarantees 
this. 
2ý2 
being in the system is being 
This enables him to convince 
aa respectable specialist 
are an important part of 
He is happy with his business returns at present 
although he did worry that projections had been set too 
high at one stage. These are now good, in his view, 
although not startlingly so. He intends to remain with 
Dampcure. 
Summa= 
Dampeure is part of the Cure 30 group of companies. 
An established damp-proofing and timber-preservation 
business, Daapcure began to make its brand name available 
to franchisees from the early 1980s. 
An initial lump-sun franchisee fee is charged which 
has been recently revised downwards by allowing 
franchisees to take care of more of their initial 
investment for themselves. This could well be a more 
efficient situation. Franchisees believe that the lump 
sum contains no real profit for the franchisor. Another 
area of fees which has been revised is the payment by the 
franchisee of a contribution towards Dampoure's 
advertising expenses: this has been abolished in practice. 
The Agreement appears to have been revised over time. The 
principal source of the franchisor's returns appears to be 
the sales royalty, which may be varied with the lump sun 
as a means of directing economic rent arising in the 
branches to the centre. 
There are few sunk investments that could reinforce 
the franchisee's consummate performance of his side of the 
contract. The Main example appears to be the goodwill 
I 
that he personally builds up 
the contract for whatever 
preventing him from operating 
for a period of time. Once h, 
must remain with them if he 
work. This should strengthen 
business a success. 
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in his area. Termination of 
reason invokes a clause 
in his trade within his area 
e has signed with Dampeure he 
is to stay in his line of 
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CASE 0 BARSTOCK 
1. Backuround 
Barstock Limited was established in 1983 as a service 
which audits stocks once a month for the hotel trade and 
public houses. An instant-printout computerised system is 
used. The benefits of this are that licensed traders can 
check on the honesty of their staff and re-order stocks 
without spending time stocktaking. Until now, Graham 
Watson has operated Barstock using direct employees but he 
now intends to sell franchises starting in 1988. The 
company is small with three employees working in the field 
and another two at head office. It operates from Glasgow 
and is becoming well known locally. The intention in to 
offer a small-scale franchise that someone could easily 
start with. 
2. Nature-of the franchise 
Mr. Watson intends to offer a full business-format 
franchise in which the use of his computer software would 
be written in to the franchise agreement. The systems 
would remain his property. A franchisee would operate 
from a van based at his own home and copy the current 
service but in other areas. Mr. Watson intends to 
continue company operations in areas close to Glasgow, 
where he is already set up and where monitoring in 
relatively easy for him. 
Figure 0 illustrates the rranchise system which Mr. 
Watson intends to create. Arrowheads show the direction 
or sales flows. No products change hands an Mro Watson 
will, offer support services and training to franchisees 
an the basis of his system. It in assumed in the figure 
that the franchisee will remain free to choose whether or 
not to service any particular contract. 
ISb 
Essentially a franchisee will obtain the right to 
use a brand name which at the moment in of local standing, 
and to use the franchisor's computerized systems. 
Cgntrl&ct 
3(i) The Agreement 
Mr. Watson is currently (1987) constructing the 
Agreement he intends to use. Only limited details are 
therefore available. 
The franchisor will charge an initial lump-sun fee to 
reflect the costs of setting up the franchisee. These 
costs include training (excluding travel and subsistence)$ 
computer hardware and software and launch advertising. A 
continuing royalty will also be charged and will give the 
franchisor his returns. No property lease arrangements 
are likely to be relevant to the franchise contract. 
Mr. Watson intends the franchise to be saleable by 
the franchisee subject to his approval of any purchaser. 
He will also use a professional limitation clause 
restricting the franchisee's competition with the system 
for a period after termination or sale of the contract. 
This will retain any business goodwill within the 
franchise system. 
He intends to use & comPulsory-arbitration clause in 
the Agreement. 
3(11) ImiDlicit saiDects of the- contract 
Mr. Watson anticipates that understandings will 
emerge between himself and his franchisees. He accepts 
that business is "Not a question of enforcing the letter 
of the law but one of give and take" Re believes that an 
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area likely to generate understandings in the creation of 
territories for franchisees; these are not to be rigidly 
defined as lines on a map in the agreement. 
3(iii) Enforcement and monitoring 
Mr. Watson will require franchisees to submit weekly 
business returns covering sales. From his own experiencet 
he has an idea of what sales should be possible in an area 
and of the costs attached to these. In addition# a 
centralised complaints procedure will indirectly act as a 
check on unreported sales. 
The franchisor's expectations over implicit aspects 
of the contract reported above also suggest that he would 
not regularly quote the agreement at franchisees. 
4. Why franchise? 
Mr. Watson believes that franchisees would benefit 
from working under a brand name that he hopes to build up. 
He also states that his computerised system in valuable. 
In addition, he believes that a centralized advertising 
budget is likely to be more effective in generating 
business than separate efforts would be. 
The main advantage to the franchisor stems from the 
nature of his business. Mr. Watson states that trust 
between the final customer and the local operator is very 
important. The customer needs to f eel that the operator 
is wholly motivated to stem any losses which way be 
occurring. This is more likely to happen if the operator 
is & small businessman with a strong incentive to retain 
business. 
Another advantage to the franchisor is that he maven 
monitoring costs under franchising. Franchisees should be 
Z53 
motivated to give good service as they benefit from the 
profits which follow this. A franchisee should also be 
more inclined towards honest reporting of sales results 
compared with employed operatives. This is because he 
only saves a sales royalty by under-reporting and risks 
disrupting his business future. 
Mr. Watson perceives capital-raising advantages to 
franchising for himself. Franchising allows his to make a 
particular kind of investment and raise capital for his 
business. He is enabled to invest in an easier-to- 
monitor network. 
Summary 
Barstock is a specialised barstocking service offered 
to the licensed trade. It intends to expand by 
franchising largely because of the incentive this will 
provide to franchisees to become committed to good 
customer service. 
It remains to be seen whether Barstock offers a 
sufficient advantage to franchisees compared with 
independent operation. 























CASE P COMPUTRRLAND 
The franchisor 
1. Background 
Computerland operates 820 outlets worldwide dealing 
in computer hardware, software, maintenance and training. 
The company was first established in the USA in 1976, 
entered European markets in 1980 and case to the UK in 
1982. There are 20 shops in France, 20 in Germany, IS in 
the UK, 6 in Spain and 2 in Italy. Most of the remainder 
are in the USA and Japan. In the UK (and Europe) business 
markets are servedo in contrast to the USA where personal 
and business markets are catered for. Each branch employs 
around 15 people. The UK is administered from regional 
offices at Milton Keynes which are ultimately under the 
control of Computerland S. A. head offices in Luxembourg. 
This case concentrates on the UK operations. 
Computerland belonas to the British Franchise 
Association. There is an active franchisee association* 
Franchising has always been part of ComputerlandOn 
business philosophy. Virtually all outlets are franchised 
worldwide; in the UK an exception exists where a branch 
has been bought back from a franchises whose business was 
failing. Multiple franchises are permitted: Scotland has 
three shops belonging to one franchisee; one London 
franchisee owns four outlets; Manchester# Birmingham and 
salford form a group. No fractional franchises are 
permitted. 
Nature of thO 1XIMChime 
The franchisee purchases the risht tO trade under the 
computerland brand name at a particular location. A 
). 6( 
territory is conferred on his in the sense that no other 
branch will be established within a one nautical mile 
radius. Computerland deals in all of the supplies that a 
franchisee might want but leaves his free to choose where 
to buy. In addition a full site-desixn service in 
provided at cost by the franchisor at the start up of a 
new franchised outlet. 
I interviewed Caroline Fitz-Gibbon, Computerland's 
Franchise Operations Manager# at the UK headquarters in 
Milton Keynes. She sees a franchisee's obligations an 
paying franchise fees and maintaining operating standards 
in line with those laid down from time to time by 
Computerland. In return, the franchisor aims to provide 
full managerial support of franchisees and to obtain good 
discounts on supplies. 
Computerland offers a full business-format franchise 
with manuals covering all operating, sales and 
administrative sYstems. No financial support in given; 
franchisees are directed to independent sources of finance 
like the major banks. Training in at the franchisor's 
expense (but excludes travel and subsistence coats for the 
franchisee) if the franchisor requests it. 
The Computerland franchise system is illustrated in 
Figure P, where arrowheads indicate the direction of sales 
flows. As far as is known, nothing in the franchisee's 
contract limits his normal freedom to choose whether to 
supply any particular customer. 
A franchisee makes a substantial sunk investment i 
his business. It Costs around 2250,000 to set up a 
medium-sized branch serving a population of between 
100,000 to one million Peoples Approximately one-quarter 
of this would not be recovered in the event of the 
business failing. The sunk items are a lump-mum initial 
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franchise fee, training costs at the start up and a 
proportion of the cost of making leasehold improvements 
and adding fixtures to the business promises. There is no 
control of the lease by the franchisor so the franchisee 
could reallocate some of his investment in improving his 
property if the need szose. Nevertheless, the sun of 
around 260,000 represents a considerable sunk investment 
which is likely to motivate the franchisee to make a 
success of his business. 
It should be noted that little of the sunk investment 
is naturally unrecoverable. Around 920#000 worth of the 
organisational and training costs of the franchisee could 
be regarded as an investment in creating local business 
goodwill. These are sunk because the franchisor may take 
steps to retain all goodwill if the franchisee leaves. 
Also, the lump sum of up to 225,000 in a further sunk cost 
which is created by the franchisor. 
A coPY of the franchisor's projections for the 
initial investment attached to setting up a unit catering 




Computerland uses a detailed Franchise Agreement but 
was not prepared to provide a copy for analysis in this 
study. A few details can be gathered from co mme nts of 
t4ra. Fitz-Gibbon and of franchisees. 
A lump-sun initial franchise fee is charged. This 
varies according to the Population targeted for a branch. 
Currently* this starts at 913000 if the population is 
less than 100,000 and at 2209000 otherwise. These sums 
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are described by Mrs. Fitz-Gibbon as embodying only a 
modest profit element. In addition, the franchisee pays 
3.5% of his sales turnover as a continuing royalty payment 
and a further 1% as an advertising levy to the franchisor. 
Turnover is calculated before VAT. However# VAT is added 
to all franchise fees and may be reclaimed from the 
authorities by a franchisee. (This careful procedure 
prevents double counting). 
A professional-linitation clause prevents the 
franchisee from competing with the Computerland system for 
a period after termination of the Agreement. This keeps 
all goodwill in an area to the franchisor. The franchise 
may be sold subject to the franchisor's approval of a 
prospective purchaser. 
3(11) Implicit-seDects of the c()ntract 
It is possible to identify at least two business 
understandings that have grown up within the Computerland, 
franchise system. These rely on the long torn value of 
the franchise relationship for their support. 
Computerland appears to accept the need to listen to 
franchisee's requests for revisions of the written 
Agreement. In 1987j the franchisees obtained a reduction 
in the sales royalty from 8% to 3.5%. In return, 
Computerland was permitted discretion to add a profit 
element to the prices of product sales to franchisees: 
previously it was understood that products would be passed 
over at cost. Franchisees felt that Conput*rland was not 
being an vigorous an possible over obtaining discounts and 
keeping administration costs low on its distribution 
service. The new arrangements tie the franchisor's 
rewards more directly to his performanceg particularly an 
franchisees are not obliged to buy products from his. 
2.6 if 
Secondly, the prices of transferred products must be 
kept competitive with alternative supply sources. From 
what has been said already, it in clear that otherwise 
franchisees will buy elsewhere. 
3(111) Enforcenent and monitoring 
Mrs. Fitz-Gibbon states that 
avoid the need to ever quote the 
carefully designing the contract to 
and franchisor's interests coine 
recent contract changes have been 
pressures from franchisees". 
Computerland trios to 
Franchise AXreement by 
make the franchisee's 
ide. She accepts that 
the result or "Market 
Monthly sales figures are reported by franchisees. 
Computerland field managers also inspect branches from 
time to time. The franchisor in confident that wild 
under-reporting of sales would be detected. The 
monitoring system is thought to be of sufficiently low 'K7 50000- 
cost, as borne out by the small UK head-office staff of 
five. 
The franchisor states that the system runs fairly 
free of disputes. Occasionally franchisees conflict over 
sales as territories refer to locations and not to sales. 
one UK franchisee was inefficient. In addition to these 
examples, it should be noted that the recent payment 
schedule changes were essentially the result of a 
conflict- 
Computerland bought Out the inefficient franchis*9 
(Southampton) rather than see one of its branches fail. 
This would have had a bad reputation effect an far an 
recruitment of franchisees JIB concerned. Southampton will 
be re-franchised once a now buyer in found. 
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4. Why franchise? 
Mrs. Fitz-Gibbon believes that a major advantage of 
being a Computerland franchisee in the ability to use the 
trade name. The name is well known in business circles 
due to the company's size in the USA. A second advantage 
is that franchisees can use each other to support 
maintenance on sales made away from local markets; there 
are network advantages. Computerl&nd also believes that 
product discounts are important and this is supported by 
recent franchisee actions over royalties. Finally, 
franchisees are automatically accredited an dealers for 
certain manufacturers like IBM by being in the 
Computerland network. 
Computerland benefits from having committed local 
entrepreneurs in the branches. Mrs. Fitz-Gibbon points 
out that this philosophy is emphasised in some of the 
publicity literature. One example of this in: 
"The a maitment of loca 
Each Computerland centre in owned by individuals 
oesoo so each centre represents a substantial investment by its owner ... you're dealing with 
the owner - and he's there ror the long term". 
(Computerland brochure, 1987). 
it is believed that franchisees have such more at stake in 
their branches than AnY emPloyed manager could ever have. 
Mrs. Fitz-Gibbon also states that 
are Judged such lower than would be 
company-owned network. The exVerience 
southampton convinces her of this. The 
up more management time than the 0! 
network. 
monitoring costs 
the case with a 
of buying back 
branch has taken 
mtire franchised 
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5. Fees and returns 
Franchise fees are reported in Section 3(1) above. 
These together with the charge for transferred products* 
are used to divide economic rent between the rranchisor 
and franchisee. 
Computerland provided no sales projections for 
analysis in this study. Mrs. Fitz-Gibbon states that 
returns are excellent for both franchisees and 
Computerland. 
The f-ranchisees 
1. Franchisee Pi 
P, became a Computerland franchisee in April 1986 
having worked as a computer specialist for 0 Around 
15% of his business is with individuals and the rest in 
with companies. He buys 40% of his requirements within 
the UIK and 60% from Computerland's warehouse in 
Luxembourg. There are 12 employees in XXXX. The business 
is a busy, ultra-modern combined office and showroom. 
PjL sees his main obligations to the franchisor an 
"Doing everything possible to strengthen the 
organisation"- An example of this commitment aris*s when 
he buys products. A rival companyo Comprop in often 
cheaper than Computerland but P, will not buy from them. 
In returno he expects fUll support from Computerland ands, 
in particular# expects good product discounts. 
The franchisee confirms the structural details of the 
Computerland system recorded by Mrs. Fitz-Gibbon. 
AdditionallYt he is able to clarify sOme aspects of the 
franchise relationship. The 1% levy an sales which 
franchisees contribute to the franchisor's marketing costs 
Z 4: ý 
is allocated to different promotional methods by a 
committee of the UK franchisees. The franchisees meet 
monthly anyway for general purposes; they feel they have 
been successful in keeping the franchise relationship 
beneficial from their point of view. 
PjL believes that the brand name is or some value to 
him as a franchisee. He describes this an worth i% or his 
turnover; it is not or major importance. The main benefit 
to him is that Computerland obtains volume discounts which 
are then passed on. Pi believes that he in able to offer 
local entrepreneurship that Computerland could not get any 
other way. 
Interestingly, Pt did not read his Agreement nor did 
he consult a solicitor before becoming a franchises. He 
based his decision on a personal assessment of the 
franchise system and the rranchisor's staff. This in 
astonishing but may be quite shrewd; given that contracts 
are rarely quoted or legally enforced, the personal 
aspects are important ones. He confirms that the 
franchisor does not quote his Agreement to his. 
P, has experienced very 
business# which was profitable 
operation. He intends to remain 
& Jump sun of E17,000, which 
from the figures quoted by the 
that there was a profit element 
weeks training and store-design 
have used up this figure. 
good returns from his 
within its first your of 
with the system. He paid 
suggests some negotiation 
franchisor. He believes 
in this; he received four- 
services that could not 
He reports that it can be difficult to transfer 
maintenance work within the System. This has always been 
possible but the quality of work comins from another 
branch for his customers could not be guaranteed. There 
is now a national maintenance agreement which P, describes 
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as "A step in the right direction". This again suggests 
that the franchisor is prepared to be flexible. 
2. Franchisee P2 
P2 began as a Computerland franchisee in 1983 in 
Branches in XXXX and XXXX were added in 1984. The 
business was originally a partnership but has operated as 
XXX Limited since 1985.85% of all sales are to large 
companies. All dealings are with businesses an thore in 
no walk-in trade as there would be in the USA. P*--has 31 
employees spread across salest engineoring, training and 
administration. 
P2 sees his obligations an paying his royalty and 
abiding by the spirit of his Agreement. In return he 
expects "Dwlivery of the right product at the right price 
and in good time". His supplies come from Computerland 
only if this is the cheapest source. Ps believes that 
often he can do as well on his own. 
The main benefit to belonging to the system in soon 
as the bulk-buying discounts that can &rise. A secondary 
benefit is the ability to trade under the brand name. Pa 
reports that he "Took a gamble that the brand would 
develop over here" in signing with Computerland. This 
paid off an there is now a reasonable national presence. 
The existence of a national chain means that support can 
be offered to distant customers. Pe shares Pile view of 
the problems of ensuring the quality of transferred 
maintenance work. 
P2 confirms the structural details of the 
Computerland franchise system reported by Mrs. Fits. 
Gibbon. He emphasises that franchisees# expectations have 
changed over time towards regarding the franchisor as a 
bulk-buyins distributor. They have been successful in 
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making Computerland's rewards more dependent on efficiency 
at doing this. The franchisor's enforcement of the 
Agreement is not seen as heavy handed. 
Returns are described as very good by Pa. He intends 
to remain a franchisee and looks forward to future 
expansion. He believes that the initial lump-sun 
franchise fee contains a profit element for Computerland, 
and bases his assessment on his knowledge of industry 
setting-up cost conditions. 
Summary 
In the 1980s Computerland expanded into the UK and 
Europe using a franchise system which has been developed 
in the USA. In the UK, the markets served are exclusively 
business ones. Franchisees appear to enjoy brand-name 
advantages. The system has settled down into a pattern 
where the franchisor acts as a bulk-buying distributor for 
the franchisees and receives returns which are based on 
performance in this area. A small sales royalty in 
charged with most of the franchisor's returns coming from 
a mark up on products that the franchisee in not obliged 
to buy. 
If Computerland performs the bulk-buyinS service well 
then economic rent is likely to be created at the retail 
end of the business. These MAY be extracted through the 
jump-sum initial franchise fee, the royalty or the mark up 
on products. The mark up remains flexible after 
Agreements have been signed. Franchisees believe that the 
jump sun has a profit element for the franchisor. 
A Computerland franchisee makes a significant sunk 
investment in his business because of the lump-sun fee and 
restrictions Placed On his business activities if he 
leaves the sYsteno Professional limitations moan that 
2; 0 
initial and continuing investment in creating local 
business goodwill are lost to the franchisee. 


































, ýý2 APPENDIX P COMPUTERLAND PROJECTION 
Investment. organisation and start-uiD costs (Slooo) 
for a medium sized market 
Franchise fee 20 
Leasehold improvements 30 - 40 
Fixtures 15 - 22 
Furniture and equipment 28 - 35 
Initial stocks 40 - 50 
Sign and installation 2 
Working capital 40 - 60 
Organisational, training 
and other costs 20 - 30 
Capital cost (approximate) 195 - 259 
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CASE Q YVES RCCHER 
The franchisor 
1. Background 
Yves Rocher is a French cosmetics company which was 
established in 1959. It is named after its founder who 
still controls the company. There are around 900 shops, 
600 of which are in France with the remainder spread 
-mainly around Europe and the UK. Current sales turnover 
is approXimately 2400 million (1987). Around 3,000 people 
are employed directly by the company, mainly in France 
with another 5,000 or so employed in shops which are 
almost all franchised. One-half of the total revenue 
comes from shops with the rest coming from a mail-order 
business. Mail order does not operate in the UK which now 
has a chain of 30 franchised shops. This case 
concentrates on Yves Rocher in the UK. 
The business is based on cosmetics which are derived 
from plants and advertised as natural beauty products. 
Each franchisee sells these from a shop usually located 
just off main high streets. Beauty therapy is also 
offered to women at these locations. The franchise is 
aimed at female beauticians who wish to open their own 
businesses; usually if they are married the husband 
becomes involved on the administrative side. - 
The franchisor does not Permit multiple or fractional 
franchises. All sites are small stand-alone units. 
Yves Rocher is a member of the British Franchise 
Association. There is no franchisee association. 
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2. Nature of the franchise 
Franchisees receive the right to trade under the Yves 
Rocher trademark at a particular location. In return for 
this they pay an initial lump-sum franchise fee and agree 
to sell only Yves Rocher products. Within each branch a 
beautician's salon is run under the trademark but without 
any returns to the franchisor. This is regarded as a good 
means of bringing in customers by Yves Rocher who are 
essentially interested in selling products. 
Gisle Navacelle is the Managing Director of Yves 
Rocher (London) Limited, which is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of the French parent company. He sees 
franchisees' obligations as buying the product, honouring 
their contracts, taking advice, and building their 
businesses. He emphasises that they must be fully 
committed to their businesses. In return he aims to give 
full managerial support and promotes the brand. He also 
considers it important that he polices standards 
throughout the network to protect both Yves Rocher and 
franchisees from loss of reputation. 
Yves Rocher offers a full business-format franchise 
with manuals covering sales, operating and administrative 
procedures. Beautician training is not covered: either 
the franchisee is already trained or a beautician is 
hired. A highly standardised shop layout is followed by 
each franchisee. Property leases are not compulsorily 
taken through the franchisor; a head-lease arrangement is 
available if a franchisee finds this helpful to secure her 
property. 
Each shop costs about 254,000 to establish. This 
consists of expenditure which is for the most part sunk 
into the business as far as a franchisee is concerned. A 
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projection of set-up costs provided by Yves Rocher is 
shown as Appendix Q. If the franchisee controls her own 
lease then building costs of around 230,000 establish an 
asset that could be relocated (at some cost) to other 
uses. The franchise fee is sunk along with furnishing and 
legal costs into the specific business; these amount to 
about 924,000. Since Yves Rocher uses a contract 
containing a professional-limitation clause, local 
goodwill cannot be retained by the franchisee if the 
contract is terminated. Since she cannot compete with 
Yves Rocher in her old area, initial investments in the 
specific business and subsequent efforts to build it up 
become sunk expenditures. The franchisee can only sell 
her business as a going conern with the consent of the 
franchisor. 
Some financial support may be given to franchisees by 
Yves Rocher. This is discretionary and is given as a 
subsidy where site costs are very high. Otherwise, 
franchisees raise funds from independent bank sources. 
They are assisted in putting together financial plans. 
The Yves Rocher franchise system is illustrated in 
Figure Q, where arrowheads show the direction of sales 
flows. It is assumed that nothing in the franchisee's 
contract limits her normal freedom to decide whether or 
not to deal with any particular customer. 
3. The contract 
The Agreement 
Yves Rocher uses a detailed Franchise Agreement with 
franchisees. A COPY was not provided for analysis in this 
study. Nevertheless some details can be gathered from 
discussions with Mr. Navacelle and with franchisees. 
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The franchisee pays an initial lump-sum franchise fee 
of 97,500. This covers training, initial management 
support, some advertising and store-design services. Mr. 
Navacelle states that Yves Rocher usually spends more than 
this in starting up a franchisee. In addition, the 
Agreement specifies that franchisees will receive a 35% 
discount on the recommended retail prices of products. 
There is no sales royalty as such. 
The Agreement runs for five years and is renewable 
provided the franchisee's performance is satisfactory. If 
the Agreement is terminated, the franchisee cannot compete 
within his old area for a period. This preserves all 
goodwill in the hands of the franchisor. The franchise 
may be sold by the franchisee subject to the franchisor's 
approval of any purchaser. Territories are linked to 
postcodes, according to Mr. Navacelle. 
3(ii) Implicit aspects of the contract 
Mr. Navacelle states that it is understood that Yves 
Rocher will support a franchisee financially if sales turn 
out to be significantly below projections for a site. He 
is aware of the damage to recruitment which could follow 
from the failure of his franchisees. 
A second implicit aspect is advertising. The 
Agreement specifies only that the franchisor should offer 
adequate support. Actual amounts, mainly in newspapers 
and magazines, are not stated. Again, the rranchisor is 
motivated to be seen to be building up the brand by 
effects on the recruitment and retention of franchisees. 
Finally, although the retail mark up for franchisees 
is specified in the Agreement, list prices are not. It is 
understood that these are to be sensitive to cost and 
demand conditions. Franchisees state that sales-revenue 
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maximisation implies profit maximisation for them (i. e. 
they are in an output range where costs and revenues are 
diverging). The franchisor may choose his prices to meet 
his own objectives, subject to leaving franchisees at 
least a normal retailing return; they will sell whatever 
can be sold at any given price. 
3(iii) Enforcement and monitoring 
Mr. Navacelle does not aim regularly to quote 
Agreements to franchisees. However, he has a policy of 
trying to stop contract violations an early an possible. 
His usual method is exhortation. Termination of an 
Agreement would be a last resort; some negotiated 
settlement would be preferred. 
Weekly sales returns are made to the franchisor and 
reinforced by occasional visits to stores. Mr. Navacelle 
is confident that he would detect any misrepresentation of 
sales through these means. The tied-in product given the 
franchisor a direct connection with the franchisee8s 
performance. The relevant check is to see whether the 
franchisee is sticking to selling the branded goods. 
Tied-in sales, retail returns and visits must all point to 
the amount of business that Mr. Navacelle believes an area 
can generate. Monitoring costs are felt to be reasonable. 
Mr. Navacelle states that there have been occasional 
disputes within the Yves Rocher system. There are minor 
disagreements from time to time over particular 
promotional strategies and over product availability. He 
knows of OnlY two serious disputes. One franchisee did 
not Pay for his product and had his contract terminated. 
One franchisee did not achieve the results felt to be 
possible and a buyer waa found for the franchise. 
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4. Why franchise? 
Mr. Navacelle believes that the franchisee's major 
benefit from belonging to the network is the right to 
trade under the brand name. This brings business through 
the doors as many customers know of Yves Rocher from the 
Continental shops. Also it gives them a stake in the 
cosmetics business even though they may be small shops. 
Many major manufacturers like Chanel and Givenchy Just do 
not deal with small businesses. 
The franchisor believes that two main benefits follow 
from franchising. First. the franchisee has personal 
wealth staked in her business and is more likely to 
vigorously develop the shop. Mr. Navacelle points out 
that "Franchisees are part of the local economy". 
Secondly, there are monitoring cost savings which follow 
from the greater trust which may be placed upon 
franchiseest who have no incentive to under-report sales 
as long as Yves Rocher products retain brand and cost 
advantages. 
Mr. Navacelle believes that there are capital-raising 
advantages to franchising but that these are not the main 
reasons for organising along these lines. 
5. Fees L36nd returns 
The franchisee must PAY a 97,500 initial lump-sun 
franchise fee and buy tied-in products an discussed above. 
A typical city shop &ins to reach annual Sales 
figures of around 22509000 within three years, according 
to projections supplied by the franchisor. This gives an 
annual profit (before interest and tax but allowing for 
depreciation) of 230,000. This represents an excellent 
return for a small business in 1987. Mr. Navacelle states 
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that returns are variable for franchisees but that many do 
hit their targets. Yves Rocher is itself a successful and 
profitable company. 
The franchisees 
1. Franchisee Qi, XXXX 
Q, is a trained beautician who worked in salons and 
taught in a technical college before starting as a 
franchisee. She established her business in 1983 an the 
XXXX Yves Rocher shop in XXXX. XXXX is regarded an a good 
location because of its holidaymakers. She has five full- 
time staff. The shop contains a salon. 
Q, sees her obligation to Yves Rocher an total 
loyalty to the brand name. In return, she hopes for full 
managerial and marketing support. In addition, she 
believes the franchisor should monitor the network to 
control slack service quality. She would report any poor 
quality shop of which she became aware. This in because 
low standards are seen as having a detrimental effect on 
the value of the brand name. 
Capital to start the shop came from a loan raised 
using her house as security. She is proud of her own risk 
taking in this respect. Moreover, she has a very clear 
understanding that most of her-- 
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personal wealth was put on 
the line at the start of the' business. She states that 
she could not have been more committed to success: "If it 
had failed then I would have lost everything". She has 
her own lease on the shop which in located Just off the 
main shopping thoroughfare in XXXX. 
The Agreement is described an being filed away. Q, 
claims that she cannot understand it and that it does not 
crop up in the normal course of events. She confirms the 
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structural details of the franchise reported by Mr. 
Navacelle and that the franchisor in not heavy handed in 
his dealings with her. She makes weekly sales returns and 
receives a visit from a field manager twice a month. 
Q, is not aware of any territorial limit applying to 
her franchise. This in not consistent with Mr. 
Navacelle's statement that territories, which are based on 
location not sales, are linked to postoodes. She does 
believe that an understanding exists whereby the 
franchisee would be given first refusal over a nearby shop 
likely to compete with hers. 
The franchise system appears to run trouble free for 
the most part. However, Q, perceives one problem area. 
Faulty goods may be returned to any shop for an exchange. 
The franchisee then receives a replacement item but no 
handling charge. Some franchisees refuse to make returns 
and customers then find their way to one, like Qi, who 
does. This causes a lot of time to be lost on 
administering such returns. Qi feels the franchisor could 
enforce policy more strictly and prevent some franchisees 
from free riding in this way. 
The main advantage of being a franchisee in the right 
to use the brand name. This is well known due to the size 
of the French network and the franchisor's advertising in 
women's magazines. Q, Also feels that the initial support 
she received was excellent. She appears to be a little 
surprised to find herself successfully established in 
business, and seems pleased with the franchise system. 
Before she started she had seen an article in the Glasgow 
Herald reporting the better success rate of franchised new 
businesses. 
Q, I reports that her business returns are "Pleasing 
and as expected". Increased sales generally imply 
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increased profits in her shop. She intends to remain 
within the system and would like to open another shop if 
this were possible. Qi believes that the franchisor must 
have spent at least the initial lump-sun franchise fee in 
starting up her business. 
Franchisees Q2 
Mr. and Mrs. Q2 are both franchisees: Mrs. Qs began 
the XXXX shop in 1983 and Mr. Q2 is currently setting up 
in XXXX (1987). Mr. Q2 was previously a butcher in his 
family's business in XX=, whereas Mrs. Q* was employed as 
a beautician before 1983. Mr. Q2 has always been involved 
in his wife's business. Mr. Navacelle points out that in 
making each the franchisee for separate shops, his policy 
of not encouraging multiple franchises is followed. I 
interviewed Mr. Q2 with respect to both businesses. 
The XXXX shop is located just off XY XXXX in an 
arcade of jewellers and similar specialist shops. Five 
full-time staff are employed. The shop contains a 
separate beauty salon. The XXX shop is being set up in 
the XXXX in XXXX and will have a similar format; it will 
be run by a manageress as it is felt important that 
customers should deal with a woman. 
Mr. Q: believes that his obligations are to represent 
the Yves Rocher image adequately and to build up sales. 
In return, he expects good marketing support, prompt 
supplies and careful monitoring of the network. By good 
marketing support, he means that he expects quality 
advertisements in major women's magazines. 
He confirms the structural details of the franchise 
reported by Mr. Navacelle. Mr. Q* also confirms that the 
franchisor does not quote details of the Agreement to him. 
He knows of no disputes within the system. Weekly sales 
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reports are made and a visit is paid by a field manager 
once a month. Mr. Q2 understands that there are 
territorial limits, based on location, and that these are 
linked to postoodes. 
Mr. Qz emphasises the benefit of trading under the 
brand name which he enjoys an a franchisee. Other 
benefits include the general support which the franchisor 
provides in areas like marketing and help in obtaining 
property leases. Both shops make use of head-lease 
arrangements through the franchisor; these are so 
arranged that rents must be passed on without additional 
charges. Mr. Q2 regards the lease arrangements as a 
service provided by Yves Rocher and does not feel that 
they place additional controls upon him. He feels that he 
is able to offer the franchisor a much more comýmitted 
local management than could be obtained from employed 
managers. He states that his business future in staked on 
the businesses. 
The Q2s are happy with their business returns. 
Increased sales generally imply increased profits. 
Despite recent tight trading conditions in the XXXX area, 
profits have stood up well. The Qts are sure that Yves 
Rocher spent more than the lump-sums they have paid in 
setting up their businesses. They intend to remain with 
the system. 
summary 
Yves Rocher operates a chain of 30 franchised 
cosmetics shops. Franchisees buy tied-in products on 
which the franchisor makes his profits. Franchisees are 
in competitive local market conditions as they face 
competition from department stores and other specialists 
like BodyshoP. Franchiseestoosto may be relatively fixed 
over likely sales ranges. The franchisor can be confident 
193 
that they will sell all that they can at or below prices 
that he recommends. The franchisor benefits from the 
local entrepreneurship of franchisees who have personal 
wealth committed to their businesses. 
Head lease arrangements operate an a service to 
franchisees who are not obliged to use them. Rents must 
be passed on at cost. If a franchisee makes use of the 
arrangement he may incidentally give the franchisee the 
power to render all building and decorating costs 
completely sunk into the business: if the franchisee were 
to leave he might be prevented from adapting theme to 
other uses. However the franchise fee, furnishings and 
decor which are specific to the brand, and professional 
fees represent heavy sunk costs anyway. The franchisee 
may not worry about sinking further costs providing there 
are benefits to him from doing so. 
Franchisees benefit mainly from the brand name itself 























Appendix Q Yves Rocher set-up costI3 (1,9 000) 
Franchise fee 7.5 
(design, plans, 
training and launch) 
Building and decorating 30 
(Shopfitting, lighting, 
services provision) 
Furnishing and decor is 
(Yves Rocher units, 
signs and salon equipment) 
Legal fees 




Case R Austin Rover GrouD 
The franchisor 
1. Background 
Austin Rover Group Limited in the car-making division 
of Rover Group Limited. Freight Rover and L&ndrover are 
the other main divisions which specialise in commercial 
vans and four-wheel-drive vehicles. Austin Rover (AR) in 
the descendant of the British Leyland Motor Corporation 
which was formed in the 1960a from the merger of Leyland 
Cars and British Motor Holdings. These companies in turn 
were an amalgamation of traditional British makes: 
principallly Rover, Jaguar, Riley and Austin-Morris. A 
system of franchised car dealerships goes back to just 
after the first world war through the history of these 
makes. There are approximately 900 dealers in the AR 
network. 
In the 1970a British Leyland ran into financial 
difficulties and began to receive public subsidies with 
the UK Government becoming the principal shareholder. In 
1986, Jaguar was returned to private ownership. Over the 
course of the early 1980s many brand names were dropped. 
The result in that the current model range consists of 
Austin, Rover and MG cars. The company received poor 
publicity in the 1970s and early 1980x concerning poor 
product quality but in now confident that the slimmed-down 
model ranger covering executive# family and sporting 
saloons overcomes old. problens. AR in a major British oar 
producer with around 18% of the UK new-car market. 
Car dealerships are typically regarded as a separate 
form of franchising. AR9 in common with other car maker*, 
does not belong to the British Franchise, Ass(miation. 
Instead, it belongs to the Society of Motor Manufacturers 
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and Traders. There is a dealers' association which acts 
as a franchisees' association. 
Nature of the franchise 
AR does not claim to provide a full business-format 
franchise for dealers. However, procedures covering most 
aspects of sales, administration and operations are 
detailed by the franchisor in manuals. In many ways it in 
difficult to detect much difference between this and the 
franchise manuals offered by acknowledged full business- 
format franchises. A significant difference in that AR 
does not claim to be able to take an inexperienced 
businessman and provide a total support package; instead 
trade experience is expected. Also, some aspects of the 
business are not covered such an used-car trading 
activities. 
I interviewed Mr. Keith Field, AR's Scottish Area 
Dealership Manager at the company's regional headquarters 
in Glasgow- He believes that a franohisee's principal 
obligations are to exercise local entrepreneurship, to 
remain loyal to AR, and to achieve high standards or 
operation. In returnt AR must provide cars that will 
sello give full marketing support and provide back up over 
most of a dealer's activities. 
A dealer trades under the AR brand name in now and 
used cars. He provides service facilities and stocks 
parts. The used car part of his business in not subject 
to controls from AR. : According to Mr. Field, an 
exclusivity Policy is followed so that# with very few 
minor exceptions, a dealer only has the An name on his 
site. Multiple franchises are not encouraged where this 
would lead to a dealer controlling a number of contiguous 
sales areas. Dealers may have other brands on sites with 
which AR has no connection. 
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The dealer makes a brand-specific investment in 
signs, tools and service facilities. He does not take his 
lease through AR so that promises could easily be adapted 
to other retail car-sales usese No professional- 
limitation clause operates in his Agreement, so he could 
always trade on his local goodwill if he left the AR 
network. The franchisor has discretion over whether to 
buy back specific assets like signs and tools if the 
dealer leaves; but a good second-hand market exists in 
most of these items anyway. Whilst it in not possible to 
be precise here due to a lack of data on start-up costaq 
it is likely that only a small part of any initial 
investment is sunk expenditure for a dealer. 
AR provides a stock franchising system for 
franchiseest who must maintain vehicle stocks based on a 
12-month moving average of their sales performance. The 
system is known as Wholesale Vehicle Finance (WVF). The 
moving-average annual number of vehicles sold minus fleet 
sales and demonstration cars in multiplied by a weighted 
average of vehicle prices to arrive at a total sales 
value. This in multiplied by 11% to provide the stock 
base for a dealer approximately equal to one and a half 
months' cover of sales. The dealer then Pays variable 
interest charges on the stock base each month. The system 
is open to all distributors and main dealers, and to 
retail dealers who are judged financially sound by AR. 
Distributors are large dealers who also supply cars 
to smaller retail dealers located in their sales 
territory. The -distributor receives a handling charge 
from AR for this service. Main dealers are larger dealers 
without distribution responsibilities. Other than this 
det&ilv all dealers are on broadly similar contracts. 
Distributors also supply parts to main dealers. 
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Actual vehicle stocks do not depend on the charges 
levied by WVF for a particular dealer. Distributors, main 
dealers and retail dealers regarded an financially sound 
may order any stocks subject to vehicle availability and 
may hold them for 180 days without penalty. Thereafter 
they must return them to AR or purchase then at the 
wholesale price plus car tax and VAT. Smaller retail 
dealers have stock limits placed on then related to sales- 
targets. WVF charges are discounted by &mounts related to 
the achievement of annual sales objectives. Dealers make 
their own financial arrangements to cover stocks of parts 
which they keep. 
AR provides training for dealers and their staff 
covering sales, operating and administrative systems. 
Dealers pay their own travel and subsistence costs on 
this. 
The AR franchise system is illustrated in Figure R 
where arrowheads show the direction of sales. The 
dealers' contracts limit their freedom to choose whether 
to supply any particular customer. Dealers may always 
elect not to use WVF if they wish instead to place 
deposits on vehicles ordered equal to the stock base 
described above. Distributors administer WVF charges 
, applying to retail dealers. 
It may seem that there. in little dif f erence between a 
system in which a dealer places a deposit covering one and 
a half months' stocks with the manufacturer and one where 
he Pays interest on the same amount. In both cases he 
jaunt tie up the same assets either to pay the deposit or 
to generate funds to pay the interest. However# the WVF 
system means that the assets are tied up elsewhere and are 
not locked in with the maker. The system was adopted in 
1981 after pressure from dealers who were worried about 
the financial soundness of what was then British Leyland. 
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The interest-based WVF scheme means that large deposits 
are not vulnerable to manufacturer failure. 
3. The contract 
3(j) Agreements 
AR uses a number of Agreements with dealers. These 
are straightforward and do not attempt to exhort the 
franchisee to practise good standards an in the case with 
full business-format franchising. A similar basic Dealer 
Agreement is used with distributors, main dealers and 
retail dealers with differences affecting areas where the 
distributor has a relationship with retail dealers. These 
aspects are the administration of WVF and stock delivery 
which have been discussed above. In addition to the basic 
Agreement there are separate Finance Agreements, Sale or 
Return Agreements and Minimum Standards Agreements 
covering each type of dealership. 
The Finance Agreement covers WVF, which has been 
discussed. Sale or Return Agreements specify that dealers 
have 180 days in which to sell care or else they must 
return or purchase then. Minimum Standards Agreements 
cover the parts stock, garage facilities and other 
detailso such as demonstration fleet, which each type or 
dealer must provide. This section concentrates on the 
basic Agreement for a main dealer. A copy or this in 
available for inspection should this be required. 
The Agreement Confers the non-exclusive right to 
trade under the brand name in a specified location, for an 
unspecified period of time but subject to two-years notice 
of termination by either party. AIR sets the dealer's 
territory whioh refers to location and marketing, not 
sales. The Agreement runs to 21 pages and 11 principal 
Clauses. 
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It in precise over any area that is covered but does 
not try to deal with all possible eventualities. 
Sales procedures are detailed. Vehicle registration 
procedures must be followed and the customer must be 
provided with relevant vehicle handbooks. Transfers of 
vehicles between dealers must be notified to AR. All 
technical or other information relevant to AR must be kept 
confidential by the dealer. Stock returns must be made at 
the times specified by AR. The dealer will trade 
exclusively in AR cars unless he has written permission to 
the contrary. Sales targets are to be set annually by the 
manufacturer in consultation with the dealer. 
The franchise is not saleable as such. The dealer 
may sell his business but the AR franchise w. ill only be 
transferred to the buyer if he meets AR's approval. This 
differs from similar provisions in business-fornat 
franchise agreements. 
AR may bypass dealers in making retail sales; this 
enables centralised marketing efforts over fleet sales. 
Stocking conventions may be varied from time to tine, and 
the dealer must adapt to the changes. The dealer must 
service vehicles presented to him by owners of the make: 
his freedom to supply in limited here. He must also deal 
with any warranty claim whether or not he sold the vehicle 
to which it refers. Prices are recommended maximum prices 
which the retailer may freely vary. 
The Agreement may be terminated by either party if he 
considers the other to have breached it. He aunt give 
notice of the steps necessary to remedy & breach and 20- 
days to correct matters. If one party becomes insolvent 
then the other may terminate the Agreement by notice 
alone. There is also freedom for either side to terminate 
with 24-months notice of the intention to do so. 
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If AR terminates under the 24-monthe procedure it 
must buy back unsold vehicles and parts, and brand- 
specific equipment. Prices are basically those paid by 
the dealer minus a wear and tear allowance in the case of 
special tools. However, if the dealer exercises his 24- 
months notice period, AR is not obliged to buy back the 
brand-specific investment. This condition acts an a 
deterrent to the franchisee's leaving in that it may be 
more costly for him to sell these assets on his own 
account rather than back to the franchisor. However, a 
completely sunk investment in not created; there are 
alternative markets for these items. If the contract ends 
the dealer must take down AR signs and cease trading an a 
franchisee. 
The franchisor retains the right to create changes in 
the dealer's territory if he is thought to be performing 
poorly and has been notified of required changes which 
have not been made. 
The dealer must cooperate with the manufacturer and 
with other dealers to promote the brand. Any dealer 
advertising material must be approved before it in used by 
AR. 
There are the usual technical clauses: if either 
party fails to exercise a right it in not waived; clauses 
are severable, the dealer cannot act an AR's agent in the 
legal sense of proxy; and the Agreement in governed by 
English law. There in no requirement for compulsory 
arbitration. 
ImiDlicit aspects of the 
_Oontreot 
A number Of imPlicit asPects of the contract between 
AR and its franchisees can be identified. These are 
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business understandings which are supported by the long- 
term value of the relationship to both parties. 
Vehicles are transferred between the manufacturer and 
dealer at prices which broadly allow a 12% to 17% mark up 
on sales according to Mr Field. This amount is qualified 
by rebates on WUF which accrue if a dealer hits his sales 
targets. Sometimes there are special bonuses for 
achieving targets for particular models. These amounts 
are not specified in the Agrement and depend upon the 
franchisor's efforts to make profits subject to giving 
satisfactory returns to dealers. Retention and 
recruitment of franchisees will motivate AR in this area. 
Mr Field states that in practice the exclusivity 
requirement does not apply to small rural retail dealers 
who could not make a living from selling one brand. These 
instances are rare but are not covered in detail in the 
Retail Agreement. In such cases AR values brand 
representation enough to waive the usual requirements. 
Training is not covered in the Agreement. 
Franchisees generally regard this an worth its costs to 
them. They pay travel and subsistence costs whereas the 
franchisor pays for direct costs. The arransement has 
arisen because of its mutual advantage without any need 
for provision in the Agreement. 
3(iii) Enforcement and monitorigg 
Mr Field states that AR "Tries very hard to work to 
the Agreement". Delaers have a tendency to forget it and 
small violations do axise from time to time. Theme occur 
in areas to do with minimum standards or when dealers run 
advertising campaigns outside of their marketing areas. 
AR tries not to be too heavy handed in applying the 
Agreement. Normally exhortation in the starting point in 
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bringing a practice into line. This may be followed by a 
rectification notice in cases where dealers are 
recalcitrant; the notice procedure giving 20 days to 
rectify a fault is a feature of the dealership system. 
Termination is rare: Mr Field could think of only one 
recent case in Scotland where a dealer'-s contract was 
terminated for selling cars which really belonged to AR. 
Dealers report their sales on a weekly basis. This 
is backed by use of the national vehicle registration 
system: all makers obtain details of new car registrations 
from the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Centre at Swansea. 
In addition, field managers are used occasionally to 
observe franchisees across all areas of their activities 
and to advise over any improvements that may be required. 
Mr Field argues that AR is aware of the need to keep 
the franchise system working well from the dealer's point 
of view. There is nothing stopping a dissatisfied dealer 
from leaving except the reorganisation costs which he 
would face and limitations on the availability of other 
franchises. 
An independent review of dealers' financial 
performance is carried out for AR by Intercompany 
Comparisons. Dealers who fall below average performance 
levels are advised of ways to correct matters. 
Participation in the scheme is voluntary. 
Why franchise? 
Mr Field states that AR could not consider selling 
cars through any outlet prepared to deal with them. This 
would lead to difficulties in ensuring that service levels 
were adequate. There would be a temptation to sell care 
cheaply by cutting the full range of support presently 
provided. Dealers would then be unlikely to provide 
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quality showroom facilities, for examplet knowinS that 
customers may use them to obtain information or 
demonstrations and then purchase from cheaper sources. AR 
believes that quality services are worthwhile from the 
point of view of stimulating total demand. The avoidance 
of product-debasement externalities is an argument for 
running either a franchise system or company-owned 
showrooms. 
A second advantage to AR of franchising in that the 
local trading expertise of dealers can be relied on. In 
particular, this refers to their dealings in vehicles 
which are traded in against new cars. A problem in 
handling part exchanges is that used-car values vary 
considerably depending on condition. An employed salesman 
has an incentive to overstate a trade-in value if he 
wishes to sell a new car. This may be controlled if the 
salesman faces consequences if he overtrades. It is 
thought that this is best controlled if he is employed by 
a local businessman whose profits depend on proper 
performance in this area. Also, this local man's 
knowledge may be vital to discerning what a vehicle will 
sell for. Mr Field points out that makers like Renault 
who have tried running their own showrooms have made 
losses on them. 
Mr Field believes that dealers benefit from being 
able to trade under a maker's brand name. Their second- 
hand trading becomes more respectable in the eyes of 
purchasers if combined with a new-car showroom. In 
addition, there are whatever sales are generated in an 
area for new vehicles, parts and service. Many of theme 
sales follow from the maker's national reputation. 
Mr Field reports that AR did try an experiment in 
retailins in 1986. And& ran a 12-car display in one of 
their supermarkets (on the Isle of Dogs in London) along 
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with a service operation carried out on another site. 
This failed after nine months in May 1987. The principal 
reason seems to have been that Asda did not develop the 
car-tradina specialism that traditional dealers appear to 
possess. 
Mr Field also perceives capital-raising advantages to 
franchising. AR is able to concentrate its investments 
where it has relative advantages: in car production and 
distribution. 
5. Fees and returns 
All returns to dealers come from their mark up of 12% 
to 17% on new car sales, their second-hand trading 
profits, and profits on parts, servicing and service- 
station operations. AR makes its profits from the prices 
of transferred tied-in products. A 1% loyalty bonus in 
paid on wholesale prices to dealers who do not attempt to 
bring other brands on to their sites during a year. 
AR may vary transfer prices and WVF scales an means 
of extracting any economic rent &rising at the retail end 
of the business. These are flexible means of doing this. 
Sales targets are set annually for dealers. In 
principle, this enables AR to specify a quota of cars to 
be sold as well as the MaXiMUM price at which this in to 
be done. In the short term at least the practice of 
forcing could occur, where the dealer in made to sell 
beyond his profit-maximising price when this suits AR. In 
practice, this will be constrained by the need to retain 
dealers over the longer-termp unions all makers adopt 
exactly the same practice. 
It is well known that AR has a recent history of long 
making. It is similarly understood within the motor trade 
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that retail margins are very tight indeed on now-car sales 
for all makes. A typical annual profit rate on sales 
could be as low as 2%. Many motor traders went through a 
period of very bad returns between 1980 and 1983. 
The franchisees 
1. Franchisee Rt. _Of 
Scotland 
Ri is the Managing Director of the Scottish division 
of XXXX PIC. In Scotland, in an AR distributor and 
main dealer, selling around 2,000 cars a year, with five 
showrooms. In addition, the XXXX and XXXX businesses 
carry Landrover and Jaguar franchises. This study 
concentrates on the XXXX franchise, which has the motor- 
trade site in xxxx. 
XXXXIs XXXX operation in an AR distributorship with 
full service and parts facilities for retail and motor- 
trade customers. There are XXXX retail dealers attached 
to xxXX who are based in surrounding urban and rural 
districts. There are approximately 50 full-tine employees 
at the XXXX site- Jaguar sales, which used to be based on 
the same premises, have had to moved to a separate 
showroom since Jaguar's privatination. 
R, confirms the structural details of the franchise 
and also is able to clarify aspects of the contract 
between a distributor and AR. He states that whilst, the 
franchise is not a full business-format onep it in 
becoming increasingly well packaged. The dealer in able 
to follow systems laid down by AR in most areas if he so 
wishes. AR pays a discretionary amount towards local TV 
advertising costs an it in keen to encourage dealerw to 
use this medium. TV advertising ia likely to have 
external effects on neighbourins ftanchisees. 
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An implicit aspect of the contract pointed out by Rt 
is that cars are never returned to AR under the Sale or 
Return Agreement. Dealers feel that if they have not sold 
a car at the end of the 180-day stock consignment period 
then they must adopt it or transfer it to another dealer. 
Warranty claims filed by dealers are an area which 
could suffer from fraud, according to R1. In the AR 
system, standard job times are used to ensure diligence in 
carrying out of warranty work. Average error in times are 
subtracted from the entire job card by AR. This 
essentially obliges the dealer to be at least of standard 
efficiency or face some warranty costs himself. 
XXXX takes part in the voluntary Intercompany 
Comparisons performance analyses. R, states that this in 
a beneficial service which helps him to identify areas of 
weakness. Visits from field managers do not have the 
character of monitoring checks but are more like 
opportunities for consultation. AR in not heavy h&nded in 
its interpretation of the Agreement according to Ri. He 
remembers no instance of it being quoted to an XXXX 
dealership. 
The main advantage of belonging to the AR system is 
the right to trade under the brand name. XXXX has a long- 
established link with AR which goes back to the 1920s. R, 
points out that it would take a lot of dissatisfaction 
with the brand to disrupt this an the business in geared 
up to work for it. He seen no possibility anyway for a 
large garage to operate an an independent retailer with 
many brands on site. It comes down to choosing which 
brand and AR has -*a loyalty subject to retail profits 
holding up. 
RI believes that the main advantage which a franchise 
system offers AR, given that control over service levels 
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is requiredt in that local trading skills are used to the 
full. He cannot see how an employee-based system could 
overcwme problems of valuing trade-ins. In particular, he 
knows that has to be careful within well defined 
local dealerships to control salesmen's wishes to achieve 
sales targets by overgenerously pricing part-exchanged 
vehicles. Rt also believes that over the years companies 
like his have become expert at trading and distributing. 
XXXX is a profitable company which has weathered the 
19go to 1983 motor-trade recession well following some 
recent reorganisation. Ri states that forcing in not a 
problem in the trade at present. The maker has built in 
incentives which cause dealers to wish to sell an much as 
possible at or below recommended prices. He does not feel 
that XXXX is forced to sell more than its profit 
maximising output. However, this would not be true 
without incentives like the rebate on WVF charges and 
occasional special promotional payments which accrue when 
sales targets are achieved. In the 1970s and early 1980s 
these payments were not available and traders complained 
of forcing. 
2. Franchisee Ra. XXXX. XXXX 
Rx is a Director or an AR main dealer based in 
xxxx. The business in relatively new having boon started 
in 1979 as a retail dealership in Glasgow. The move was 
made to main-dealer status in 1986 when AR decided to 
offer the area around XXXX to his. This was a change that 
R2 Was pleased to make an he felt that AR*s policy was to 
reduce the retail network to consist only of small country 
garages; in the longer term he believed that his city 
retail set up would not have been required. 
The garage offers a range of now and used oars, 
repair services and a parts service. All now care cone 
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direct from AR and there are about 50 in stock at any one 
time. Annual new-car sales targets aro ourrently around 
300 cars. A minimum parts-stocking agre*nent means that 
2,500 separate lines must be kept on site. The site 
employs 19 people. 
R2 confirms the structural details of the AR 
franchise system reported by Mr. Field. In addition he 
agrees that the franchisor does not regularly quote 
Agreements to him. In general, reward structures are 
designed to ensure that it in in the dealer's interest to 
sell as many cars an are supplied at or below the 
recommended retail price. 
Rs sees his obligations to AR an achieving sales 
targets and maintaining service standards. In return, he 
expects brand development, stock availability and 
marketing support. He comments that the support received 
when moving his dealership was very good and almost 
amounted to the kind of start up help given in full 
business-format franchises. 
Rs takes part in the Intercompany Comparisons 
performance analyses and finds these a useful check on his 
efficiency relative to the rest of the network. He makes 
weekly sales returns. He sees AR field managers about 
once a month and regards their visits as consultative 
rather than monitoring exercises. There are occasional 
disputes within the network; none have affected his and 
usually they are over model availability or sales targets. 
The dealer gains respectability for his used-car 
operations and AR business on parts, service and now sales 
in an area by belonging to the network, 22 fools it in 
not feasible to attempt independent trading in the new-car 
business. It in a question of choosing betwen brands cm 
the basis of returns and the availability of a territory. 
Sol 
The manufacturer benefits from more committed local 
entrepreneurship by using a dealer network, according to 
Ra: "There is a more personalised service due to me having 
my money invested in the business". 
R2 is happy with his profits which are "At least as 
good as the other makes". A few years ago, when AR was in 
difficulties with its model range he thought of exercising 
his option to quit giving two-years notice. He is now 
much happier with the range and no longer has this 
intention. He comments that a dealer would face high 
costs in switching maker. Most makers have exclusivity 
policies and a fairly fixed number of territories. 
Finding a new franchisor may mean also moving location 
which may sacrifice some assets attached to the existing 
site; in particular, it might prove difficult to transfer 
local goodwill elsewhere. 
Forcing is not considered a problem these days due to 
incentive schemes which increase the dealer's profits the 
more he sells. 
3. Franchisee R3, XXXX# Edinburgh 
R3 is Dealer-Principal of XXXX, an AR retail dealer 
located in Edinburgh. 'X= is R3's distributor. XXXX is 
an old family firm which was established in XXXX and which 
first took a franchise with Wolesley in XXXX. There are 
21 employees in this garage which sells around 100 new 
cars a year. About three times an many used cars are also 
sold. 
R3 believes that he has two obligations to AR; he 
must keep to his Agreements and maintain service standards 
equal to the rest of the network. In return, he expects 
new models to be developed at suitable intervals and for 
cars to be delivered on time. He confiras the structural 
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details of the franchise reported by Mr. Field and states 
that the franchisor in not heavy handed in interpreting 
Agreements. 
This dealer prefers to lodge a deposit with 
rather than incur WVF charges on new-car stocks. At any 
one time 35 cars are likely to be stocked. The preference 
for the older method of stock runding may reflect simple 
inertia on the dealer's part. Alternatively he may have 
no worries about lodging capital sums of around 265,000 
with a respectable local firm like R3 gives no 
account or his reasoning. 
Sales returns are made weekly. In addition, Rs 
participates in the Intercompany Comparisons performance 
analyses and finds these useful. He in visited at roughly 
two-month intervals by AR field managers who mainly advise 
over workshop matters. 
R3 feels that the main benefit of being an AR 
franchisee is the respectability which in added to his 
operationst particularly on the used-car side of things. 
His long association with the company "Makes it easier to 
deal with them". He also benefits by being able to obtain 
some specialist tools which would otherwise be hard to 
buy. He believes AR benefits from his local trading 
knowledge. 
A retail dealer like XXXX has no territory as such 
but is located, along with other retail dealers. within 
the marketing territory of the Distributor. Ra complains 
that in his area three dealers are located within a few 
miles of each other. AR would like more of a spread but 
no-one wants to move. Ra would prefer sore leadership in 
these matters. 
*3 03 
Ra confirms that forcing does not occur at present: 
given the incentive structure, it in most profitable for 
him to sell all that he can at prices at or below those 
recommended by AR. This all changed around 1983. He 
feels at the moment that he could be more profitable with 
a different maker and looked at some in the early part of 
1987. 
Summary 
AR uses a franchised dealer network to sell oars with 
associated services like repairs and parts stocking. All 
profits derive from transfer prices on tied-in sales for 
AR. Incentives are carefully chosen to ensure that 
dealers sell all that they can at or below AR's 
recommended prices; the incentives are either special 
rebates or rebates on WVF which are linked to sales 
targets. 
Franchisees who act an distributors, main dealer* or 
retail dealers, receive modest returns in comparison with 
other retail activities on their new-car sales. Howevert 
a dealer's respectability in enhanced by trading under a 
maker's name and this helps his used-car sales and his 
servicing work. It may partly be returns on theme other 
activities which explain dealers$ preferences for taking a 
franchise. 
AR benefits from the local-trading expertise of 
franchised dealers and has a marked preference for 
operating in this manner. At the same time, a franchised 
network enables standards of sales service and repair work 
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Ford Motor COMID&BY Limited 
The Franchisor 
1. Background 
Ford entered the UK market in a major way after 
1950. Franchising policies developed in the 1960s as Ford 
moved towards being the UK's major car producer. Ford in 
organised into five regional divisions: London and the 
South East; the North; the Midlands; the South Went; and 
Scotland and Northern Ireland. The company produces a 
full range of cars and light and medium-sized vans. Truck 
production is not well developed although a recent joint 
venture with IVECO may change this (1986). This case 
study concentrates on Ford's retailing of cars. Ford has 
around 25% of the UK new-car market. 
Ford has a two-tier distribution network of 
franchised dealers. There are 390 main dealers together 
with 350 smaller retail dealers. Main dealers buy cars 
and parts directly from Ford and sell to retail customers; 
they also act as wholesale distributors to any retail 
dealers located within their area of responsibility. Ford 
does not like fractional or multiple franchise 
arrangements and has a policy of not allowing franchisees 
to develop chains of dealerships. Fractional franchises 
very occasionally &rise in remote country districts where 
Ford wishes to be represented but where any one brand 
would not provide an adequate income for a dealer. 
In oonmon with other car makers Ford does not 
belong to the British Franchise Association. Instead it 
in a member of the SooietY of Motor Manufacturers and 
Traders. There is a dealers' association which acts an a 
franchisees' association. 
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2. Nature of the franchise 
A dealer sells now and used vehiclest provides 
service facilities and stocks Ford parts at his site. 
Retail dealers are small country or suburban garage* 
whereas main dealers tend to be located in larger 
population arease Parts are bought outright using 
whatever financial sources are available; in 1986 average 
parts stocks were Z125tOOO a garage. Care are bought on 
sale or return subject to a deposit scheme. 
The Bulk Deposit Scheme (BDS) used by Ford 
requires a main dealer to pay 13% of his 12-month moving 
average sales (minus fleet sales) to Ford. Each month he 
then pays to or receives from Ford a sum which maintains 
this percentage. He may stock up to six times this 
amount. Vehicle consignment periods are for 180 days 
after which they must be either returned to Ford or 
purchased by the dealer. It in intended that oars should 
be sold within this period. If a vehicle in bought by a 
dealer at the end of its consignment period, no adjustment 
is made to the BDS charge. Main dealers administer the 
system for retail dealers. The BDS in not characterized 
by significant vehicle returns or dealer adoptions. Ford 
motor Credito a separate Ford-owned company may be used to 
finance stocks. 
Dealers pay their own local advertising costa 
and pay charges for training which in provided by Ford. 
Sometimes there are subsidies for local advertising. 
Training covers salest administration and workshop matters 
and is provided at loss than market cost# according to Mr 
George Tilleyo Ford's Regional Director for Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. 
Ford does not ain to provide a full taniness- 
format franchise yet it does supply a comprehonsivo 
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package of guidance for dealers* Manuals exist covering 
sales, administration and maintenance procedures. Plenty 
of support and advice is available more or loan free of 
charge. 
Ford does occasionally run its owmýshowroomso 
An area may be under-represented in Ford's wiew: perhaps a 
dealer dies and his business cloves or possibly population 
movements occur. ForA will then invest in a Dealer 
Development Site (MDS). The intention here in to bring a 
site up to commercial viability and then to sell the 
business to a franchisee; the buyer usually moves into the 
DDS as manager and then gradually buys out Ford's interest 
over time. The DDS system demonstrate* Ford's preference 
for running its retail system through "Owner-driver 
franchisees", as Mr Tilley puts it. 
The Ford retail network in illustrated in Fisure 8 
where arrowheads show the direction of sales flown. 
Dealers must provide parts and maintenance services for 
Ford vehicles, so their freedom to choose whether or not 
to supply any particular customer in constrained. 
3. The Contract 
Agreements 
Ford uses a Sale or Return Agreement and a Dealer 
Agreement with its franchisees. Versions exist for both 
retail and main dealers. The Sale or Return Agreement 
covers the BDB which in described above. This section 
gives a brief outline of the principal clauses, of the Main 
Dealer Agreement (henceforth 'the Agreement'). A copy of 
this is available for inspection should this be required. 
The dekaler agrees to purchase vehicles &" parts for 
sale in his Dealer Area of Responsibility (DAR). The DAR 
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may contain retail dealers for whom the main dealer taken 
wholesaling responsibilities. The DAR in defined an a 
marketing area: the dealer must not advertise outside of 
it but may sell cars to customers regardless of their 
location. The dealer accepts annual sales targets which 
are to be agreed with Ford at the start of each year. The 
Agreement is of open term but in subject to two-years 
notice of termination from either party at will. 
The Agreement requires the dealer to promote 
vigorously the sale of vehicles and parts. In setting 
sales targets, Ford may use its sales forecasts for the 
DAR. The dealer must employ trained service staff and 
must keep service equipment and parts stocks which are 
agreed with Ford from time to time. Ford will advertise 
nationally at its discretion. The dealer undertaken to 
subject his own advertising to approval by Ford. He also 
agrees to keep a fleet of demonstration vehicles specified 
by Ford for his franchise. 
The dealer undertaken to train his staff using Ford's 
training materials. He also agrees to operate Ford's 
warranty system in his DAR. Unless Ford given permission 
to the contrary, no competing products may be sold by the 
dealer in his DAR. No more than rive DARa may be operated 
by one dealer (under separate Agreements) and none of 
these may be contiguous areas. 
The Ford Agreement contains clauses which exhort the 
franchisee to do his beat an in the case of the ones 
covering sales which are quoted above. 
Ford may terminate the Agreement with immediate 
effect if the dealer acts fraudulentlyt becomes insolvent, 
dies or becomes incapacitated, or changes the ownership of 
his business without consent. In all other cases of 
contractual breach by the dealer, at least 90-days notice 
301 
must be given during which time he has the right to 
rectif3r the complaint. 
The dealer may terminate the Agreement with immediate 
effect if Ford becomes insolvent or persists in any 
contractual breach after a warning has been given. if 
Ford rails to provide spare partst technical services or 
vehicles in a manner which prevents the dealer from 
meeting his agreed sales objectives, or rails to pay 
monies owed to the dealer, and notice in writing has been 
given by the dealer twice within a 12-month period, then 
the dealer may also terminate the Agreement. 
Should the Agreement be terminated, the dealer aunt 
pay all debts to Ford and cease trading under the maker's 
name. He must stop dealing in Ford products at the site. 
Ford may choose to buy back equipment specific to the sake 
along with unused stocks of vehicles and parts. There is 
nothing compulsory about this purchase so that Ford could 
leave a dealer with the task of disposing of such items on 
second-hand or similar markets. If parts and vehicles are 
repurchased it is at current list prices; vehicles are 
unlikely to be owned by the dealer. Disputes over the 
valuation of equipment are to be settled by an independent 
valuer selected by Ford and the dealer. There are second- 
hand markets for these items so there in a limit to the 
amount of a dealer's initial investment that could be made 
sunk by this means. 
The dealership may not be sold by the disaler. He nay 
sell his business but Ford in free to choose whether or 
not to accept the purchaser an a franchisee. 
The price list published by Ford in to be interpreted 
an recording maximum prices for the dealerse sales. If 
more is charged then damages must be paid to Ford. These 
amount to one-half or the price Of & v*hiol* or three 
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times the price of a part sold above the reooýended 
prices. A further penalty clause fines the dealer 9500 
for exhibiting vehicles, and 1100 for exhibiting parts, 
outside of his DAR. 
Any disputes &rising from the Agreement are to be 
settled by compulsory arbitration. The arbitrator may be 
appointed by the mutual consent of the dealer and Ford. 
If they cannot agree then the President of the Law Society 
appoints an arbitrator in England. In Scotland, the 
Arbitration Act of 1894 may be followed to appoint an 
arbitrator. In England, the Agreement in governed by 
English law. Agreements which are signed in Scotland are 
governed by Scottish law. 
There are a number of 
of any right does not coi 
party; the dealer is not 
olauses are severable. 
straightforward and does 
eventuality. 
technical clauses: non-exercise 
astitute its waiver by either 
legally the agent of Ford; and 
The Agreement is relatively 
not attempt to cover every 
IM12licit "llects Of the contract 
A number of business understandings have grown up in 
Ford's franchise system. These rely on the long-tern 
value of the franchise relationship to one or both parties 
for their support and may be regarded an implicit aspects 
of the contract. 
It is understood that the return option of the Sale 
or Return Agreenent in rarely exercised by dealers. If 
they do not sell a vehicle within its 180-day consisment, 
period, it is either adopted at the dealership or 
transferred to another dealer who is looking for such a 
model. So states that he has never known the return 
option to be exercised. Dealers go along with this rather 
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than disrupt smooth relations with Ford. The implication 
of a return is that a sale has not occurred for the maker 
and Ford does not want this. 
Items like the minimum parts stock, service 
provision, the stock of vehicles and levels of dealer 
advertising are incompletely specified in the Agreement. 
These levels must satisfy Ford's market strategy subject 
to leaving the dealer at least the return he could make 
elsewhere on his assets. Otherwise franchisees would not 
be retained in the longer run. Ford's level of national 
advertising is not specified either; this must be adequate 
to reassure dealers that the oars will sell, which in a 
result that Ford will anyway wish to achieve. 
Prices are augmented with bonus schemes for the 
dealers from time-to-time. Exact pricing details of this 
kind are not specified in the Agreement. The strategy 
chosen must leave dealers with at least normal returns or 
else they will not be retained in the long run. 
3(iii) Enforcement and-monitoring 
Mr Tilley states that Ford does not enforce 
Agreements in an heavy-handed manner. Agreements are only 
occasionally quoted over serious infringements such an 
advertising outside of a DAR. Ford aims to build up a 
good management relationship with dealers and relies on 
this in conjunction with dealer loyalty to run the retail 
network. 
Sales figures are reported by dealers at least 
weekly. Tied-in sales act an an automatic check on theme 
an does the national registration of vehicles at Swansea. 
Registrations are reported to the SMMT and thence to 
manufacturers as a matter of course. The relevant 
monitoring for Ford in of standards of service and of 
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brand loyalty. Occasionally visits by field managers 
during which advice is given to dealers act an a check on 
standards and on any bootlegging. 
A system of voluntary reporting by dealers of their 
business performance, the Business Management Return, in 
operated by Ford. Participating dealers receive a 
comparison between their figures and relevant averages. 
Generally, the network runs smoothly, according to Mr 
Tilley. He known of no terminations of any Agreements. 
just occasionally a dealer "Has his knuckles rapped" by 
Ford over territorial incursions or perhaps use of non- 
Ford parts. Mr Tilley believes that Ford is good at 
maintaining incentives so that the dealer network wishes 
to fit in with the maker's plans. 
4 Wh-y franchise? 
Mr Tilley believes that Ford keeps its brand image an 
it wishes and maintains service levels by franchising its 
dealer network. There in no intention of moving away from 
the owner-driver model Of & family owned dealership an an 
ideal although the matter has been reviewed several tines. 
In particular, he believes that an alternative like 
selling through supermarket chains would cause a reduction 
in the model range which would be stocked and that this 
would be detrimental to overall sales. 
The limited size of most dealers* businesses means 
that garages become speoialised in their local markets. 
This has important consequences for Ford. Mr Tilley 
states "Ford is good at marketingg logistics and 
production. We don't sell oars; that's the dealer's job". 
Ford draws on local entrepreneurship in two main sx, oam: 
trade-ins are valued and sold at proper market prioomp and 
local demand can be better aaseemed. Ford's production is 
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adaptable through model variations to local market 
conditions. Local men use their knowledge to order their 
stocks allowing production to be better Seared to demand. 
Mr Tilley believes that franchised dealers have a lot at 
stake giving then an incentive to get their trading right. 
Mr Tilley believes that franchisees benefit from the 
brand strength of Ford. The returns on now-car sales, 
parts and servicing are in themselves valued by dealers. 
In addition, their used-oar trading in made more 
respectable because they trade under the Ford sign. 
5 Fees and returns 
Ford levies no initial lump-sum franchise fee nor any 
sales royalty. All makerss profits come from the transfer 
prices of vehicles and parts. These may be varied to 
alter the distribution of any econonio rent &rising at the 
retail end of the business. Ford in a major UK comp"y 
and is currently profitable. 
Mr Tilley reports that Ford has a definite view of 
the desirable level of profitability for dealers. Prices 
are regarded an market determined. Wholesale transfer 
prices &in to give & 17% gross margin to dealers. When a 
dealership in opened, it is expected to yield at least a 
26% return on investment (profit per unit of original 
capital employed). The Business Management Return in used 
to check the performance of different types of franchises. 
Too low a return leads to worries that dealers will leave 
the network. Sales bonuses to dealers say be used to help 
dealer financial performance. 
Current dealers' returns are not particularly good, 
according to Mr Tilley, but they are improving. 
'? 1* 
The Franchisees 
1. Franchisee Si. Edinburgh 
S, is the Managing Director of Limited, an 
Edinburgh-based Ford main dealer. The company in owned by 
its parentr XXXY, and was founded in 1900 as a bicycle 
dealer. XXXX began an a Ford franchisee in the late 
1940s. 100 staff are employed at the Edinburgh business 
which sells around 1,400 new cars and vans each year. In 
addition, used cars are sold, a full service facility in 
offered, parts are stocked, and a oar hire business runs 
on the Edinburgh site. Three retail dealers are supplied 
by II 
S, sees his obligations an "very wide". The dealer's 
job is to provide the service levels expected of a ajaor 
car maker and to achieve sales targets which are set each 
year. In return, Si expects a full back-up service from 
Ford in areas like marketing and technical training. He 
also expects poor quality dealers to be brought up to 
standard by Ford to prevent erosion of the brand image. 
This dealer confirms the structural details of the 
franchise system reported by Mr Tilley. In addition, Sl 
in able to olarify some aspect& of the contract. He uses 
Ford Motor Credit to finance his BDS charges but points 
out that he in free to use any finance sourc* that he 
wishes in this area. Training in paid for by XXXX (at 
below market rates) but grants are available from the Road 
Transport Industry Training Board to which dealers pay a 
levy. Local advertising is left to St 'a discretion 
without attempted interference. 
S, states that Ford in a strict intorpret*r of the 
written Agreements. It is "Not advisable for & franchises 
to bend the rules". Persistent poor porformano, ep for 
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example in meeting sales objectives, leads to a Ford 
survey and improvement plan. The dealer is then given a 
lot of support for a period at the end of which 
termination would occur if improvement was not obvious. 
However, S1 agrees with Mr Tilley that termination* are 
rare. Also, he does not experience regular quotation of 
his Agreements. The main implicit contractual aspect 
recognized by Si in the understanding that vehicles are 
not returned. 
Disputes occasionally arise in the dealer network. 
From time to time there have been accusations of forcing 
levelled at Ford by dealers. However it in now the case 
that incentive structures, with sales bonuses, imply that 
the dealer increases his prof its by niaximining his sales. 
Sometimes dealers try to use non-Ford parts and are 
disciplined by Ford. The general pattern in that disputes 
are settled if they are general in their effect following 
discussions between Ford and the dealer association. 
Specific problems with one dealer are normally 
successfully controlled by exhortation from Ford. 
S, believes that the main advantage of belonging to 
the Ford network in the ability to trade under the brand 
name. The product is strong in the UK market having a 
reputation for good design and easy servicing. Bales are 
good and are backed by excellent central marketing 
undertaken by Ford. Another advantage to Laidlaw in the 
increase in respectability conferred on used oar trading. 
Higher prices can be charged for used oars when a buyer 
feels assured about the quality of his purchase. 
Ford benefits from XXXXIs local market knowledge, 
according to Si. He suggests that "Ford are in a 
different business; they make cars! ". The arrangements 
are seen as very convenient to Ford who can concentrate on 
manufacture without needing to develop retailinS skills. 
D& 
YY is a profitable dealership although return on 
sales is no higher than the industry average at around 2% 
(operating profit an a percentage of sales turnover). 81 
is committed to the Ford network and has no intention of 
seeking other franchises. 
Franchisee Sap Edinburgh 
S2 is Managing Director of 
a subsidiary of XXX - xxx: 
association with Ford. In 
XXXX for sale in Scotland. The 
sub-agents who grew to become 
right in time. Presently, 
Edinburgh; XXXX; XXXX; and 
concentrates on Edinburgh. 
of Edinbursh Limited, 
X has a lons history of 
1908, Ford supplied cars to 
company appointed numerous 
main dealers in their own 
has four main dealerships: 
XXXX. This case study 
XXXX offers a full range of dealer facilities: sales 
of new and used cars; servicing; and parts stocking. 
Approximately 80 staff are employed across the range of 
activities- Current new-car sales targets are 1t500 units 
a year. There is no responsibility for retail dealers. 
Sa believes that his principal obligation to Ford in 
to provide a quality local sales and service operation 
whilat achieving sales targets. In return, he expects 
support from Ford over the marketing and development of 
the product. National advertising should create 
continuing brand awareness among consumers. The product 
should remain oomPetitive, in every way with those of major 
competitors. 
This dealer confirms the structural details of the 
Ford franchise system reported by Mr Tilley. Ford given 
good sales, operations and administrative support and 
advice. Sa does not use Ford Motor Credit to fund his BDS 
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charges but uses an independent credit company; Ford has 
no objection to this. He is able to clarify aspects of 
the contract, viewed from a dealer's Ford 
require a dealer to submit his building and location plans 
for approval at the start of a venture; this appears to be 
an implicit aspect of the contract. S2 recoanises that 
the return option of the Sale or Return Agreement does not 
really apply. He also expects that Ford should not be too 
heavy handed in interpreting Agreements. 
So reports that Ford generally lives up to his 
expectations. There is no continual citing of Agreements 
in his dealings with Ford. Rather, "Ford shown a big- 
brother attitude". If practices occur which Ford wishes 
to change it generally proceeds by exhortation. So states 
that it is important that dealers think they can trust 
Ford: it is always open to Ford to invoke contractual 
breaches to terminate an Agreement if it so wishes. Ford 
has no history of that kind of behaviour. 
XXXX participates in the Business Management Return 
and finds feedback from this useful. Sales are reported 
weekly and automatically reinforced by registrations at 
Swansea in the case of vehicles. Ford managers visit the 
dealership roughly every month in an advisory capacity; 
this also acts as a monitoring device. If deficiencies 
are identified, Ford sometimes identifies key personnel 
whose performance must be improved. 
St is aware of some disputes in the dealer network. 
These normally arise over the use of non-Ford parts, 
bootlegging of cars or advertising outside of the DAR. A 
dealer bootlegs if he sells an unauthorised make or sells 
through jan pproved channels. Ford does not use 
arbitration to settle such issues: the typical use of 
exhortation in normally a sufficient control. 
31S 
The main benefit of being a franchisee is the ability 
to trade under the brand name, according to Sa. The brand 
is currently strong in the market and generates plenty of 
sales and service work. St agrees with St that the Ford 
name helps used car sales to be more respectable. In 
return, St believes offers local trading expertise 
which Ford would not otherwise possess. 
X= is a profitable dealership in Edinburgh, 
although returns are around the average of 2% return on 
sales (operating profit as a percentage of sales 
turnover). There is no intention of seeking alternative 
franchises. 
3. Franchisee S3 
Ss is Dealer-Principal of , which is a Dealer 
Development Scheme (DDS) garage in the process of moving 
from Ford's ownership. He is also X in Scotland. XXXY 
has been a problem area for Ford; the dealership was run 
down prior to 1981t when S3 took over under the DDS. Ford 
bought the dealership and recruited Ss who had been 
working an a sales manager for a Ford dealer. Over the 
following six years, profits accruing to Mr. Inglis have 
been used under the Scheme to buy out Ford's interest in 
the business. This process is now complete (1987). 
acts as a main dealership with responsibility 
for one retail dealer in 0A full range of service 
facilities are offered alongside new-car and used-car 
sales. Around 800 new Ford& are sold each year. 55 staff 
are employed. 
S3 sees his obligations to Ford as maintaining 
standards at least equivalent to those elsewhere in the 
network and meeting his sales targets. In return, he 
expects "comprehensive support" covering sales, operations 
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and administration. Ford has performed well for him 
particularly as he has been on the DDS. He confirms the 
" tructural details of the dealer system reported by Mr 
Tilley and can clarify the operation of the DDS. 
During the period of operation of the DDS, Ford 
management sat on S3's board of directors. Also, audits 
were taken of sales and service activities every three 
months; these would normally occur every three years for a 
regular dealer. Advice was always available from DDS 
personnel of Ford. S3 did not find Ford to be continually 
quoting his Agreements during this period. Rather a 
management relationship was built up which allowed him 
increasing independence as the six years progressed. 
S3 confirms that the main benefit of being a 
franchisee is the market strength of the Ford brand name. 
He believes that his sales and service receipts are higher 
than would be the case with any other make in his 
locality. He also states that his used-car trading is 
made more respectable by the Ford sign over the site. 
Ford benefits from his local trading knowledge which has 
developed over recent years. S3 believes that he has 
every incentive to use this as his business future is tied 
up in the business: "Ford must value this or they would 
not operate the Scheme". 
Returns are not yet good on the XXXX site, according 
to S3. The business receives support from Ford. S3 in 
committed to his business as it is planned and does not 
contemplate moving franchises. 
4. Franchisee S4, Ford retail dealer 
S, & became a Ford retail dealer in 1985 having 
previouslY worked an a mechanic and then an a garage 
manager. When he bought his garage, which in sited Just 
outside , he succeeded 
with which its previous ow 
sales targets of around 40 
50 used cars each year 
operations on the site. 
employed* 
3* 20 
in retaining the Ford franchise 
mer had been associated. He has 
new cars a year, sells at least 
and runs service and parts 
A total of 14 people are 
S4 sees his obligations to Ford as meeting his 
targets and providing an high quality service operation in 
his area. In return, he expects a full back-up from Ford, 
particularly over technical matters and in terms of rapid 
parts supply. His principal benefit from being a dealer 
is the volume of service business which he obtains, 
particularly where this is attached to company and fleet 
cars. He states that little profit arises on his new-car 
dealing and that he has difficulty meeting targets. His 
used-car operations are small and he cannot say whether 
they benefit from their location on a franchised site. He 
describes support on the serv-ice and parts side an 
"excellent". 
A XXXX garage, 9 is S4'S main dealer. XXXX is 
responsible for supplying parts and vehicles to S4* The 
main dealer is also the first point of contact over 
technical matters. 
S4 reports that he has been in dispute with Ford. 
Ford have complained that he has not met his sales targets 
on new cars and threatened to remove his franchise. In 
1987, S4 actually sold some new cars at a loss to himself 
to ensure that he retained his franchise. This was 
because of the benefits that he perceives on the servicing 
side of his business. 
A retail dealer's coýitnent to the Ford network is 
explained by the sales revenue which the brand name 
generates, according to S4. Specialized tools and parts 
are another fact, 
If he were to 
terminated, he 
costs. Much of 
business. 
321 
Dr. He has around 212,000 worth of these. 
move franchise, or had his Agreement 
would recoup only one-quarter of these 
his personal wealth is sunk into the 
S4's business is a busy small garage on the main 
Cambridge to Oxford route. He is very much the Ford model 
franchisee in being personally involved in the running of 
the garage and showrooms. 
Summary 
Ford uses a two-tier system of franchises to 
distribute its products whilst providing a full service 
back up for the customer. No lump-sum franchise fees or 
sales royalties are charged by Ford whose profits accrue 
from the wholesale prices of products. Ford has a 
preference for a franchised dealer network and even 
subsidises the establishment of dealers in poorly 
represented areas through a Dealer Development Scheme. 
Ford benefits from the local trading skills of 
franchisees, which would be difficult to replicate in a 
fully integrated network. Compared with open sales to 
retailers, franchise restrictions preserve service 
facilities. Dealers benefit from trading under the Ford 
nazi6; these benefits include the respectability that a 
maker's name confers on used-car sales. 
This franchise system relies largely on using 
financial reward structures for franchisees to keep their 
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